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Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Tue Sep 13, 2011 5:57 pm

Troubled Waters: The Rough Side of Real Estate Investing in Alberta
Posted By Gunnar On May 1, 2011 @ 12:20 am In Real Estate | 33 Comments

by Joni MacFarlane

Bridgecreek raised millions of dollars through exemptions filed with the ASC, which allowed Bradley and Becker to raise capital with little to no requirement for disclosure.


When property developers Bill Bradley and Colin Becker arrived in Crowsnest Pass, the business partners declared that their company, Bridgegate Development Corp., which later became known as Bridgecreek, would turn the area into a Rocky Mountain resort destination.

In the mountainous corner of southwestern Alberta, Bridgecreek proposed two developments. Both were billed as luxurious and every bit as sophisticated as Canmore and Fernie. Bradley called it one of the most exciting projects of his life. “It’s going to be so phenomenal, not only for the Crowsnest Pass, but for the whole world,” he told local media.

The community didn’t realize Bridgecreek had already started another real estate development project that was left unfinished in Canmore. The municipality let Bridgecreek start laying the groundwork for construction.

Today the only evidence of development is a few rusting earthmovers in a field of weeds along a stretch of coal-scarred land. That sad tableau of a development that never was still serves as an all-too-visible reminder to area residents of the dreams they once had and to angry investors of the millions of dollars they’re still waiting
to collect.

The future looked bright in 2005 when Bridgecreek presented Crowsnest Pass municipal council with a proposal for a 27-acre project on Crowsnest Lake. Dubbed Bridgegate Resort Village, it got rave reviews from municipal council and residents eager for a long-awaited economic boom.

The first phase was slated for early 2007 and grew to include a luxury hotel with a conference centre, condos, an indoor aquatic and fitness centre and a 5,000-seat indoor skating rink. Initial plans included a marina on Crowsnest Lake, which locals say is too cold and windy for water sports or boating. The total price tag for all amenities raised the projected costs to $1.8 billion.

According to an offering memorandum from subsidiary company Bridgegate Financial Corp. dated January 2006, the appraised value of the land was $19.1 million, based on direct comparisons with destination resort sites such as Invermere and Canmore. A source close to the story said Bridgecreek paid just $1.5 million. The land was rezoned and the area structure plan and subdivision gained municipal approval.

A Bridgecreek press release said the 2006 offering memorandum would raise $50 million for land servicing. Investors would have a chance to achieve returns of 8.25 per cent over a five-year term, plus 25 per cent equity participation for a minimum $10,000 RRSP-eligible investment.

In addition to the $1.5 million paid for the land, Bradley said the company invested more than $900,000 in 2006 in third-party costs that included planning and infrastructure studies. Bradley told the Calgary Herald in June of 2006 that Bridgecreek was offering full or fractional ownership in order to open the property up to everyone. “Initially, we’re going to focus on Albertans and people from Saskatchewan, but eventually the market will expand to [become] an international destination attraction.”

Four months later, Bridgecreek bought a 52-acre stretch of land sandwiched between Highway 3 and the Crowsnest River for $1.8 million. This second acquisition gave Bridgecreek two desirable pieces of municipal real estate: one nestled on the shores of the nearby Crowsnest Lake; the other, right in the middle of town.

It, too, was appraised at Canmore prices and valued at more than $14 million. Plans for this second property, River Run, included a resort hotel with pool and conference centre, retail shops, mid- and low-density residential housing, commercial properties and, eventually, seniors’ housing. Again the land was rezoned and again council approved an area structure plan.

A multi-stage development agreement from July 2007 called for a deposit of $10.3 million to be held as surety from the developer for construction and installation of municipal improvements such as water and sewer systems. But no cheque was ever cut.

The municipality was supposed to receive legal protection in the form of a letter of credit, certified cheque, promissory note or other form of security from the developer. Typically, this is usually collected once a development agreement is signed and before building begins. But the policy was flexible in terms of what was allowed on the land before receiving payment. In Bridgecreek’s case, earthwork proceeded for many months but the municipality never collected a deposit, a move some councillors came to regret.

Meanwhile, money poured in for the Bridgecreek proposal from investors around the world. A marketing campaign included the opening of an investment office in Amsterdam to attract European investors. Then-mayor Dr. John Irwin was featured in a promotional video touting the project, and one councillor, Gary Taje, went on the company’s payroll, although he excused himself from council discussions and votes on the issue. At that time, the municipality had no formal conflict-of-interest policies for elected officials.

An attractive sales centre was built on the site of an old glass shop in Blairmore and was to feature model suites, maps and scale displays of what the developments would look like.

The marketing pitch was polished, with Bradley stressing that Crowsnest Pass was the last community to reinvent itself in Alberta’s Rockies. In early 2007, Bradley said the company had raised close to $20 million in investments over the past year. A waiting list held more than 1,400 buyers for the lake project, and another 1,000 were waiting for the River Run project. A development permit application that would list a value in excess of $300 million was close to being filed, he said.

“There is a huge pent-up demand for the Crowsnest Pass,” Bradley said at the time. “The [overall] Crowsnest Lake development will be the largest mountain resort in the whole world – three times bigger than Banff Springs.” But to date, nothing has been built on either property. Neither Bradley nor Becker was available for comment on the Bridgecreek developments.

During the marketing effort, Bridgecreek installed itself in downtown Calgary digs, though Bradley and Becker were often seen in “the Pass” driving around and dining in local eateries. Not much was known about the developers, but Bradley and Becker soon became familiar in the area, cutting high-profile figures in a rural municipality more comfortable with hiking boots and flannel than power suits.

As investment dollars continued to flow in, so too did the expenses. Bradley said at the time that Bridgecreek spent half a million dollars on design consultants. Neither site has seen a contractor or construction crew, but the development team insisted construction was just around the corner. In June 2008, Bridgecreek project manager Cameron Gillies told a local newspaper that while it may not have appeared that much was happening, a lot of activity was going on behind the scenes. “We are doing it the logical and rational way,” said Gillies, adding that in large-scale projects of this nature, the wheels tend to move slowly. River Run, he said, was actually ahead of schedule.

n October 2008, Bradley said Bridgecreek had invested more than $22 million in the Crowsnest properties, but didn’t specify where or how the money was spent. Nothing ever happened at the lake project and the only hint that any activity had taken place at the River Run site was the abandoned earthmovers that sat idle on it. Bridgecreek blamed the recession.

At the time, neither Bradley nor Becker was required to be registered with the Alberta Securities Commission. Bridgecreek raised millions of dollars through exemptions filed with the ASC, which allowed Bradley and Becker to raise capital with little to no requirement for disclosure. In June 2008, the B.C. Securities Commission issued a cease-trade order for Bridgegate Mortgage Corp. – another Bradley and Becker company that raised money for the Crowsnest Pass properties. After only nine months, the company had defaulted on interest payments to investors, claiming that there was no money left for the project.

A paralegal at Dutch law firm Bartels Advocaten, which specializes in investment fraud, confirmed that it was contacted by Dutch bondholders of the River Run project. The bondholders, who invested about $9.5 million, stopped receiving interest payments in early 2009 and were left wondering where their money had gone. By mid-2009, Bridgecreek closed its Calgary office amid rumours of financial difficulty.


Crowsnest Cross-Up

There were at least six separate groups with investments in the River Run project. Critics claim the creation of multiple companies under the Bridgecreek umbrella was a strategy used to create confusion, as investors were unable to track where their dollars were spent.

Cameron Ross, a Calgary real estate developer, says he’s not surprised that Bridgecreek hasn’t produced any bricks-and-mortar results. Ross says he and another partner had a brief business association with Bradley and Becker 20 years ago, one that ended up with considerable losses. “[They] may try to blame the downturn in the economy for Bridgecreek’s demise, but if nothing gets built it is really immaterial what the market is doing.
“It appears that a lot of money was raised from Bridgecreek investors with little or nothing to show for it today.”

At a special shareholders’ meeting held in January 2010, Bradley told investors the company had raised 14 per cent of its goal – a total of $32 million – and the “mortgage proceeds have been spent.” A breakdown of the spending was provided for $17 million and included a non-recoverable intercompany loan of $5 million to Canmore’s Bighorn project. The meeting left more questions unanswered and an angry group unwilling to invest another dime. The Crowsnest Pass mayor and chief administrative officer appeared at the meeting, where Bridgecreek asked investors for another $2.5 million to kick-start the project. The proposal was flatly rejected.

Irwin, the former Crowsnest Pass mayor, says he believes the demands put on Bridgecreek were higher than those placed on other developers. The company, he says, was asked to do too much all at once, such as building roads and bridges and installing water and sewer systems in addition to paying property tax on the land. “[Municipal council] put more demands on them than other developers and they tried to meet them,” he says. “They were not treated fairly, certainly not like everyone else.”

Myron Achtman, the chairman of River Run Vistas Steering Committee – one of the investor groups that invested $14 million – says the group voted overwhelmingly in favour of taking the project into its own hands. Although he’s now talking with someone interested in seeing the development go through, he is not hopeful. “I’m not optimistic about ever seeing my money,” he says. “Where are we going to get more money to start this? No one in our group would put up another penny.”

Other investor groups are unwilling to come forward, either because they’ve given up on ever seeing a dime or out of fear of jeopardizing potential lawsuits.

Legal action is already afoot, in fact. Robert Kubke, the chair of the Bridgegate OM2 Investor Group that represents the majority of investors in the Crowsnest Lake resort project, says the matter is the subject of court proceedings. “I can confirm … that our investment has not been repaid when it came due and we are taking legal action to pursue whatever we can recover.”

Investors and Crowsnest Pass residents are left to speculate over how much money in total was raised through the Bridgecreek companies. Speculators add up offering memorandums and bonds, but no one can offer proof of the total dollar figure raised for development at the two Crowsnest Pass properties.

ive and a half years after the splashy unveiling of the project, many Bridgecreek investors’ hopes for Crowsnest Pass are dead. While various investor groups are left to fight over the scraps, the community is dealing with an environmental mess that could cost millions to resolve. They won’t be able to pay that bill by selling the land, either, as outstanding liens and unpaid taxes could delay any potential sale for years.

Dean Ward, a former councillor who was in office over the course of the Bridgecreek fiasco, admits that local politicians fell hard for the sales pitch. He now regrets that council did not collect a deposit to protect taxpayers. “Don’t get caught up in the glitz and glamour,” he says. “Attending developer golf tournaments and going for
celebratory drinks after zoning is approved [is] not good practice in a small town. The more promises you get, the more the lights should go on.”

The voters of Crowsnest Pass elected a new mayor and council in the fall of 2010. While many factors were at play, some believe members of the previous council were punished for their relationship with the developer. Only one of six incumbents running for re-election was returned to office. But they left the community with something of a going-away present: a ratified policy that will ensure that all future developments – both large and small – would provide 100 per cent security of the estimated construction costs for municipal and utility improvements before a shovel goes in the ground.

The municipality approved another policy prohibiting councillor endorsements of private enterprises – a conflict-of-interest measure directly related to involvement of elected officials in Bridgecreek.

“The municipality and the developer should be seen to be at arm’s length,” says Ward. “While a councillor working for a developer and a mayor appearing in promotional material and attending shareholders’ meetings may not be illegal, it certainly enhances the credibility of the developer to the outside world.”

One thing everyone agrees on is that the Bridgecreek boys were exceptional salesmen. Crowsnest Pass was eager to see the type of growth experienced in other mountain towns and the municipality got caught up in the whirlwind of possibility. When things began turning sour, Bradley accused the community of pessimism.
While lawyers figure out how to restructure the Bridgecreek group of companies and investors seek ways to move forward with development, the Crowsnest Pass properties remain stuck in legal limbo. The municipality, meanwhile, is left with an unsightly plot of land that it may be responsible for cleaning up. And as for Bradley and Becker, they filed for personal bankruptcy in January 2011.

For his part, Crowsnest Pass’s new mayor isn’t about to stand idly by any longer. Bruce Decoux has given notice that something will be done about the mess that Bradley and Becker left behind in his community. “There are certain steps a municipality can take,” he says. If there’s one thing that’s certain, though, it’s that those steps won’t be enough to return his community to where it was before Bill Bradley and Colin Becker rolled into town.

Memorandum Globetrotters

Bill Bradley and Colin Becker’s privately incorporated company, Bridgecreek, was involved in two other major real estate development projects.

Bighorn Mountain Resort in Canmore was a high-end private residence club offering fractional ownership. About $15 million was raised in secured first mortgages and the project was regularly cited as one of the company’s key real estate deals.

According to one Canmore investor, Malcolm Achtman, the developers continually made management changes, tweaking designs and specifications. It was a constant loop of build, change, tear out, rebuild, change and rebuild. When the project was about half-finished, it went into receivership. A group of 110 investors formed their own company and took control of the development. After taking charge, the investor group brought in additional capital and is working to bring the new development, Innoka Resort, to completion.

