Financial crime more than every other crime combined?

[admin]

detailed estimates of financial harm

It is a great lawyer-wallpapering trick, and a regulator confidence-game….

but something just seems wrong when a govt regulator secretly sells in advance, deferred prosecution agreements (exemptions to the law)...out the back door of the regulator, to allow private financial parties to violate the law, and violate the public!

When the resulting financial harm adds up to an average hit of $5,000 to $7,000 upon the shoulders of society, as measured by every man, woman and child in Canada.

Estimates of dollar values at stake:

Canadian Stock market capitalizations $2.3 Trillion

Canadian Bond Markets $2 Trillion, 2014

Mortgage Markets $

Mutual Fund holdings $1.74 trillion at the end of May 2019

Derivative Investments $

Hypothecated Investments (K O’Leary) $

Alternate (exempt market) investments (Private Capital Market) $2 Trillion


Sub Total $8.04 Trillion


Alternate Investments (prospectus exempt, real estate, mortgages, business schemes, fast talking hotel ballroom pitches)


Foortnotes for above

1. The Toronto Stock Exchange (often abbreviated as TSX) is a stock exchange in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. It is the 9th largest exchange in the world by market capitalization. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toronto_Stock_Exchange



2. https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/ ... t-2014.pdf

3.


4. https://www.ific.ca/en/info/stats-and-facts/


5.

6.

7. https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/ ... t-2014.pdf page 6

8.


9. https://pcma.news/private-capital-sitti ... -activity/


There is virtually no public police enforcement of laws in this 8 Trillion market…

While I was researching this info, the program on TV was Global TV’s Border Security show, where a lady traveller had a small bag of lemons confiscated as the border agent stated “they are a threat to the local economy….”

A bag of fresh lemons is a threat to the economy, while 2 or 3%*** of our combined $8 Trillion dollars in investments is....the perfect crime. Do the math. (OSC Chairperson Maureen Jensen is the source of the 2-3% harm estimates, see source-link *** at end of this post)

$160 Billion to $240 Billion in Financial Harm to Canada (for 34 million people)...

...is also $160 Billion to $240 billion in unjust enrichment to rich, old white men and their corporations...

This equals an average number between approx $5000 to $7000 for every man, woman and child in the land….cost of the financial harm when boiled down to a per person measure of population

Ontario 13.4 million people = 80 billion to 90 Billion per year
Quebec 8.1 million people = $40 Billion to $56 Billion
BC 4.6 million people = $25 Billion to $35 Billion
Alberta 4 million people = $20 Billion to $28 Billion
Manitoba 1.2 million people= $5 Billion to $7Billion
Sask 1 million people = $5 Billion to $7Billion
etc.,etc

2kfrzp.jpg (33.71 KiB) Viewed 459 times

something just seems wrong when a govt regulator secretly sells deferred prosecution agreements (exemptions to the law)...out the back door of the regulator, to let private financial parties violate the law, and violate the public!

==========

***
In a speech, Maureen cited research from the National Bureau of Economic Research that she said suggests a combination of embedded fees and unsuitable portfolio construction has caused the investment returns of advised clients to lag passive market benchmarks by two to three per cent a year.

“The impact of these fees on investor returns is significant,” she said. “Investors experiencing this kind of outcome on a consistent basis would never break even and would, in fact, be worse off.”

Maureen Jensen
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=177&p=4092#p4046

=========

In comparison to the $5000 to $7000 cost of financial harm from rigged and self regulated investment games:

Lets look at a quick comparison to see how much we pay for our health care.

Alberta is on pace to spend more per person on health care this year than any other province, a new report says.

The province is forecasted to spend $7,552 on health care per person in 2018, a report released Tuesday by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) found, higher than the Canadian average of $6,839.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/ ... -1.4912319

[admin]

From: Ken Kivenko <kenkiv@gmail.com>
Date: June 13, 2019 at 9:15:04 AM EDT
To: Stan Magdison <stan.magidson@asc.ca>, Brenda Leong <bleong@bcsc.bc.ca>, David  Cheop <david.cheop@gov.mb.ca>, Kevin Hoyt <kevin.hoyt@nbsc-cvmnb.ca>, Renee Dyer <reneedyer@gov.nl.ca>, Tom Hall <Tom_Hall@gov.nt.ca>, Paul Radford <paul.radford@novascotia.ca>, Maureen Jensen <mjensen@osc.gov.on.ca>, Roger Sibotkiewicz <roger.sobotkiewicz@gov.sk.ca>, Fred Pretorius <fred.pretorius@gov.yk.ca>, Steve  Dowling <sddowling@gov.pe.ca>, Louis Morisset <louis.morisset@lautorite.qc.ca>, Laura Belloni <laura.belloni@acvm-csa.ca>
Subject: Six month anniversary. Proposed ban of DSC funds and discount brokerage fee gouging

Today marks the six month anniversary of the close of consultations on the above noted subject matter.

The harm done to Canadians by the Discount brokers collecting fees for no service and the continued sale of DSC funds continues unabated.

These two changes are no- brainers and should have by now been prohibited.