The Villa in Cathedral City, California, was a resort hotel that Bradley and Becker purchased for about $4 million. They hired a local contractor and demolished it – gutting buildings, ripping out the pool – while wooing potential investors to secure funding. A second property, used for movie shoots and magazine photos, was purchased for about $2 million and was similarly demolished and left abandoned. Today, both properties sit vacant.

Article printed from Alberta Venture | Western Business Insight: http://albertaventure.com

URL to article: http://albertaventure.com/2011/05/troubled-waters/
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Sat Sep 10, 2011 10:44 pm

An interesting back and forth showing an investment advocate and whistleblower, giving evidence of perhaps criminal wrongdoing to the BCSC and the reply from them. As I have experienced from BCSC and other securities commissions, they will do almost anything in the world to avoid taking on a difficult case or a case which reflects poorly on their own regulatory efforts. (in this case the securities commission GAVE THE company involved an exemption to the law, so they could churn their clients into proprietary (house brand) funds, making millions for themselves, at client expense......go figure......follow the money and find out just who the commissions serve)

Large financial firms can get away with financial violence daily, with no fear of investigation by securities commissions or the police in Canada, if they maintain their payments to the commission. "Self regulation is decriminalization"
The BCSC person quoted here would be making as much money as any police person in Canada, and more than the head of the SEC in the USA. To do, "the square root of nothing" as quoted by billionaire philanthropist and one of Canada's most experienced financiers, Stephen Jarislowski. I agree with him.
====================================================================
From: Sandy Jakab [mailto:sjakab@bcsc.bc.ca]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2011 3:54 PM
To: 'Joe Killoran'
Cc: Paul Bourque; Doug Mackay
Subject: RE: Assante conglomerated BC's F.P.C. Investments Inc. in Jan. 1998

Right, we will not investigate these allegations.

Regards,
Sandy

Sandra Jakab
Director, Capital Markets Regulation
British Columbia Securities Commission
P.O. Box 10142, Pacific Centre
701 - West Georgia Street
Vancouver, BC V7Y 1L2
(604) 899-6869 (direct line)
(604) 899-6506 (fax)
sjakab@bcsc.bc.ca


From: Joe Killoran [mailto:killoran@sympatico.ca]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2011 3:33 PM
To: 'Sandy Jakab'
Subject: RE: Assante conglomerated BC's F.P.C. Investments Inc. in Jan. 1998


Thanks Sandy.

My Hail Mary prayer appears to have been burst.

Does this mean that the BCSC will not now investigate whether or not Assante’s purchase of BC registered FPC Investments in 1998 included extra undisclosed secret commissions that rewarded the FPC salespersons when they self-interest Redemption / Switch CHURNED 40% of their 3rd party client owned funds over into Assante’s own in-house proprietary funds over the following 3-year period, an investigation by the BCSC based upon connecting:

n Kent Shirley’s whistleblower evidence v. Assante, DataPlan, etc., and there being no statute of limitations on crimes that breach our Criminal Codes?

to

n Evidence in Assante’s own May 19, 1999, IPO Final Prospectus, that showed Assante used its similar escrowed shares business model when it purchased FPC Investments + the statement on page 16, etc.:

By earning the privilege of managing client assets, there is the potential for
a nine to sixteen fold increase in operating margins when assets under
administration also become assets under management. This potential
margin expansion is based on assumed industry average margins for
assets under management (90 to 120 basis points) and assets under
administration (7.5 to 10 basis points).


Sincerely,

Joe

From: Sandy Jakab [mailto:sjakab@bcsc.bc.ca]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2011 2:08 PM
To: 'Joe Killoran'
Cc: Doug Mackay; Paul Bourque; 'Lynn Tsutsumi'; Curtis Brezinski; Susan Greenglass; KENT SHIRLEY'S FAMILY
Subject: RE: Assante conglomerated BC's F.P.C. Investments Inc. in Jan. 1998

Joe, we do not agree that the Assante's acquisition of FPC in 1998 gives us jurisdiction.

We will not be investigating the MFDA (or ourselves, as you suggested).

Regards,
Sandy

Sandra Jakab
Director, Capital Markets Regulation
British Columbia Securities Commission
P.O. Box 10142, Pacific Centre
701 - West Georgia Street
Vancouver, BC V7Y 1L2
(604) 899-6869 (direct line)
(604) 899-6506 (fax)
sjakab@bcsc.bc.ca
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Fri Sep 09, 2011 1:47 pm

lends a new meaning to the term "regulatory masturbation......."

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article ... aries.html

Senior SEC workers caught downloading porn on their office computers
By DAILY MAIL REPORTER
Last updated at 9:45 PM on 9th March 2011

Employees of the Securities and Exchange Commission caught in a porn scandal were on huge six-figure salaries, it has emerged today.

Seventeen of the workers were earning between $99,356 and $222,000 a year.

They were among 33 investigated for downloading pornography on their SEC computers at SEVEN offices around the country.


Caught: Highly-paid employees downloaded pornography onto SEC computers

They were 'counselled and disciplined for accessing pornography', but not one was sacked, according to the lawyer who exposed their behaviour.

The men worked in Denver, Atlanta, Boston; Chicago, Fort Worth, Texas, Los Angeles and Washington.

Last year the Office of Inspector General's investigation revealed between 2005-2010 that:

A senior attorney admitted downloaded pornographic images to his SEC computer during work hours so frequently that, on some days, he spent eight hours accessing online pornography.
He downloaded so much pornography that he exhausted the available space on the hard drive and downloaded pornography to CDs or DVDs that he accumulated in boxes in his office.

A regional office staff accountant received more than 16,000 access denials for Internet websites classified by the Commission's Internet filter as either 'sex' or 'pornography' in a one-month period.
In addition, the hard drive of the employee's SEC laptop contained numerous sexually suggestive and inappropriate images.

A regional office senior enforcement attorney accessed pornographic images from his SEC laptop during work hours and saved sexually explicit images to his computer hard drive.
The investigation also found a thumb drive connected to his SEC laptop that contained five distinct videos depicting hard core pornography.


'Disciplined': The SEC office in Denver where workers were investigated for downloading porn

The report said: 'Many of the employees who engaged in such conduct were at a senior level and earned substantial salaries.'

In response to a Freedom of Information Act request by Denver attorney Kevin Evans, the SEC's Office of the General Counsel, did not reveal the number of employees working at each office.


Crusading: Attorney Kevin Evans

They were employed at Labat-Anderson, CACI International, Garda Security, Keane Federal and ISN Corporation, the letter said.

Evans, a securities attorney who defends people investigated by the the SEC, is angry no worker was sacked.

He said: 'The message you are sending is if you are caught you get a slap on the wrist. There are higher standards for a lawyer.'

He told Denverchannel.com: 'We're talking about some of these folks making in excess of $200,000 of year and spending quite a bit of their of time … searching porn.

'Now look, I'm no a prude. I really don’t care what these people do on their own time.

'But, as a taxpayer, when somebody's … supposed to be out there protecting us from fraud, etc, and instead what they're doing is wasting our taxpayer dollars, sitting there pleasuring themselves that really upsets me.'

He noted that several of the porn abuses occurred 'right before the stock market crashed in 2008,' when critics claim securities regulators failed in their oversight of financial markets and unscrupulous investment advisers.

Evans said many people have asked him why he's been so dogged in his one-man war against government porn watching.

He said.'If I did in private practice what they have gotten away with doing -- which is bill clients for hours and hours and hours for sitting at a computer looking at porn -- I got to tell you my licence would be suspended at the very least.

Many of his public records requests have been rejected. Evans sought the release of the SEC employees' names. But a federal judge denied his request in December.



Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article ... z1XURX5V4f

(advocate comments.....here in Alberta, the Alberta Securities Commission had inflatable sex dolls in the office.....among other complaints by nearly three dozen employees who were offended at the "anything goes" attitude at the provincial securities regulator) Those who study extensively learn that securities commissions are often merely "handmaidens" to financial players. Self regulation is decriminalization.
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Fri Sep 02, 2011 8:13 am

From: Mike Macdonald
To: bill.rice@asc.ca
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2011 11:09 AM
Subject: Fund Facts

I note with resignation that it appears that Fund Facts will proceed as is. The current format for FF provides minimal information in a format designed to assist fund salespeople and the fund industry.

As usual, the initial goals of the FF document has been severely watered down by an industry that lags the world in disclosure, education and ethics, while leading the world in opposing disclosure and maintaining fat margins. Also as usual, the regulatory authorities place industry relationships first and investors last. Within the industry every firm utilizes benchmarks and every fund manager is held accountable for monthly expenses. Retail investors are somehow not entitled to similar information either monthly, nor in the case of benchmarking, on the disclosure documents. Combined with a risk ranking system that is a sad effort that serves no investor, and it is clear the Fund Fact is destined to become a marketing sham that hides true risk while removing the requirement for pre sale disclosure and allows the prospectus requirements to slowly fade into the past.


I am sure your ongoing consultations with the industry will ensure investors remain at the end of the disclosure line and business sales practices will be disrupted as little as possible.

Disappointing!


Mike

(advocate comment......Mike, a former investment industry professional, is correct. Securities Commission heads are paid over $500,000 by the investment industry to be a handmaiden to the industry. I expect the day will come when breach of trust and or gross negligence concepts come to be enforceable against public servants who sell out the public interest)
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Mon Aug 22, 2011 4:19 pm

ROLLING STONE
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ne ... stpopular3
August 17, 2011 8:00 AM ET
Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes?
A whistle-blower claims that over the past two decades, the agency has destroyed records of thousands of investigations, whitewashing the files of some of the nation's worst financial criminals.

Pete Gardner/Getty
by: Matt Taibbi
Imagine a world in which a man who is repeatedly investigated for a string of serious crimes, but never prosecuted, has his slate wiped clean every time the cops fail to make a case. No more Lifetime channel specials where the murderer is unveiled after police stumble upon past intrigues in some old file – "Hey, chief, didja know this guy had two wives die falling down the stairs?" No more burglary sprees cracked when some sharp cop sees the same name pop up in one too many witness statements. This is a different world, one far friendlier to lawbreakers, where even the suspicion of wrongdoing gets wiped from the record.
That, it now appears, is exactly how the Securities and Exchange Commission has been treating the Wall Street criminals who cratered the global economy a few years back. For the past two decades, according to a whistle-blower at the SEC who recently came forward to Congress, the agency has been systematically destroying records of its preliminary investigations once they are closed. By whitewashing the files of some of the nation's worst financial criminals, the SEC has kept an entire generation of federal investigators in the dark about past inquiries into insider trading, fraud and market manipulation against companies like Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and AIG. With a few strokes of the keyboard, the evidence gathered during thousands of investigations – "18,000 ... including Madoff," as one high-ranking SEC official put it during a panicked meeting about the destruction – has apparently disappeared forever into the wormhole of history.
Under a deal the SEC worked out with the National Archives and Records Administration, all of the agency's records – "including case files relating to preliminary investigations" – are supposed to be maintained for at least 25 years. But the SEC, using history-altering practices that for once actually deserve the overused and usually hysterical term "Orwellian," devised an elaborate and possibly illegal system under which staffers were directed to dispose of the documents from any preliminary inquiry that did not receive approval from senior staff to become a full-blown, formal investigation. Amazingly, the wholesale destruction of the cases – known as MUIs, or "Matters Under Inquiry" – was not something done on the sly, in secret. The enforcement division of the SEC even spelled out the procedure in writing, on the commission's internal website. "After you have closed a MUI that has not become an investigation," the site advised staffers, "you should dispose of any documents obtained in connection with the MUI."
Many of the destroyed files involved companies and individuals who would later play prominent roles in the economic meltdown of 2008. Two MUIs involving con artist Bernie Madoff vanished. So did a 2002 inquiry into financial fraud at Lehman Brothers, as well as a 2005 case of insider trading at the same soon-to-be-bankrupt bank. A 2009 preliminary investigation of insider trading by Goldman Sachs was deleted, along with records for at least three cases involving the infamous hedge fund SAC Capital.
The widespread destruction of records was brought to the attention of Congress in July, when an SEC attorney named Darcy Flynn decided to blow the whistle. According to Flynn, who was responsible for helping to manage the commission's records, the SEC has been destroying records of preliminary investigations since at least 1993. After he alerted NARA to the problem, Flynn reports, senior staff at the SEC scrambled to hide the commission's improprieties.
As a federally protected whistle-blower, Flynn is not permitted to speak to the press. But in evidence he presented to the SEC's inspector general and three congressional committees earlier this summer, the 13-year veteran of the agency paints a startling picture of a federal police force that has effectively been conquered by the financial criminals it is charged with investigating.
n In at least one case, according to Flynn, investigators at the SEC found their desire to bring a case against an influential bank thwarted by senior officials in the enforcement division – whose director turned around and accepted a lucrative job from the very same bank they had been prevented from investigating.
n In another case, the agency farmed out its inquiry to a private law firm – one hired by the company under investigation. The outside firm, unsurprisingly, concluded that no further investigation of its client was necessary. To complete the bureaucratic laundering process, Flynn says, the SEC dropped the case and destroyed the files.
Much has been made in recent months of the government's glaring failure to police Wall Street;
n to date, federal and state prosecutors have yet to put a single senior Wall Street executive behind bars for any of the many well-documented crimes related to the financial crisis.
Indeed, Flynn's accusations dovetail with a recent series of damaging critiques of the SEC made by reporters, watchdog groups and members of Congress, all of which seem to indicate that top federal regulators spend more time lunching, schmoozing and job-interviewing with Wall Street crooks than they do catching them.
n As one former SEC staffer describes it, the agency is now filled with so many Wall Street hotshots from oft-investigated banks that it has been "infected with the Goldman mindset from within."
The destruction of records by the SEC, as outlined by Flynn, is something far more than an administrative accident or bureaucratic fuck-up. It's a symptom of the agency's terminal brain damage. Somewhere along the line, those at the SEC responsible for policing America's banks fell and hit their head on a big pile of Wall Street's money – a blow from which the agency has never recovered. "From what I've seen, it looks as if the SEC might have sanctioned some level of case-related document destruction," says Sen. Chuck Grassley, the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, whose staff has interviewed Flynn. "It doesn't make sense that an agency responsible for investigations would want to get rid of potential evidence. If these charges are true, the agency needs to explain why it destroyed documents, how many documents it destroyed over what time frame and to what extent its actions were consistent with the law."
How did officials at the SEC wind up with a faithful veteran employee – a conservative, mid-level attorney described as a highly reluctant whistle-blower – spilling the agency's most sordid secrets to Congress? In a way, they asked for it.
On May 18th of this year, SEC enforcement director Robert Khuzami sent out a mass e-mail to the agency's staff with the subject line "Lawyers Behaving Badly." In it, Khuzami asked his subordinates to report any experiences they might have had where "the behavior of counsel representing clients in... investigations has been questionable."
Khuzami was asking staffers to recount any stories of outside counsel behaving unethically. But Flynn apparently thought his boss was looking for examples of lawyers "behaving badly" anywhere, including within the SEC. And he had a story to share he'd kept a lid on for years. "Mr. Khuzami may have gotten something more than he expected," Flynn's lawyer, a former SEC whistle-blower named Gary Aguirre, later explained to Congress.
Flynn responded to Khuzami with a letter laying out one such example of misbehaving lawyers within the SEC. It involved a case from very early in Flynn's career, back in 2000, when he was working with a group of investigators who thought they had a "slam-dunk" case against Deutsche Bank, the German financial giant. A few years earlier, Rolf Breuer, the bank's CEO, had given an interview to Der Spiegel in which he denied that Deutsche was involved in übernahmegespräche – takeover talks – to acquire a rival American firm, Bankers Trust. But the statement was apparently untrue – and it sent the stock of Bankers Trust tumbling, potentially lowering the price for the merger. Flynn and his fellow SEC investigators, suspecting that investors of Bankers Trust had been defrauded, opened a MUI on the case.
A Matter Under Inquiry is just a preliminary sort of look-see – a way for the SEC to check out the multitude of tips it gets about suspicious trades, shady stock scams and false disclosures, and to determine which of the accusations merit a formal investigation. At the MUI stage, an SEC investigator can conduct interviews or ask a bank to send in information voluntarily. Bumping a MUI up to a formal investigation is critical, because it enables investigators to pull out the full law-enforcement ass-kicking measures – subpoenas, depositions, everything short of hot pokers and waterboarding. In the Deutsche case, Flynn and other SEC investigators got past the MUI stage and used their powers to collect sworn testimony and documents indicating that plenty of übernahmegespräche indeed had been going on when Breuer spoke to Der Spiegel. Based on the evidence, they sent an "Action Memorandum" to senior SEC staff, formally recommending that the agency press forward and file suit against Deutsche.
Breuer responded to the threat as big banks like Deutsche often do: He hired a former SEC enforcement director to lobby the agency to back off. The ex-insider, Gary Lynch, launched a creative and inspired defense, producing a linguistic expert who argued that übernahmegespräche only means "advanced stage of discussions." Nevertheless, the request to proceed with the case was approved by several levels of the SEC's staff. All that was needed to move forward was a thumbs-up from the director of enforcement at the time, Richard Walker.
But then a curious thing happened. On July 10th, 2001, Flynn and the other investigators were informed that Walker was mysteriously recusing himself from the Deutsche case. Two weeks later, on July 23rd, the enforcement division sent a letter to Deutsche that read, "Inquiry in the above-captioned matter has been terminated." The bank was in the clear; the SEC was dropping its fraud investigation. In contradiction to the agency's usual practice, it provided no explanation for its decision to close the case.
On October 1st of that year, the mystery was solved: Dick Walker was named general counsel of Deutsche. Less than 10 weeks after the SEC shut down its investigation of the bank, the agency's director of enforcement was handed a cushy, high-priced job at Deutsche.
Deutsche's influence in the case didn't stop there. A few years later, in 2004, Walker hired none other than Robert Khuzami, a young federal prosecutor, to join him at Deutsche. The two would remain at the bank until February 2009, when Khuzami joined the SEC as Flynn's new boss in the enforcement division. When Flynn sent his letter to Khuzami complaining about misbehavior by Walker, he was calling out Khuzami's own mentor.
The circular nature of the case illustrates the revolving-door dynamic that has become pervasive at the SEC. A recent study by the Project on Government Oversight found that over the past five years, former SEC personnel filed 789 notices disclosing their intent to represent outside companies before the agency – sometimes within days of their having left the SEC. More than half of the disclosures came from the agency's enforcement division, who went to bat for the financial industry four times more often than ex-staffers from other wings of the SEC.
Even a cursory glance at a list of the agency's most recent enforcement directors makes it clear that the SEC's top policemen almost always wind up jumping straight to jobs representing the banks they were supposed to regulate. Lynch, who represented Deutsche in the Flynn case, served as the agency's enforcement chief from 1985 to 1989, before moving to the firm of Davis Polk, which boasts many top Wall Street clients. He was succeeded by William McLucas, who left the SEC in 1998 to work for WilmerHale, a Wall Street defense firm so notorious for snatching up top agency veterans that it is sometimes referred to as "SEC West." McLucas was followed by Dick Walker, who defected to Deutsche in 2001, and he was in turn followed by Stephen Cutler, who now serves as general counsel for JP Morgan Chase. Next came Linda Chatman Thomsen, who stepped down to join Davis Polk, only to be succeeded in 2009 by Khuzami, Walker's former protégé at Deutsche Bank.
This merry-go-round of current and former enforcement directors has repeatedly led to accusations of improprieties. In 2008, in a case cited by the SEC inspector general, Thomsen went out of her way to pass along valuable information to Cutler, the former enforcement director who had gone to work for JP Morgan. According to the inspector general, Thomsen signaled Cutler that the SEC was unlikely to take action that would hamper JP Morgan's move to buy up Bear Stearns. In another case, the inspector general found, an assistant director of enforcement was instrumental in slowing down an investigation into the $7 billion Ponzi scheme allegedly run by Texas con artist R. Allen Stanford – and then left the SEC to work for Stanford, despite explicitly being denied permission to do so by the agency's ethics office. "Every lawyer in Texas and beyond is going to get rich on this case, OK?" the official later explained. "I hated being on the sidelines."
Small wonder, then, that SEC staffers often have trouble getting their bosses to approve full-blown investigations against even the most blatant financial criminals. For a fledgling MUI to become a formal investigation, it has to make the treacherous leap from the lower rungs of career-level staffers like Flynn all the way up to the revolving-door level at the top, where senior management is composed largely of high-priced appointees from the private sector who have strong social and professional ties to the very banks they are charged with regulating. And if senior management didn't approve an investigation, the documents often wound up being destroyed – as Flynn would later discover.
After the Deutsche fiasco over Bankers Trust, Flynn continued to work at the SEC for four more years. He briefly left the agency to dabble in real estate, then returned in 2008 to serve as an attorney in the enforcement division. In January 2010, he accepted new responsibilities that included helping to manage the disposition of records for the division – and it was then he first became aware of the agency's possibly unlawful destruction of MUI records.
Flynn discovered a directive on the enforcement division's internal website ordering staff to destroy "any records obtained in connection" with closed MUIs. The directive appeared to violate federal law, which gives responsibility for maintaining and destroying all records to the National Archives and Records Administration. Over a decade earlier, in fact, the SEC had struck a deal with NARA stipulating that investigative records were to be maintained for 25 years – and that if any files were to be destroyed after that, the shredding was to be done by NARA, not the SEC.
But Flynn soon learned that the records for thousands of preliminary investigations no longer existed. In his letter to Congress, Flynn estimates that the practice of destroying MUIs had begun as early as 1993, and has resulted in at least 9,000 case files being destroyed. For all the thousands of tips that had come in to the SEC, and the thousands of interviews that had been conducted by the agency's staff, all that remained were a few perfunctory lines for each case. The mountains of evidence gathered were no longer in existence.
To read through the list of dead and buried cases that Flynn submitted to Congress is like looking through an infrared camera at a haunted house of the financial crisis, with the ghosts of missed prosecutions flashing back and forth across the screen. A snippet of the list:
Screen shot 2011-08-22 at 5.17.19 PM.png