We appreciate that Ontario will not support a ban on DSC but that is no reason for the other jurisdictions to permit this toxic form of compensation to continue to harm Canadians.

There have some horrifying cases on the use of the DSC , one involving a 90 year old.

The discount broker overcharging is costing Canadians an estimated $190 Million per annum.

We ask the CSA to take action now or to at least provide a date by which action will be taken. That would demonstrate respect for the retail investor.

Respectfully ,

K. Kivenko, President
Kenmar Associates, Toronto

[admin]

In a speech, Maureen cited research from the National Bureau of Economic Research that she said suggests a combination of embedded fees and unsuitable portfolio construction has caused the investment returns of advised clients to lag passive market benchmarks by two to three per cent a year.

“The impact of these fees on investor returns is significant,” she said. “Investors experiencing this kind of outcome on a consistent basis would never break even and would, in fact, be worse off.” Maureen Jensen

http://business.financialpost.com/news/ ... ment-funds

Ontario Securities Commission chair Maureen Jensen says Canada’s compensation model for mutual funds is fundamentally flawed and that regulators are looking at an outright ban on embedded fund fees as a “possible solution.”

“The current compensation model consists of fees set by the fund manager to incent sales,” Jensen said Tuesday in her first major address since taking the helm of the country’s largest market watchdog.

“This does not put the investor’s interest first, and that’s a fundamental flaw that needs to be addressed.”

Following the luncheon speech at the Toronto Board of Trade, Jensen told media it is up to the investment industry to come up with a viable alternative to a ban.

Market watchdogs heighten scrutiny of cyber security at Canada’s biggest companies
OSC to launch fintech hub to help companies navigate and possibly ‘tailor’ regulatory framework
She said some suggested alternatives, such as capping the embedded fees, do not go far enough because they don’t eliminate conflicts of interest at the heart of the current system.

“We know this would be a major change for investors and the industry,” she told the business crowd during her speech. “That’s why input from all of our stakeholders is necessary throughout this process.”

The Canadian Securities Administrators, an umbrella organization for provincial commissions, will publish a consultation paper by the end of the year that looks at the potential impacts of an outright ban on embedded fees for investment funds, including mutual funds. It is the culmination of an examination that has been under way for more than three years.

The investment industry has fought strongly against curtailing embedded mutual fund fees, which have been banned in other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom. Industry groups argue that banning the embedded fees in favour of a set annual fee for advice would squeeze some investors out of the investment game because they either cannot afford, or would chose not to pay the upfront fee.

Industry representatives have also argued that new rules requiring greater disclosure of fund fees will improve outcomes for investors by giving them a better understanding of what and how they pay for advice.

Jensen called these “critically important” changes, but said “disclosure alone is not enough.”

In her speech, she cited research from the National Bureau of Economic Research that she said suggests a combination of embedded fees and unsuitable portfolio construction has caused the investment returns of advised clients to lag passive market benchmarks by two to three per cent a year.

“The impact of these fees on investor returns is significant,” she said. “Investors experiencing this kind of outcome on a consistent basis would never break even and would, in fact, be worse off.”

Jensen, who took the helm at the OSC in February, also used the speech to announce that the regulator will be the first in Canada to launch a hub to work directly with fintech companies. The official unveiling of LaunchPad is to take place in a few weeks, and the plan is to help the upstart financial technology firms navigate — and even potentially tailor — the regulatory framework.

The upstarts, which use technology and data to compete in traditional financial services business lines from lending to investment advice, don’t fit “neatly” into current regulations, Jensen said, acknowledging that some requirements “might not make sense” for the new business models.

“Based on our experience so far, many Fintech companies ‘don’t know what they don’t know’ about operating in a regulated industry, and that can threaten their ability to do business,” she said. The idea behind LaunchPad is to help “tailor regulation and oversight to their unique business models, as long as investor protections are in place.”

Forty fintech firms have sought registration over the past couple of years, Jensen said, adding that these include online advisers, peer-to-peer lenders, and crowdfunding platforms.

She said another recent OSC initiative, a paid whistleblower program with rewards of up to $5 million for tips that lead to successful cases against those who breach securities laws, has already proven “fruitful.” It has generated 30 tips since the launch in July, some of which involve alleged malfeasance on accounting statements and disclosure violations.

There are suggestions of “serious potential offenses” among the tips received, Jensen said, adding that tipsters are coming forward to reveal alleged activity and behaviour that would have been very difficult for the commission to unearth on its own.

“I am encouraged by these early results,” she said. “New enforcement tools like this will help us resolve cases more quickly and effectively.”

Financial Post

bshecter@postmedia.com

[admin]

2kfrzp.jpg (33.71 KiB) Viewed 2133 times

1. WorldBank estimates that per capita income could increase 400 per cent
CORRUPTION

WorldBank estimates that per capita income could increase 400 per cent if developing countries controlled #corruption and enforced the “rule of law.”

Al Barnhill PhD
@FinancialMurder https://lethbridgeherald.com/commentary/opinions/2019/02/05/tackling-the-problem-of-corruption/

2. FINANCIAL MURDER CAUSING ECONOMIC SUICIDES

A dramatic spike in suicides between 2008 and 2010 can be linked with the economic crisis, according to a study published today in the British Journal of Psychiatry.