One MUI – case MNY-08145 – involved allegations of insider trading at AIG on September 15th, 2008, right in the middle of the insurance giant's collapse. In that case, an AIG employee named Jacqueline Millan reported irregularities in the trading of AIG stock to her superiors, only to find herself fired. Incredibly, instead of looking into the matter itself, the SEC agreed to accept "an internal investigation by outside counsel or AIG." The last note in the file indicates that "the staff plans to speak with the outside attorneys on Monday, August 24th [2009], when they will share their findings with us." The fact that the SEC trusted AIG's lawyers to investigate the matter shows the basic bassackwardness of the agency's approach to these crash-era investigations. The SEC formally closed the case on October 1st, 2009.
The episode with AIG highlights yet another obstacle that MUIs experience on the road to becoming formal investigations. During the past decade, the SEC routinely began allowing financial firms to investigate themselves. Imagine the LAPD politely asking a gang of Crips and their lawyers to issue a report on whether or not a drive-by shooting by the Crips should be brought before a grand jury – that's basically how the SEC now handles many preliminary investigations against Wall Street targets.
The evolution toward this self-policing model began in 2001, when a shipping and food-service conglomerate called Seaboard aggressively investigated an isolated case of accounting fraud at one of its subsidiaries. Seaboard fired the guilty parties and made sweeping changes to its internal practices – and the SEC was so impressed that it instituted a new policy of giving "credit" to companies that police themselves. In practice, that means the agency simply steps aside and allows companies to slap themselves on the wrists. In the case against Seaboard, for instance, the SEC rewarded the firm by issuing no fines against it.
According to Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, the Seaboard case also prompted the SEC to begin permitting companies to hire their own counsel to conduct their own inquiries. At first, he says, the process worked fairly well. But then President Bush appointed the notoriously industry-friendly Christopher Cox to head up the SEC, and the "outside investigations" turned into whitewash jobs. "The investigations nowadays are probably not worth the money you spend on them," Turner says.
Harry Markopolos, a certified fraud examiner best known for sounding a famously unheeded warning about Bernie Madoff way back in 2000, says the SEC's practice of asking suspects to investigate themselves is absurd. In a serious investigation, he says, "the last person you want to trust is the person being accused or their lawyer." The practice helped Madoff escape for years. "The SEC took Bernie's word for everything," Markopolos says.
At the SEC, having realized that the agency was destroying documents, Flynn became concerned that he was overseeing an illegal policy. So in the summer of last year, he reached out to NARA, asking them for guidance on the issue.
That request sparked a worried response from Paul Wester, NARA's director of modern records. On July 29th, 2010, Wester sent a letter to Barry Walters, who oversees document requests for the SEC. "We recently learned from Darcy Flynn... that for the past 17 years the SEC has been destroying closed Matters Under Inquiry files," Wester wrote. "If you confirm that federal records have been destroyed improperly, please ensure that no further such disposals take place and provide us with a written report within 30 days."
Wester copied the letter to Adam Storch, a former Goldman Sachs executive who less than a year earlier had been appointed as managing executive of the SEC's enforcement division. Storch's appointment was not without controversy. "I'm not sure what's scarier," Daniel Indiviglio of The Atlantic observed, "that this guy worked at an investment bank that many believe has questionable ethics and too cozy a Washington connection, or that he's just 29." In any case, Storch reacted to the NARA letter the way the SEC often does – by circling the wagons and straining to find a way to blow off the problem without admitting anything.
Last August, as the clock wound down on NARA's 30-day deadline, Storch and two top SEC lawyers held a meeting with Flynn to discuss how to respond. Flynn's notes from the meeting, which he passed along to Congress, show the SEC staff wondering aloud if admitting the truth to NARA might be a bad idea, given the fact that there might be criminal liability.
"We could say that we do not believe there has been disposal inconsistent with the schedule," Flynn quotes Ken Hall, an assistant chief counsel for the SEC, as saying.
"There are implications to admit what was destroyed," Storch chimed in. It would be "not wise for me to take on the exposure voluntarily. If this leads to something, what rings in my ear is that Barry [Walters, the SEC documents officer] said: This is serious, could lead to criminal liability."
When the subject of how many files were destroyed came up, Storch answered: "18,000 MUIs destroyed, including Madoff."
Four days later, the SEC responded to NARA with a hilariously convoluted nondenial denial. "The Division is not aware of any specific instances of the destruction of records from any other MUI," the letter states. "But we cannot say with certainty that no such documents have been destroyed over the past 17 years." The letter goes on to add that "the Division has taken steps... to ensure that no MUI records are destroyed while we review this issue."
Translation: Hey, maybe records were destroyed, maybe they weren't. But if we did destroy records, we promise not to do it again – for now.
The SEC's unwillingness to admit the extent of the wrong doing left Flynn in a precarious position. The agency has a remarkably bad record when it comes to dealing with whistle-blowers. Back in 2005, when Flynn's attorney, Gary Aguirre, tried to pursue an insider-trading case against Pequot Capital that involved John Mack, the future CEO of Morgan Stanley, he was fired by phone while on vacation. Two Senate committees later determined that Aguirre, who has since opened a private practice representing whistle-blowers, was dismissed improperly as part of a "process of reprisal" by the SEC. Two whistle-blowers in the Stanford case, Julie Preuitt and Joel Sauer, also experienced retaliation – including reprimands and demotions – after raising concerns about superficial investigations. "There's no mechanism to raise these issues at the SEC," says another former whistle-blower. Contacting the agency's inspector general, he adds, is considered "the nuclear option" – a move "well-known to be a career-killer."
In Flynn's case, both he and Aguirre tried to keep the matter in-house, appealing to SEC chairman Mary Schapiro with a promise not to go outside the agency if she would grant Flynn protection against reprisal. When no such offer was forthcoming, Flynn went to the agency's inspector general before sending a detailed letter about the wrongdoing to three congressional committees.
One of the offices Flynn contacted was that of Sen. Grassley, who was in the midst of his own battle with the SEC. Frustrated with the agency's failure to punish major players on Wall Street, the Iowa Republican had begun an investigation into how the SEC follows up on outside complaints. Specifically, he wrote a letter to FINRA, another regulatory agency, to ask how many complaints it had referred to the SEC about SAC Capital, the hedge fund run by reptilian billionaire short-seller Stevie Cohen.
SAC has long been accused of a variety of improprieties, from insider trading to harassment. But no charge in recent Wall Street history is crazier than an episode involving a SAC executive named Ping Jiang, who was accused in 2006 of enacting a torturous hazing program. According to a civil lawsuit that was later dropped, Jiang allegedly forced a new trader named Andrew Tong to take female hormones, come to work wearing a dress and lipstick, have "foreign objects" inserted in his rectum, and allow Jiang to urinate in his mouth. (I'm not making this up.)
Grassley learned that over the past decade, FINRA had referred 19 complaints about suspicious trades at SAC to federal regulators. Curious to see how many of those referrals had been looked into, Grassley wrote the SEC on May 24th, asking for evidence that the agency had properly investigated the cases.
Two weeks later, on June 9th, Khuzami sent Grassley a surprisingly brusque answer: "We generally do not comment on the status of investigations or related referrals, and, in turn, are not providing information concerning the specific FINRA referrals you identified." Translation: We're not giving you the records, so blow us.
Grassley later found out from FINRA that it had actually referred 65 cases about SAC to the SEC, making the lack of serious investigations even more inexplicable. Angered by Khuzami's response, he sent the SEC another letter on June 15th demanding an explanation, but no answer has been forthcoming.
In the interim, Grassley's office was contacted by Flynn, who explained that among the missing MUIs he had uncovered were at least three involving SAC – one in 2006, one in 2007 and one in 2010, involving charges of insider trading and currency manipulation. All three cases were closed by the SEC, and the records apparently destroyed.
On August 17th, Grassley sent a letter to the SEC about the Flynn allegations, demanding to know if it was indeed true that the SEC had destroyed records. He also asked if the agency's failure to produce evidence of investigations into SAC Capital were related to the missing MUIs.
The SEC's inspector general is investigating the destroyed MUIs and plans to issue a report. NARA is also seeking answers. "We've asked the SEC to look into the matter and we're awaiting their response," says Laurence Brewer, a records officer for NARA. For its part, the SEC is trying to explain away the illegality of its actions through a semantic trick. John Nester, the agency's spokesman, acknowledges that "documents related to MUIs" have been destroyed. "I don't have any reason to believe that it hasn't always been the policy," he says. But Nester suggests that such documents do not "meet the federal definition of a record," and therefore don't have to be preserved under federal law.
But even if SEC officials manage to dodge criminal charges, it won't change what happened: The nation's top financial police destroyed more than a decade's worth of intelligence they had gathered on some of Wall Street's most egregious offenders. "The SEC not keeping the MUIs – you can see why this would be bad," says Markopolos, the fraud examiner famous for breaking the Madoff case. "The reason you would want to keep them is to build a pattern. That way, if you get five MUIs over a period of 20 years on something similar involving the same company, you should be able to connect five dots and say, 'You know, I've had five MUIs – they're probably doing something. Let's go tear the place apart.'" Destroy the MUIs, and Wall Street banks can commit the exact same crime over and over, without anyone ever knowing.
Regulation isn't a panacea. The SEC could have placed federal agents on every corner of lower Manhattan throughout the past decade, and it might not have put a dent in the massive wave of corruption and fraud that left the economy in flames three years ago. And even if SEC staffers from top to bottom had been fully committed to rooting out financial corruption, the agency would still have been seriously hampered by a lack of resources that often forces it to abandon promising cases due to a shortage of manpower. "It's always a triage," is how one SEC veteran puts it. "And it's worse now."
But we're equally in the dark about another hypothetical. Forget about what might have been if the SEC had followed up in earnest on all of those lost MUIs. What if even a handful of them had turned into real cases? How many investors might have been saved from crushing losses if Lehman Brothers had been forced to reveal its shady accounting way back in 2002? Might the need for taxpayer bailouts have been lessened had fraud cases against Citigroup and Bank of America been pursued in 2005 and 2007? And would the U.S. government have doubled down on its bailout of AIG if it had known that some of the firm's executives were suspected of insider trading in September 2008?
It goes without saying that no ordinary law-enforcement agency would willingly destroy its own evidence. In fact, when it comes to garden-variety crooks, more and more police agencies are catching criminals with the aid of large and well-maintained databases. "Street-level law enforcement is increasingly data-driven," says Bill Laufer, a criminology professor at the University of Pennsylvania. "For a host of reasons, though, we are starved for good data on both white-collar and corporate crime. So the idea that we would take the little data we do have and shred it, without a legal requirement to do so, calls for a very creative explanation."
We'll never know what the impact of those destroyed cases might have been; we'll never know if those cases were closed for good reasons or bad. We'll never know exactly who got away with what, because federal regulators have weighted down a huge sack of Wall Street's dirty laundry and dumped it in a lake, never to be seen again.
Editor’s Note: The online version of this article has been amended from the print version to reflect that the SEC’s case against Deutsche Bank proceeded beyond a Matter of Inquiry to a full-blown investigation.
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Fri Aug 19, 2011 5:56 pm

images.jpeg
images.jpeg (10.05 KiB) Viewed 5140 times
http://www.truth-out.org/unequal-regulation/1313495625
(These principles apply fairly to Canadian investment "self" regulation., doing harm to consumers.)
Unequal Regulation
Tuesday 16 August 2011
by: Thom Hartmann, Berrett-Koehler Publishers | Serialized Book

(Image: JR / t r u t h o u t)

There can be no effective control of corporations while their political activity remains.

-Theodore Roosevelt, speech, August 31, 1910

There’s a side to regulation that most people don’t think about, and it has far-reaching effects if representatives of corporations are writing the rules. Once a regulation is passed saying, “you can emit no more than 10 ppm [parts per million] of mercury,” you can legally emit up to 10 ppm. Before that rule was passed, any amount you emitted might subject you to potential lawsuits from nearby humans made ill by your emissions, by other states, or even by the federal government. The regulatory rule essentially legalizes what a corporation is doing. In the best of worlds, this wouldn’t be a problem. But in practice it means that business interests are often directly involved in writing the regulations that they themselves will have to obey.

Watch, Thom Hartmann's The Daily Take:



Regulations Can Legalize Activity That Causes Public Harm

During the Reagan administration, Robert Monks and Nell Minow worked with the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. Monks says, “We found that business representatives continually sought more rather than less regulation, particularly when [the new regulations] would limit their liability or protect them from competition.”

Monks and Minow became disenchanted with the process. In their 1991 book Power and Accountability, they say, “The ultimate commercial accomplishment is to achieve regulation under law that is purported to be comprehensive and preempting and is administered by an agency that is in fact captive to the industry.”[1] In this way corporations find an actual government shield for their actions. For example:

Tobacco companies point to the government-mandated warnings on their labels, saying that the labels relieve them of responsibility for tobacco-related deaths because they’re obeying government rules.
Producers of toxic wastes can’t be sued or attacked if they are releasing their toxins within guidelines defined by a government agency.

Telemarketing companies push for laws and regulations that define their practice, thus legalizing it.
Manufacturers of genetically modified products can bring them to market without labeling, so long as the products are made within the guide- lines of the regulations. [2]

The Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop

Before there was a single genetically modified food product on the market, Monsanto, a leading provider of agricultural products to farmers, including Roundup, the world’s best-selling herbicide, and a pioneer in genetically altered crops, sent lobbyists to the White House in late 1986 to meet with Vice President George H. W. Bush.

“There were no products at the time,” Leonard Guarraia, one of the Mon- santo executives at the meeting, told the New York Times in 2001. “But we bugged him for regulation. We told him that we have to be regulated.”[3]

And so, the Times reports, “the White House complied,” and Monsanto got the regulations it wanted from the EPA, FDA, and USDA.

Those regulations evolved throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations into a regulatory policy, announced by Vice President Dan Quayle on May 26, 1992, when he said, “We will ensure that biotech products will receive the same oversight as other products, instead of being hampered by unnecessary regulation.”

Certainly there would be no unnecessary regulation, but the regulations that were now in place were necessary for the industry. Said the New York Times, “The new policy strictly limited the regulatory reach of the FDA.”[4]

Under the regulations shepherded through government agencies by the White House, the dangers of genetically modified foods would be determined by the manufacturers, not the government, and testing would occur only when the companies wanted it to. And consumers were not to be notified if their food contained genetically modified organisms (as does now a substantial percentage of the American food supply).

“Labeling was ruled out as potentially misleading to the consumer, since it might suggest that there was reason for concern,” notes Times reporter Kurt Eichenwald.[5] In the meantime, gene-altered corn accounted for about 32 per- cent of the 1998 U.S. crop, 38 percent for soybeans, and 58 percent for Canadian canola oil.[6]

In the summer of 2000, the Clinton administration had to select an American representative to the World Trade Organization talks on genetically modified foods. Ignoring the nomination of a scientist from the Consumers Union, the administration instead chose a former lobbyist for one of the largest companies in the business of genetically modified foods.

And in one of the most notorious cases, a multinational chemical and agricultural-products company’s attorney quit his job with the company’s law firm; went to work for the FDA, where he wrote a regulation that allowed that company’s product into the food supply; quit the FDA and went to work for the USDA, where he participated in writing regulations eliminating labeling of the product for consumers; and then quit the USDA and went back to work for the law firm representing the multinational.[7]

Unfortunately, because of “veggie libel laws” passed in numerous states after much lobbying by pesticide manufacturers and others in the agricultural products industry (under which Oprah Winfrey was sued for her hamburger remarks), it would be a crime in at least fourteen states (where, hopefully, this book will be for sale) for me (or any reporter) to give you the details of this episode.*

*Even Ben & Jerry’s must, by law, say something nice about the outcome of this incident on their labels, although you can read the entire story on the wall of their Waterbury, Vermont, manufacturing facility, as Vermont has not yet passed a law making it illegal to question the safety of the American food supply.

The GMO (genetically modified organism) regulations followed a pat- tern set out years before by the chemical industry. As Paul Hawken pointed out in 1994 in The Ecology of Commerce, the industry launched such a huge lobby- ing effort to fight regulations on toxic chemicals after the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act that by 1990 “the agency has been able to muster regulations for exactly 7 of the 191 toxins that fell under the original legislation.”[8]

A decade later things are still problematic, with profit driving the equation at every turn. The last year for which EPA statistics are available on the release of toxic chemicals into the environment by industry is 1999, and in that year 7.7 billion pounds of toxins were released directly into our air and water, most with unknown short- or long-term effects.[9] And as huge as that statistic may sound, it’s actually only the tip of the iceberg:

Lobbyists defined EPA regulations so that now only 650 of the more than 80,000 chemicals being used in industry have to be reported— which means that the 7.7-billion-pound total represents only 1 percent of the possible chemicals in use.
Only America’s largest chemical manufacturers are required to report their figures.
Those figures include only accidents and spills. As the Worldwatch Institute’s Anne Platt McGinn noted in a commentary titled “Detoxifying Terrorism” on November 16, 2001, “Releases during routine use are not included” in that 7.7-billion-pound figure. Platt added that we don’t yet even know how dangerous or carcinogenic are more than “71 percent of the most widely used chemicals in the United States today” because the data simply doesn’t exist or hasn’t been released by the industry.[10]
The Impact on Small Business

Small businesses rarely lobby Congress, the White House, or regulatory agencies for more regulations. But because large businesses have an infrastructure to deal with regulations, the burden of regulations on small businesses some- times wipes them out. Many regulations come along with benefits. Farm subsidies represent a huge transfer of tax money to corporations, but only a very small portion goes to family farmers.

In the agriculture industry, four multinational corporations control 82 percent of the beef cattle market; five companies control 55 percent of the hog-packing marketplace. Although large agricultural corporations numerically own only 6 percent of U.S. farms, that 6 percent accounts for almost two- thirds of all farm income.[11]

In a growing trend known as contract farming, farmers are forced (because they can’t compete against large-scale multinational purchasing) to sell their farms to agribiz companies and then work on the land they once owned. The United States lost 300,000 family-owned farms between 1979 and 1998. As agriculture writer Julie Brussell notes, “This agrarian ‘genocide’ mirrors the descent of much of America’s rural country into economic serfdom.”[12] The result, as documented by the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund’s (CELDF) Thomas Linzey, is that, “Suicides have replaced equipment- related deaths as the number one cause of farmer deaths.”[13]

References:

1. Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow, Power and Accountability (New York: Harper- Collins, 1991), http://www.ragm.com/archives/books/poweracc/cover.html.

2. Kurt Eichenwald, “Redesigning Nature: Hard Lessons Learned; Biotechnology Food: From the Lab to a Debacle,” New York Times, January 25, 2001, http://www.nytimes .com/2001/01/25/business/redesigning-nature-hard-lessons-learned-biotechnology- food-lab-debacle.html?pagewanted=1.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Marian Burros, “Shoppers Unaware of Gene Changes,” New York Times, July 20, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/20/world ... ne-changes .html?scp=1&sq=Marian%20Burros,%20%E2%80%9CShoppers%20Unaware%20 of%20Gene%20Changes,%E2%80%9D%20New%20York%20Times,%2020%20 July%201998&st=cse.

7. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0523-02.htm.

8. Paul Hawken, The Ecology of Commerce (New York: HarperCollins, 1994).

9. Anne Platt McGinn, “Detoxifying Terrorism,” Worldwatch.org, November 16, 2001, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1711.

10. Ibid.

11. http://secret-of-life.org/too-big-to-fail.

12. Julie Brussell, “Our Family Farms: A Final Requiem or a Route to Recovery?” Conscious Choice, May 2001, http://www.lime.com/magazines?uri=consciouschoice.com/ lime/2001/cc1405/ourfamilyfarms1405.html.

13. Interview with Thomas Linzey, Esq., and POCLAD published in Defying Corporations, Defining Democracy, ed. Dean Ritz (New York: Apex Press, 2001).

This material is not covered under Creative Commons license and cannot be published without the permission of the author and Berrett-Koehler Publishers.

Copyright Thom Hartmann and Mythical Research, Inc.

Want a copy of the book? Receive "Unequal Protection: How Corporations Became 'People' - And How You Can Fight Back" as a thank-you gift with a donation of $35 or more to Truthout.


THOM HARTMANN
Thom Hartmann is a New York Times bestselling Project Censored Award winning author and host of a nationally syndicated progressive radio talk show. You can learn more about Thom Hartmann at his website and find out what stations broadcast his program. He is also now has a daily television program at RT Network. You can also listen to Thom over the Internet.
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Mon Jul 18, 2011 5:43 pm

Mr. Fennell

I do not believe any system of complaint handling in the world can close a file when no response is received and it has not been accepted by the complainant. The OSC does not take this position on its website so we conclude that closure is non-compliant with standard OSC complaint handling protocols.If this is the new standard , we want to see this publicly revealed.

In any event, our complaint was actually more of a systemic issue than just BMO.

In fact we have now reciived through other means the IFIC document and do not find it acceptable. It has many disclaimers its liability seems inpenetrable .Does the OSC endorse this document as the basis for the disclosure of risk in FF's? Has it been exposed to third party review to confirm its appropriateness, accuracy and robustness? It is after all prepared by the fund industry lobbyist. Surely, this cannot be considered even third world investor protection., About 10 million Canadians own mutual funds with $7billion invested.This is their nestegg.

Any document cited in a prospectus is incorporated by reference and therefore must be publicly available.

To datre, it is not publicly available.

We therefore cannot accept dismissive OSC closure of the complaint .We intend to pursue this until some semblance of investor protection has been established.

Respectfully,


Ken Kivenko P.Eng.
Kenmar Associates
----- Original Message -----
From: inquiries@osc.gov.on.ca
To: kenkiv@sympatico.ca
Cc: darcy.lake@bmo.com
Sent: Tuesday, July 12, 2011 5:44 PM
Subject: Re: File #20110613-3996 - Complaint : BMO mutual fund risk disclosure



Dear Mr. Kivenko:

Thank you for your complaint to the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) concerning the methodology used by BMO Investments Inc. in establishing the risk classification disclosed to investors in its prospectus.

I have spoken with Mr. Darcy Lake, Chief Compliance Officer at BMO Investments Inc. He assures me they are preparing an e-mail response to you which will provide the detailed information about their risk classification methodology that you have requested, and which he indicates you should receive in the next short while.

I am therefore closing this complaint file.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey Fennell
Senior Inquiries Officer
Ontario Securities Commission
inquiries@osc.gov.on.ca
416-593-8314
1-877-785-1555

The information in this e-mail should be taken as a guide. The content is not intended to provide investment, financial accounting, legal, tax or other professional advice and should not be relied upon or regarded as a substitute for such advice. We recommend that you seek advice from a qualified professional adviser before acting on the information or content appearing in this e-mail or any information or content on a web site to which a link has been provided.


From: Ken Kivenko <kenkiv@sympatico.ca>
To: inquiries@osc.gov.on.ca
Subject: Complaint : BMO mutual fund risk disclosure
Date: June 10, 2011 10:24 AM

Ontario Securities Commission
20 Queen Street West, Suite 1903,
Toronto, ON M5H 3S8

Attention: Manager, Inquiries and Contact Centre

We have a complaint against BMO Mutual Funds. As you can see from the attached email chain, BMO refuse to provide the key document pertaining to the methodology they employ to disclose risk to retail investors.This document is the IFIC Risk Classification Task Force Report .

BMO have not complied with a request for this Report. Instead they have referred us to an investment industry lobbyist, the Investment Funds Insitute of Canada. We have no relationship with this entity and do not want to establish one.

In any event, we've been told by IFIC staff that only IFIC member firms have access to this important Report.Our latest enquiry via email was not acknowledged and neither was an earlier request.

We argue that it is impossible for retail investors to evaluate fund risk without access to this key document. We therefore ask you to sanction BMO Mutual Funds for failure to properly disclose mutual fund risk and compel them to release the IFIC Risk Classification Report to us and to the public more generally.

We note parenthetically that this document is under IFIC control and can be changed without notification to the public. Additionally, CIFSC fund categories referenced are under the control of the CIFSC , another fund industry entity . There appears to be little place for retail mutual fund investors to participate in a disclosure regime intended to protect them.

Sincerely,

Ken Kivenko P.Eng.
Kenmar Associates
(416)-244-5803
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Sun May 15, 2011 10:53 am

The US SEC's handling of the Stanford International Bank fraud is an example of why you cannot combine securities regulatory enforcement with securities criminal enforcement. Separate regulatory and criminal enforcement agencies are an essential check and balance on the system. It is deeply disturbing that the securities criminal policing system of Canada relies so heavily upon the securities regulatory enforcement system for its public complaints intake . If the US SEC is captured by the investment industry, how can we expect anything different in Canada's smaller more fragmented securities regulatory system. The only hope we have for bringing integrity into securities criminal enforcement in Canada is to create the new Multi-Disciplinary Investment Fraud Agency that we are proposing.

Diane


BUSINESS
MAY 14, 2011, 5:49 P.M. ET
House Panel Presses SEC Over Stanford Fraud
By JESSICA HOLZER
WASHINGTON—A former Securities and Exchange Commission official who was faulted for blocking attempts to investigate jailed money manager R. Allen Stanford may be the target of federal criminal inquiry, SEC officials told lawmakers Friday.

Former Fort Worth Regional Office Enforcement Chief Spencer Barasch, after leaving the SEC, sought three times to represent Mr. Stanford as he fought the agency's case, and he briefly represented Mr. Stanford in 2006. The SEC made referrals to the Texas state bar and the Washington, D.C., bar as well as to criminal authorities to investigate whether Mr. Barasch violated any laws by representing Mr. Stanford, SEC Enforcement Chief Robert Khuzami said in testimony before the U.S. House Financial Services Oversight Panel.

SEC Inspector General David Kotz told senators in a hearing last fall that he had spoken with the U.S. Justice Department about opening a probe into Mr. Barasch.

During the hearing, Rep. Randy Neugebauer (R., Texas) asked Mr. Khuzami if he knew Mr. Barasch had represented a client before the commission last Friday. "I was not aware of that," Mr. Khuzami said.

Mr. Neugebauer said that he doesn't believe the Texas state bar has received a referral regarding Mr. Barasch.

Lawmakers at the hearing, many of whom said they represent investors in $7 billion of bogus certificates of deposit issued by Stanford International Bank Ltd., expressed dismay that the SEC hadn't disciplined Mr. Barasch and other senior enforcement managers who allegedly stifled attempts to investigate the scheme.

"I don't think the agency is going to change much because I don't see anything where people are being held accountable and responsible," Rep. Steve Pearce (R., N.M.) said.

Mr. Khuzami and SEC Examination Chief Carlo di Florio testified the SEC couldn't punish people who have left the agency. Mr. Barasch left the SEC in 2005. He now leads the corporate governance and securities enforcement team at Dallas law firm Andrews Kurth LLP. Mr. Barasch couldn't immediately be reached for comment.

Mr. Khuzami noted that SEC ethics rules bar former employees from ever representing clients before the commission on matters in which they had been heavily involved when they worked there.

SEC spokesman John Nester said the SEC can't move to bar a lawyer from appearing before the commission in the absence of a finding in an SEC administrative hearing that the person acted improperly or unethically or if another court enters into a judgment against the person after being sued by the SEC. Lawyers that have been criminally convicted or disbarred also cannot appear before the commission.

Mr. Neugebauer asked whether the ethics rules prohibited former employees from advising clients on SEC matters even if they don't serve as the client's agent before the commission. Mr. Khuzami said he believed former employees could advise clients on their dealings with the SEC in some situations.

Mr. Neugebauer said the rules should be tightened.

Senior enforcement staff in the SEC's Fort Worth office failed for years to open an investigation into the Stanford bank's certificate of deposits despite numerous red flags, including the conclusions of SEC examiners stretching back to 1997 that they were bogus, the SEC's internal watchdog concluded in a March 2010 report.

Mr. Stanford has pleaded not guilty to criminal charges, detailed in a 14-count indictment, that he operated the fraud. He is now awaiting trial, set for September, in a federal medical facility in North Carolina where he is receiving psychiatric treatment.

The SEC will soon determine whether victims of the Ponzi scheme should be covered by federal insurance meant to compensate people missing securities held by brokerages, SEC Deputy Solicitor Michael Conley told lawmakers at the hearing.

The SEC will determine "in the next few weeks" whether the Securities Investor Protection Corp. is wrongly refusing coverage to victims of the fraud, he said. Victims of the fraud have argued for years they deserve compensation from SIPC for the amounts they invested, but SIPC found they aren't covered by federal insurance for failed brokerages because the certificates of deposit were being held at a bank.

Julie Preuitt, an employee of the Fort Worth office who used to manage examination staff, testified as part of a second panel of witnesses that she was still being retaliated against for raising concerns a few years ago about a new "quick-hit" approach to broker-dealer examinations being pushed by her superiors. Ms. Preuitt tried to bring the alleged Stanford fraud to the attention of investigators in her office several times, beginning in 1997. Her supervisory duties were removed after she confronted her superiors about the broker examinations.

Ms. Preuitt told lawmakers she still has little work and no supervisory duties, and that her superiors continue to isolate her.

Mr. Di Florio praised Preuitt for doing a "terrific job" attempting to uncover Stanford's fraud. He said, "We are working closely with Ms. Preuitt right now to structure a portfolio of responsibilities that we think demonstrate her talents to the fullest potential," including exams "of national significance."

Write to Jessica Holzer at jessica.holzer@dowjones.com
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Sat Apr 30, 2011 7:08 pm

Screen shot 2011-04-30 at 8.02.08 PM.png

CLICK TO ENLARGE

The OSC has identified "investor protection" as it's foremost priority.

I wonder how they intend to do this in light of the obfuscation, misrepresentation and industry-sided favouritism that the OSC has built into it's system for decades.

These words will remain nothing but words, until the OSC takes some strong and clear action steps, which I just do not have confidence that they can afford to take.

What will they do with dozens and dozens of lawyers whose job it is to help confuse the public about whether they are dealing with a trusted professional investment advisor, or a commission salesperson posing as such, and relying on legal exemption to not have to meet the requirements for the job they are posing as........?

I cannot even begin to list the numbers of areas where the agency would have to change it's stripes. I just will not believe it until I see it.
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Fri Apr 29, 2011 6:42 pm

Screen shot 2011-04-29 at 7.41.03 PM.png
Self-regulatory organizations
21.1 (1) The Commission may, on the application of a self-regulatory organization, recognize the self-regulatory organization if the Commission is satisfied that to do so would be in the public interest. 1994, c. 11, s. 358.
Same
(2) A recognition under this section shall be made in writing and shall be subject to such terms and conditions as the Commission may impose. 1994, c. 11, s. 358.
Standards and conduct
(3) A recognized self-regulatory organization shall regulate the operations and the standards of practice and business conduct of its members and their representatives in accordance with its by-laws, rules, regulations, policies, procedures, interpretations and practices. 1994, c. 11, s. 358.
Commission’s powers
(4) The Commission may, if it is satisfied that to do so would be in the public interest, make any decision with respect to any by-law, rule, regulation, policy, procedure, interpretation or practice of a recognized self-regulatory organization. 1994, c. 11, s. 358.

These provisions found in the Ontario Securities Act at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statut ... .htm#BK117

seem to be in direct contrast to some of the words of the commission previously found on their web site, directing all complainants to go to their "self regulatory agency" instead of the OSC........now it appears they have removed this "direction". Complainants will have to contact me to let me know if the OSC still sends abused investors straight to the association of their abusers.
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Fri Apr 29, 2011 6:28 pm

Crown agency
(12) The Commission is an agent of Her Majesty in right of Ontario, and its powers may be exercised only as an agent of Her Majesty. 1997, c. 10, s. 37.


http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statut ... .htm#BK117

(imagine being a staff member of a crown agency, responsible for causing or assisting corporations to damage consumers by billions each year. Imagine the criminal code applying to these kinds of breaches of the public trust someday) Public information about this can be sent anonymously to:

Public Interest Leaks

Suite 309,
440-10816 Macleod Trail SE
Willow Park Village
Calgary, Alberta T2J 5N8
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Re: Securities Commissions assist predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Fri Apr 29, 2011 6:23 pm

Purposes of Act (OSC)
1.1 The purposes of this Act are,
(a) to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices; and
(b) to foster fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets. 1994, c. 33, s. 2.
PART I
THE COMMISSION

2. Repealed: 1997, c. 10, s. 36.
Principles to consider
2.1 In pursuing the purposes of this Act, the Commission shall have regard to the following fundamental principles:
1. Balancing the importance to be given to each of the purposes of this Act may be required in specific cases.
2. The primary means for achieving the purposes of this Act are,
i. requirements for timely, accurate and efficient disclosure of information,
ii. restrictions on fraudulent and unfair market practices and procedures, and
iii. requirements for the maintenance of high standards of fitness and business conduct to ensure honest and responsible conduct by market participants.
3. Effective and responsive securities regulation requires timely, open and efficient administration and enforcement of this Act by the Commission.


-------------
(now if only the commission would live up to these fine words, instead of cozying up to those persons who pay their salaries...............)

http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statut ... .htm#BK117
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Re: Securities Commissions predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Fri Apr 29, 2011 5:35 pm

Panel slams OSC plan
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Theresa Tedesco And Barbara Shecter, Financial Post · Apr. 29, 2011 | Last Updated: Apr. 29, 2011 4:07 AM ET

The Ontario Securities Commission's own investor advisory panel is criticizing the regulator for not doing enough to protect investors in its draft statement of priorities.

At the same time, the Investor Advisory Panel, an independent body of industry participants, recommends the creation of a formula to allow the Ontario regulator to award direct restitution to victims of fraud, which does not currently exist in the provincial Securities Act.

In an 11-page letter to the regulator, the Investor Advisory Panel, an independent body created by the watchdog to provide input on its policy initiatives, says the OSC's list of strategic priorities for 2011 through 2012 "does not provide a firm set of proposals to ensure that investors will indeed be protected."

The seven-member panel, including Bay Street securities lawyers and governance experts, found fault with the OSC's proposed policy priorities, calling them "overly broad" and lacking "specificity." The panel also noted they do not provide a mechanism for accountability.

"We are concerned that investors will not be able to determine if any of the priorities so stated have been achieved," declared the letter, adding the country's largest capital markets regulator must identify specific actions it will take in the upcoming year to protect investors.

In February, the OSC released a priority list naming five key areas of focus for the coming years. These included protecting investors in a world of complex products, intensifying compliance and enforcement efforts, demonstrating accountability for its performance as the country's leading regulator, supporting the development of a national securities regulator and continuing to work with the Canadian Securities Administrators on harmonizing and modernizing securities regulation in Canada.

The OSC sought comments on its priorities, and, among them, received a strongly worded response from the investor advisory panel created last year.

"We believe the commission should define more precisely what actions it intends to take to protect investors' interests. It is our view that the statement of priorities must include specific targets and goals to be achieved so that Ontario investors have an objective way to measure the Commission's effectiveness," the panel declared in its missive. "Without such specificity, the Commission's accountability is undermined."

The panel also supports amending the provincial Securities Act to include a remedy for direct restitution to victims of fraud. This would replace the current method of allocating proceeds collected through penalties and disgorgement of ill-gotten funds.

The investor advisory panel, whose members include Anita I. Anand, Nancy Averill, Paul Bates, Stan Buell, Lincoln Caylor, Steve Garmaise and Michael Wissell, delivered its comments Thursday, the last day submissions were being accepted.

The OSC is required to deliver a final priority list by June 30.

Similar criticism of the OSC came from the Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor Rights (FAIR), an advocacy group that urged the regulator to adopt a list of specific priorities rather than "aspirational statements."

Among the specifics, FAIR would like to see the OSC publish a policy paper by the end of the year to ensure investment firms are backed by a mandatory compensation fund.

The fund, which could be creted or obtained through mandaory membership in a self-regulatory agency, would protect investors "in the event of insolvency" of the firm.

The advocacy group is also pushing the OSC to get the ball rolling by year-end to increase competition in the mutual fund industry, particularly with respect to fees. According to FAIR, a recent Morningstar Global Report concluded that Canada had the highest fees for equity funds among 22 countries surveyed, and gave Canada the lowest grade of F-for its high fees in a broad range of categories.

FAIR is also urging the OSC to publish a "comprehensive" response to the Ontario government's Standing Committee on Government Agencies' 2010 report on the regulator. Among the committee's recommendations was the appointment of one or more commissioners to the OSC with "a strong retail investor perspective, and FAIR is urging the regulator to commit to such an appointment this year."

ttedesco@nationalpost.com

bshecter@nationalpost.com
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Re: Securities Commissions predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Fri Apr 08, 2011 7:44 pm

http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/publications/salarydisclosure/2011/crown11.html

Salaries paid to OSC staff.......note that top salary of top man at the SEC is capped at $162,900

In the opinion of the advocate we are paying these people to be "yes" men and women to the investment industry.

Ontario Securities Commission AIELLO SALVATORE Senior Accountant, Compliance, Team 1 $138,368.60 $497.64
Ontario Securities Commission ALEXOPOULOS TULA Director, Domestic & International Affairs $215,801.77 $2,175.76
Ontario Securities Commission ANDERSON THOMAS Senior Investigator, Enforcement, Team A $116,196.69 $452.52
Ontario Securities Commission ANGUS JAMES Director, Corporate Litigation & Special Advisor $285,122.87 $2,246.20
Ontario Securities Commission ANNIBALE JOSEPH Manager, Administration $120,507.56 $1,435.48
Ontario Securities Commission ANTONIOU NOULLA Senior Accountant, Compliance, Team 2 $129,343.04 $617.97
Ontario Securities Commission ATKINSON THOMAS Director, Enforcement $290,450.81 $2,244.16
Ontario Securities Commission AU MATTHEW Senior Accountant, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $154,552.86 $546.39
Ontario Securities Commission BALTER MICHAEL Acting Associate General Counsel $184,192.98 $692.23
Ontario Securities Commission BARKER STACEY Senior Accountant, Investment Funds $137,573.32 $514.29
Ontario Securities Commission BATES JENNIFER Business Analyst, Strategy & Operations, Canadian Securities Administrators Project Office $101,217.44 $380.04
Ontario Securities Commission BENNETT MICHAEL Senior Legal Counsel, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $192,660.15 $732.00
Ontario Securities Commission BENT CHRISTOPHER Legal Counsel, Investment Funds $135,793.19 $512.13
Ontario Securities Commission BERZINS CHRISTOPHER Senior Legal Counsel, General Counsel's Office $179,622.89 $677.55
Ontario Securities Commission BLUMBERGER EREZ Deputy Director, Registrant Regulation $246,782.75 $2,169.16
Ontario Securities Commission BORDYNUIK MICHAEL Investigator, Enforcement, Team E $101,306.13 $363.96
Ontario Securities Commission BOSWELL MATTHEW Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team A $181,571.03 $604.44
Ontario Securities Commission BOWMAN ANN Vice President Marketing, Investor Education Fund $116,217.28 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission BOYLE SCOTT Manager, Enforcement, Team F $158,142.18 $1,591.48
Ontario Securities Commission BRIDGE MARRIANNE Deputy Director, Compliance $230,574.79 $2,157.10
Ontario Securities Commission BRITTON MATTHEW Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team E $217,295.63 $2,585.59
Ontario Securities Commission BROWN MICHAEL Assistant Manager, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $204,713.88 $1,752.22
Ontario Securities Commission BROWN SHERRY Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team F $142,598.52 $532.89
Ontario Securities Commission BUREAUD JEAN-PAUL Assistant Manager, Office of Domestic & International Affairs $213,471.68 $768.78
Ontario Securities Commission BUTLER BRIAN Manager, Enforcement, Royal Canadian Mounted Police $204,316.38 $1,781.23
Ontario Securities Commission BYBERG LESLIE Director, Corporate Finance $271,869.44 $2,244.16
Ontario Securities Commission BYERS CHRISTOPHER Legal Counsel 2, Market Regulation $133,471.29 $531.36
Ontario Securities Commission CAMPBELL DONNA Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team F $121,629.98 $318.80
Ontario Securities Commission CAMPBELL IAN Chief Information Officer, Canadian Securities Administrators Project Office $283,725.00 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission CARELLI MARIA Accountant 2, Registrant Regulation, Team 3 $116,253.51 $425.64
Ontario Securities Commission CARNWATH JAMES Commissioner $163,079.67 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission CARRIER VICTORIA Senior Legal Counsel, General Counsel Office $151,769.99 $601.29
Ontario Securities Commission CASIERO VINCENT Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team G $174,639.92 $715.44
Ontario Securities Commission CENTER TAMARA Legal Counsel 2, Enforcement, Team F $142,021.02 $193.52
Ontario Securities Commission CHAK NAOMI Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team C $140,784.62 $529.32
Ontario Securities Commission CHAN RAYMOND Senior Accountant, Investment Funds $150,807.63 $538.62
Ontario Securities Commission CHAN YAN KIU Legal Counsel 1, Registrant Regulation, Team 3 $118,066.04 $395.04
Ontario Securities Commission CHAUKOS PAT Manager, Compliance & Registrant Regulation, Team 3 $227,338.22 $1,930.46
Ontario Securities Commission CHEN KAREN Accountant 2, Corporate Finance, Team 1 $106,467.14 $465.51
Ontario Securities Commission CHEUNG LUCIA Senior Advisor, Market Regulation $158,617.22 $586.86
Ontario Securities Commission CHISHOLM YVONNE Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team D $197,181.50 $723.18
Ontario Securities Commission CHO PETER Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team C $162,998.49 $620.04
Ontario Securities Commission CHUNG ANITA Accountant 2, Registrant Regulation, Team 3 $112,491.02 $420.45
Ontario Securities Commission CLARK ALEXANDRA Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team C $187,428.28 $676.02
Ontario Securities Commission CLARKIN BRIAN Manager, Enforcement, Team B $217,148.33 $1,764.16
Ontario Securities Commission COLLINS KEVIN Manager, Inquiries $138,764.62 $1,529.32
Ontario Securities Commission COLLINS STEPHANIE Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team D $175,803.17 $618.48
Ontario Securities Commission CONDON MARY Commissioner $135,750.00 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission CRAIG HUGH Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team A $178,840.25 $604.44
Ontario Securities Commission CURNOE LORNA Senior Officer, Human Resources $111,213.06 $431.88
Ontario Securities Commission D'AMATA TERESA Accountant 2, Compliance, Team 2 $112,472.80 $425.64
Ontario Securities Commission DANIELS KATHRYN Deputy Director, Case Management & Litigation $250,406.43 $2,244.16
Ontario Securities Commission DANIELSON KAREN Legal Counsel 2, Registrant Regulation, Team 3 $123,458.15 $483.72
Ontario Securities Commission DAY ROBERT Manager, Business Planning & Reporting $145,194.80 $1,532.92
Ontario Securities Commission DE LINT DIRK Senior Legal Counsel, Registrant & Regulation, Team 3 $200,361.76 $734.55
Ontario Securities Commission DE SOUZA PAUL Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team D $129,463.40 $516.36
Ontario Securities Commission DE VERTEUIL MICHAEL Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team F $162,252.49 $620.04
Ontario Securities Commission DENYSZYN MICHAEL Legal Counsel 2, Registrant Regulation, Team 4 $142,038.76 $513.75
Ontario Securities Commission DEY WENDY Director, Communications & Public Affairs $235,856.80 $2,260.72
Ontario Securities Commission DHILLON INDI Accountant 2, Enforcement, Team G $134,759.08 $503.85
Ontario Securities Commission DOWDALL-LOGIE MARGARET Executive Director, Chief Operating Officer & Chief Administrative Officer $426,447.24 $13,444.16
Ontario Securities Commission DUGUAY FREDERIC Legal Counsel 1, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $109,137.92 $404.88
Ontario Securities Commission ENRIGHT LISA Manager, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $202,149.49 $1,716.40
Ontario Securities Commission EVEREST KELLY Senior Accountant, Registrant Regulation, Team 4 $149,293.76 $553.65
Ontario Securities Commission FALLONE JOANNA Manager, Enforcement, Team H $191,927.85 $1,732.00
Ontario Securities Commission FEASBY JONATHON Legal Counsel 2, Enforcement, Team A $140,445.57 $528.27
Ontario Securities Commission FERNANDEZ DEAN Manager - Enterprise Architect, Canadian Securities Administrators Project Office $121,668.42 $338.66
Ontario Securities Commission FERRIS DEREK Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team D $201,001.68 $736.08
Ontario Securities Commission FIELD ALLISTER Investigator 2, Enforcement, Team B $100,320.44 $378.42
Ontario Securities Commission FISHER GAYLE Chief Human Resources Officer $218,366.97 $2,121.76
Ontario Securities Commission FITZSIMMONS FREDERICK Accountant 2, Enforcement, Royal Canadian Mounted Police $133,167.41 $494.04
Ontario Securities Commission FLYNN SHAUNA Senior Legal Counsel 2, Enforcement, Team B $168,618.99 $598.23
Ontario Securities Commission FORSTER PAZIENZA CHRISTINA Assistant Manager, Compliance $160,674.86 $1,563.30
Ontario Securities Commission FOUNTAIN DAVID Chief Technology Officer $198,585.23 $1,725.73
Ontario Securities Commission FOY PAMELA Legal Counsel 2, Enforcement, Team D $132,893.86 $528.81
Ontario Securities Commission FRANKEN HEIDI Senior Accountant, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $142,349.96 $495.60
Ontario Securities Commission FUNG CARLIN Senior Accountant, Registrant Regulation, Team 3 $168,966.49 $620.04
Ontario Securities Commission FYDELL BARBARA Senior Legal Counsel, Market Regulation $195,035.93 $721.65
Ontario Securities Commission GALLACHER CRAIG Senior Investigator, Enforcement, Team F $113,266.85 $419.40
Ontario Securities Commission GANAHA MINAMI Senior Legal Counsel, Information Technology $226,108.38 $790.36
Ontario Securities Commission GARD GREGORY Manager, Enforcement, Team A $170,601.90 $1,596.16
Ontario Securities Commission GEORGE CHRISTINE Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team E $163,681.09 $575.94
Ontario Securities Commission GIBSON KEN Director, Corporate Services $242,409.12 $2,246.20
Ontario Securities Commission GOLDBERG RHONDA Director, Investment Funds $230,572.84 $2,110.45
Ontario Securities Commission GORMAN KELLY Deputy Director, Corporate Finance $216,030.60 $2,022.64
Ontario Securities Commission GRANT DAVID Senior Advisor, Office of Domestic & International Affairs $100,150.28 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission GREENGLASS SUSAN Director, Market Regulation $241,781.73 $2,244.16
Ontario Securities Commission GRIVAS CHRISTOS Legal Counsel 2, Secretary's Office $134,493.38 $514.80
Ontario Securities Commission GUNN GEORGE Manager, Compliance & Registrant Regulation, Team 4 $192,809.85 $1,732.00
Ontario Securities Commission GUPTABHAYA SONALI Legal Counsel 2, Market Regulation $136,465.66 $512.73
Ontario Securities Commission HAMZA THOMAS Manager, Investor Education Fund Service Bureau $199,362.11 $685.29
Ontario Securities Commission HAYWARD PAUL Senior Legal Counsel, Corporate Finance, Team 1 $203,026.10 $724.17
Ontario Securities Commission HELDMAN SANDRA Senior Accountant, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $164,629.04 $601.29
Ontario Securities Commission HINDS ANDRE Administrator, Information Technology Database $101,239.58 $387.72
Ontario Securities Commission HO MICHAEL Accountant 2, Enforcement, Team B $133,781.84 $492.00
Ontario Securities Commission HOMENUK JILL Senior Manager, Communications & Public Affairs $165,369.97 $1,553.17
Ontario Securities Commission HORGAN SEAN Manager, Enforcement, Team D $208,293.42 $713.28
Ontario Securities Commission HUANG PEI-CHING Senior Legal Counsel, Investment Funds $165,142.25 $595.17
Ontario Securities Commission HUI KARIN Accountant 2, Registrant Regulation, Team 3 $116,069.84 $462.96
Ontario Securities Commission HUMPHREYS JOHN Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team D $187,098.61 $681.66
Ontario Securities Commission JEPSON CHRISTOPHER Senior Legal Counsel, Compliance, Team 1 $204,102.57 $736.08
Ontario Securities Commission JOHNSON CHRISTIE Legal Counsel 1, Enforcement, Team B $104,593.82 $33.87
Ontario Securities Commission JOHNSTON LAURA Mgr., Info. Technology Project Mgmt., Canadian Securities Administrators Project Office $138,176.55 $505.92
Ontario Securities Commission JOSHI MEENU Accountant 2, Investment Funds $129,023.10 $489.33
Ontario Securities Commission JOSHI SHAIFALI Accountant 2, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $123,888.80 $425.61
Ontario Securities Commission KALRA RITU Senior Accountant, Corporate Finance, Team 1 $162,733.19 $603.45
Ontario Securities Commission KANJI NAIZAM Deputy Director, Take Over Bids, Mergers & Acquisitions $228,738.91 $2,238.97
Ontario Securities Commission KEARSEY IAN Legal Counsel 2, Investment Funds $136,048.87 $488.20
Ontario Securities Commission KENNEDY PAULETTE Commissioner $155,164.83 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission KENNISH WENDY Senior Legal Counsel, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $103,971.09 $250.55
Ontario Securities Commission KHAN NALINI Legal Counsel 2, Enforcement, Team G $130,063.76 $485.76
Ontario Securities Commission KHORASANEE ALIZEH Accountant 2, Compliance, Team 1 $112,875.26 $421.44
Ontario Securities Commission KIRSH MARION Associate Chief Accountant $205,254.40 $763.05
Ontario Securities Commission KLAM JEFFREY Legal Counsel 2, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $118,363.15 $483.72
Ontario Securities Commission KNAPP LAURA Manager, Knowledge Services $103,803.29 $1,384.66
Ontario Securities Commission KOHL ROBERT Senior Legal Counsel, Compliance, Team 2 $206,326.68 $736.08
Ontario Securities Commission KOOR ELLE Deputy Director, Project Planning $179,259.80 $2,002.60
Ontario Securities Commission KOSKELA JASON Legal Counsel 2, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $133,475.49 $487.80
Ontario Securities Commission KOWAL MONICA General Counsel $286,904.91 $2,495.08
Ontario Securities Commission KOZOVSKI DANIELLA Legal Counsel 1, Enforcement, Team A $112,310.27 $429.72
Ontario Securities Commission KRIKORIAN CHRISTINE Accountant 2, Corporate Finance, Team 1 $128,236.42 $460.83
Ontario Securities Commission KRYSTIE ALLAN Senior Administrator, Investor Advisory Panel $106,994.58 $422.49
Ontario Securities Commission KWAN CARINA Legal Counsel 1, Investment Funds $113,869.26 $402.84
Ontario Securities Commission LAMACRAFT TARA Senior Legal Counsel, General Counsel's Office $133,705.29 $621.10
Ontario Securities Commission LAW LEO Applications Architect, Information Technology $117,680.64 $435.48
Ontario Securities Commission LEE IRENE Legal Counsel 2, Investment Funds $117,378.63 $497.64
Ontario Securities Commission LEITCH DONNA Senior Registration Supervisor, Registrant Regulation $105,984.73 $1,386.19
Ontario Securities Commission LEONARD NORMAN Director, Strategy & Operations $262,651.43 $2,260.72
Ontario Securities Commission LESAGE PATRICK Commissioner $100,835.17 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission LEUNG ANTOINETTE Manager, Market Regulation $180,726.53 $1,688.96
Ontario Securities Commission LIU WINFIELD Senior Legal Counsel, Market Regulation $190,351.68 $736.08
Ontario Securities Commission LJUBIC GREGORY Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team E $208,101.68 $736.08
Ontario Securities Commission LO YVONNE Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team B $174,934.49 $620.04
Ontario Securities Commission MACDONALD JAMES Manager, Communications $129,763.58 $1,477.48
Ontario Securities Commission MAINVILLE CHANTAL Senior Legal Counsel, Investment Funds $183,625.26 $735.57
Ontario Securities Commission MAKEPEACE NANCY Senior Legal Counsel, Secretary's Office $183,078.46 $655.26
Ontario Securities Commission MANARIN KAREN Deputy Director, Enforcement $246,031.59 $2,244.16
Ontario Securities Commission MARTIN GORELLE KRISTA Acting General Counsel $223,765.84 $1,885.07
Ontario Securities Commission MARTIN SIDEY DONNA Assistant Manager, Investor Assistance $170,141.73 $1,924.12
Ontario Securities Commission MARTINAKIS MERZANA Accountant 2, Compliance, Team 2 $111,438.14 $475.35
Ontario Securities Commission MASCI LARRY Senior Investigator, Enforcement, Team A $109,469.40 $419.40
Ontario Securities Commission MATEAR JO-ANNE Assistant Manager, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $196,300.51 $1,733.50
Ontario Securities Commission MATHER JAMILA Analyst, Domestic and International Affairs $107,496.87 $406.92
Ontario Securities Commission MCCANN COLIN Assistant Manager, Enforcement, Team H $118,654.93 $1,452.52
Ontario Securities Commission MCINNIS CAMERON Chief Accountant $242,794.99 $2,573.50
Ontario Securities Commission MCKALL DARREN Assistant Manager, Investment Funds $206,894.05 $1,739.74
Ontario Securities Commission MEANCHOFF ALEXIS Manager, Enforcement, Team E $169,136.44 $1,645.90
Ontario Securities Commission MIREAULT KELLY Accountant 2, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $128,026.04 $462.45
Ontario Securities Commission MOHAMMADI MOHAMMAD IQBAL Accountant 1, Corporate Services $105,994.88 $398.64
Ontario Securities Commission MONIZ ANDRE Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team C $166,816.80 $611.73
Ontario Securities Commission MOUFTAH MAYE Legal Counsel 2, Compliance, Team 2 $153,855.95 $562.44
Ontario Securities Commission NANIA VIRAF Senior Accountant, Investment Funds $171,367.62 $618.48
Ontario Securities Commission NUNES VERA Assistant Manager, Investment Funds $208,236.18 $1,745.44
Ontario Securities Commission O'DONOVAN ERIN Senior Legal Counsel, Take Over Bids $116,241.35 $423.36
Ontario Securities Commission O'HEARN SHANNON Senior Legal Counsel, Take Over Bids $182,978.66 $629.88
Ontario Securities Commission OLUJIC JULIE Legal Counsel 2, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $105,952.03 $482.61
Ontario Securities Commission OSENI SARAH Senior Legal Counsel, Investment Funds $151,917.38 $546.39
Ontario Securities Commission PAGLIA STEPHEN Legal Counsel 2, Investment Funds $128,783.59 $486.78
Ontario Securities Commission PANCHUK DONALD Manager, Enforcement, Team G $150,965.97 $535.33
Ontario Securities Commission PANZETTA FRANK Controller $183,229.18 $1,637.68
Ontario Securities Commission PARE MAXIME Senior Legal Counsel, Market Regulation $198,339.68 $736.08
Ontario Securities Commission PAUL MARGO Director, Corporate Finance $284,520.58 $2,105.92
Ontario Securities Commission PAWELEK SUSAN Accountant 2, Compliance, Team 1 $116,356.44 $440.16
Ontario Securities Commission PEARSON LESLIE Legal Counsel 2, Market Regulation $142,134.69 $531.36
Ontario Securities Commission PERRY CAROL Commissioner $101,250.00 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission PETROFF THOMAS Senior Investigator, Enforcement, Team G $129,499.88 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission PILIPAVICIUS RIMA Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team G $147,610.22 $581.16
Ontario Securities Commission PILKEY SCOTT Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team F $206,326.68 $736.08
Ontario Securities Commission PINCH MARK Senior Accountant, Chief Accountant's Office $138,527.50 $511.62
Ontario Securities Commission PRICE CULLEN Legal Counsel 2, Enforcement, Team D $148,075.33 $526.74
Ontario Securities Commission RADU RICHARD Senior Investigator, Subject Matter Expert, Team E $147,265.03 $509.58
Ontario Securities Commission RANDHAWA S. SONNY Assistant Manager, Corporate Finance, Team 1 $170,614.44 $1,631.44
Ontario Securities Commission REDMAN PAUL Principal Economist $136,512.92 $1,482.67
Ontario Securities Commission RHEE ANDREW Accountant 2, Registrant Regulation, Team 3 $108,118.94 $427.68
Ontario Securities Commission RITCHIE LAWRENCE Vice Chair $484,410.57 $11,273.60
Ontario Securities Commission SALDANHA ROY Manager, Technology Services $137,171.21 $1,499.77
Ontario Securities Commission SANDULESCU RUXANDRA Senior Accountant, Market Regulation $156,847.53 $549.00
Ontario Securities Commission SANJOTO WINNIE Senior Legal Counsel, Corporate Finance, Team 2 $170,210.69 $621.54
Ontario Securities Commission SANTIAGO DAVE Accountant 2, Compliance, Team 1 $137,556.38 $493.02
Ontario Securities Commission SCHOFIELD MELISSA Senior Legal Counsel, Investment Funds $160,208.03 $628.32
Ontario Securities Commission SHAHVIRI MEHRAN Analyst Intelligence, Enforcement, Team E $109,778.22 $417.87
Ontario Securities Commission SHEIKH USMAN Legal Counsel 1, Enforcement, Team C $104,685.46 $341.76
Ontario Securities Commission SHIELDS ANNE Senior Officer, Human Resources $102,596.08 $413.16
Ontario Securities Commission SIKORA JODY Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team C $141,731.21 $532.89
Ontario Securities Commission SILMA SUSAN Director, Compliance & Registrant Regulation $281,422.04 $2,244.16
Ontario Securities Commission SIMARD BRIDGET Accountant 2, Enforcement, Team C $123,211.27 $471.24
Ontario Securities Commission SINCLAIR DONNA Legal Counsel 2, Enforcement, Team H $144,225.97 $551.61
Ontario Securities Commission SLON CAROLYN Legal Counsel 1, Secretary's Office $109,048.22 $398.64
Ontario Securities Commission SMITH ROBERT Analyst, Information Technology Systems $102,174.58 $387.72
Ontario Securities Commission STEPHENSON ALICIA NICOLE Legal Counsel 1, Compliance, Team 1 $111,483.53 $403.35
Ontario Securities Commission STERN TRACEY Manager, Market Regulation $230,171.46 $1,793.01
Ontario Securities Commission STEVENSON JOHN Corporate Secretary $241,989.37 $2,244.16
Ontario Securities Commission SUGDEN GINA Manager, Registrant Regulation, Team 4 $107,270.28 $410.52
Ontario Securities Commission SUPERINA JOHANNA Manager, Enforcement, Team C $233,845.47 $2,803.01
Ontario Securities Commission SUTLIC EMILIJA Senior Legal Counsel, Market Regulation $157,441.48 $595.17
Ontario Securities Commission SWAYZE SUSAN Senior Editorial Advisor $112,527.60 $417.36
Ontario Securities Commission SYLVESTRE JONATHAN Senior Accountant, Market Regulation $145,142.75 $512.13
Ontario Securities Commission TANG MICHAEL Senior Legal Counsel, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $169,859.72 $601.38
Ontario Securities Commission TEDESCO FELICIA Manager, Compliance & Registrant Regulation, Team 2 $200,656.83 $1,717.64
Ontario Securities Commission THAKRAR SURESH Commissioner $112,750.00 $0.00
Ontario Securities Commission THOMAS SUSAN Legal Counsel 2, Investment Funds $142,651.39 $509.58
Ontario Securities Commission THOMPSON SIMON Senior Legal Counsel, General Counsel's Office $174,250.75 $652.11
Ontario Securities Commission THOMSON JEFFREY Senior Investigator, Enforcement, Team D $117,032.12 $417.36
Ontario Securities Commission TILLIE MARCEL Senior Accountant, Enforcement, Team B $166,097.26 $620.04
Ontario Securities Commission TOLEDANO LORI Assistant Manager, Enforcement, Team A $172,914.64 $1,928.32
Ontario Securities Commission TOM PATRICIA Senior Officer, Human Resources $103,072.53 $390.73
Ontario Securities Commission TONG ESTELLA Senior Accountant, Compliance, Team 2 $149,984.69 $536.55
Ontario Securities Commission TOO BYRON Manager, Application Services $143,912.80 $1,532.92
Ontario Securities Commission TOPP ELIZABETH Senior Legal Counsel, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $114,430.74 $595.17
Ontario Securities Commission TRIVEDI VIRAJ Accountant 2, Corporate Finance, Team 1 $111,057.56 $435.48
Ontario Securities Commission TSE AMY Accountant 2, Enforcement, Team G $136,343.40 $484.71
Ontario Securities Commission TURCOTTE JOSEE Deputy Secretary & Independent Adjudicative Counsel $217,521.34 $2,161.18
Ontario Securities Commission TURNER JAMES Vice Chair $469,779.80 $9,444.16
Ontario Securities Commission VAILLANCOURT MICHELLE Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team F $182,885.15 $688.92
Ontario Securities Commission VANDERLAAN WAYNE Senior Investigator, Enforcement, Team A $106,913.69 $394.84
Ontario Securities Commission VARMA NEETI Senior Accountant, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $147,264.37 $537.60
Ontario Securities Commission WAECHTER JANE Senior Legal Counsel, Enforcement, Team B $191,281.98 $727.35
Ontario Securities Commission WAKEFIELD STEPHANIE Legal Counsel 2, General Counsel's Office $137,465.77 $490.74
Ontario Securities Commission WALDIE CRAIG Senior Geologist $121,184.69 $457.23
Ontario Securities Commission WALZ TREVOR Senior Accountant, Compliance, Team 1 $157,724.50 $595.17
Ontario Securities Commission WATSON MICHAEL Special Advisor, Capital Markets Enforcement, Royal Canadian Mounted Police $327,950.80 $9,444.16
Ontario Securities Commission WELSH DOUG Senior Legal Counsel, Investment Funds $188,862.05 $685.32
Ontario Securities Commission WHILER RICK Senior Accountant, Corporate Finance, Team 1 $171,950.49 $620.04
Ontario Securities Commission WHYTE JAMES Senior Geologist $100,448.56 $378.42
Ontario Securities Commission WILSON JAMES Assistant Manager, Market Participant Support $141,237.12 $1,541.17
Ontario Securities Commission WILSON W. DAVID Chair $626,121.15 $14,029.80
Ontario Securities Commission WONG CHARLMANE Senior Accountant, Corporate Finance, Team 3 $123,637.03 $224.29
Ontario Securities Commission WONG YUN ZHI DAPHNE Analyst, International Affairs $108,417.92 $388.32
Ontario Securities Commission YU SO MAN Accountant 2, Investment Funds $120,759.24 $434.57
Ontario Securities Commission ZAMAN MUHAMMAD ABID Accountant 1, Compliance, Team 2 $101,094.61 $377.88
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Re: Securities Commissions predatory behaviours

Postby admin » Mon Mar 28, 2011 9:15 am

Not directly related to your issues out west but here in Nova Scotia we are fighting a case of fraud where National Bank manipulated stocks and in the process screwed hundreds of business owners like myself out of their life's work as well as thousands of smaller investors too. In all it was a $100 Million fraud.

Today, finally after 6+ years of investigating the file, the RCMP have laid charges against the three main partners in pulling off this fraud. Mind you there should also be criminal charges laid against the Securities Commission for not going after these same individuals. They allowed the broker and the lawyer who were the main parties to go scott free as well as NAtional Bank, despite the IDA recommending charges be laid. Instead they let these guys go and focus in on one of the largest victims of their scheme. Trying to make a case that he was the mastermind. It's all a complete farce, and would make a great documentary / how to movie about how to screw the public and get away with it... just have to know the right people. In this case Colpitts was the perfect person to run this scam as he controlled every end of it, including the securities commission which he was a director of.

Here's the story:

RCMP Conclude Knowledge House Investigation

March 28th, 2011, Halifax, Nova Scotia…Following an investigation by
the Nova Scotia RCMP Commercial Crime Section, fraud affecting the
public market charges have been filed in the Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia against three people. The charges result from a long-term
investigation into the company formerly known as Knowledge House
Incorporated.

The investigation into Knowledge House Inc. began after the RCMP
received a complaint from the Nova Scotia Securities Commission. As a
result of the complaint, the Commercial Crime Section of the RCMP
launched an investigation into the activities and trading of the
company.

RCMP Investigators from the Nova Scotia Commercial Crime Section worked with assistance from the Integrated Market Enforcement Team. (IMET)

The Halifax-based Knowledge House Publishing began publicly trading on the Montreal Stock Exchange in 1998. Knowledge House Publishing changed its name to Knowledge House Inc. on the 3rd day of November, 1999 and began publicly trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the trade symbol KHI on the 6th day of December, 1999. The company developed technology based learning programs and solutions. The fraud was alleged to have been committed between the 1st day of January, 2000, and the 13th day of September, 2001.

It is alleged that Daniel Frederick POTTER, Robert Blois COLPITTS and
Bruce Elliott CLARKE conspired to affect the public market of Knowledge
House Inc. shares.

As a result of the investigation the following charges have been laid:

Daniel Frederick POTTER
- One charge of Conspiracy to commit Fraud affecting the public market
contrary to Section 380(2) and 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of
Canada;
- One charge of Fraud affecting the public market contrary to Section
380(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada;
- Two charges of Fraud Over $5000 contrary to Section 380(1)(a) of the
Criminal Code of Canada;

Robert Blois COLPITTS
- One charge of Conspiracy to commit Fraud affecting the public market
contrary to Section 380(2) and 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of
Canada;
- One charge of Fraud affecting the public market contrary to Section
380(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada;
- Two charges of Fraud Over $5000 contrary to Section 380(1)(a) of the
Criminal Code of Canada;

Bruce Elliott CLARKE
- One charge of Conspiracy to commit Fraud affecting the public market
contrary to Section 380(2) and 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of
Canada;
- One charge of Fraud affect the public market contrary to Section
380(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada;
- Three charges of Fraud Over $5000 contrary to Section 380(1)(a) of
the Criminal Code of Canada.

The three will appear in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia on April 28th
at 9:00 a.m. to face the charges.

The RCMP’s Federal Policing, through its Commercial Crime and
Integrated Market Enforcement Team Programs, prevents, investigates and
supports the prosecution of serious Criminal Code capital markets fraud
offences that are of regional or national significance and that threaten
investor confidence or economic stability in Canada.

For more information on RCMP initiatives, visit
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/imet-eipmf/index-eng.htm.

Should you wish to arrange an interview with Chief Superintendent Blair
McKnight, Officer in Charge of Criminal Operations the RCMP in Nova
Scotia, please contact the Media Relations Officer listed below.
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