Researchers from the University of Oxford compared suicide data from before 2007 with the years of the crisis and found more than 10,000 "economic suicides" associated with the recession across the U.S., Canada and Europe.

[url]https://www.forbes.com/sites/melaniehaiken/2014/06/12/more-than-10000-suicides-tied-to-economic-crisis-study-says/#cc8253d7ae25
[/url]

3. FORMER SEC ATTORNEY JAMES KIDNEY SAYS $19 Trillion Harm to US

"During the Lake Forest College lecture, Kidney put up a chart to show how Wall Street’s epic corruption impacted the average American and the U.S. economy.

The chart shows that $19 trillion in U.S. wealth was lost; there was a 30 percent drop in housing prices; 8.8 million American jobs were lost; and 10 million homes were lost to foreclosure."

Kidney was a trial attorney at the SEC for 25 years until his retirement in 2014. He had never lost a case. According to Jesse Eisinger’s book, The Chickenshit Club, which features a full chapter on Kidney, in 2001 Kidney had “won the agency’s Irving M. Pollack Award,” named after the original head of enforcement at the SEC, “for his dedication to public service.”

http://wallstreetonparade.com/2019/01/former-sec-attorney-james-kidney-is-captured-regulators-worst-nightmare/?fbclid=IwAR3Xy_03trGnxqMdT-JbI_jnEHQWJqAB54jY_phL0REgvn7K7ug6LdMzkTw


(Here is how we do it (loot billions) in Canada...)

[admin]

Former SEC Attorney James Kidney suggests that the US lost $19 Trillion due to financial system design. Design that robs America while unjustly enriching financial players. Perhaps the number one (hidden) cause of economic uncertainty in America.

"During the Lake Forest College lecture, Kidney put up a chart to show how Wall Street’s epic corruption impacted the average American and the U.S. economy. The chart shows that $19 trillion in U.S. wealth was lost; there was a 30 percent drop in housing prices; 8.8 million American jobs were lost; and 10 million homes were lost to foreclosure."

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/dvq3147uhoau ... Speech.mp4

See article by Truth Telling former Wall Street exec Pam Martens below:

By Pam Martens: January 18, 2019 ~

James Kidney, Former SEC Attorney
James Kidney, Former SEC Attorney
A jaw-dropping video of a lecture James Kidney delivered at Lake Forest College outside of Chicago on October 12 arrived in our incoming email last Friday. The courage and frankness of that lecture took our breath away. It has also, no doubt, caused major ripples among the top brass at what is supposed to be the nation’s most formidable Wall Street cop, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

In the lecture, Kidney calls the leadership of the SEC when he worked there “self-serving cowards” who didn’t go after the higher ups on Wall Street following the crash of 2008 because they were simply “looking to move on, to return to their Wall Street job.” (We don’t think much has since changed at the SEC. See SEC Nominee Has Represented 8 of the 10 Largest Wall Street Banks in Past Three Years.)

Kidney was a trial attorney at the SEC for 25 years until his retirement in 2014. He had never lost a case. According to Jesse Eisinger’s book, The Chickenshit Club, which features a full chapter on Kidney, in 2001 Kidney had “won the agency’s Irving M. Pollack Award,” named after the original head of enforcement at the SEC, “for his dedication to public service.”

In other words, Kidney had enjoyed a stellar career at the SEC until one day in 2009 when a Goldman Sachs case, now infamously known as Abacus, was assigned to him. Abacus became a civil suit brought against Goldman Sachs and one of its lowly salesmen, Fabrice Tourre. Goldman Sachs settled its charges with a payment of $550 million and never went to trial. Not only did the corporation not stand trial, but neither did the American hedge fund owner, John Paulson, who, according to Kidney, plotted with Goldman Sachs to create a bundled pool of assets designed to fail so that he could make $1 billion betting against it (known as shorting). Unsuspecting investors lost approximately the same $1 billion that Paulson’s hedge fund made.

Tourre was found guilty by a Manhattan jury on six out of seven fraud counts and agreed to pay more than $825,000 in fines. He was never criminally charged and did not go to jail.

The Abacus case put Kidney on a course to deliver a blistering assessment of the SEC at his retirement party in 2014, setting off pandemonium inside the SEC when the speech went viral at major media outlets. In the speech, Kidney blamed the demoralization at the agency on its revolving door to Wall Street. The best SEC lawyers, according to Kidney, “see no place to go in the agency and eventually decide they are just going to get their own ticket to a law firm or corporate job punched.”

Kidney had pushed, to no avail, for higher ups in the chain of command at Goldman Sachs to be prosecuted along with Paulson. In his lecture at Lake Forest College, Kidney now concedes that all that pushing got him was “bounced” from the case. After that, he says he was mostly given “small potato” cases that someone of his experience should not have been given. Kidney includes a slide in his lecture comparing Goldman Sachs to a snake oil salesman. (The company is currently facing criminal charges in Malaysia on allegations of participating in another massive fraud there, with news breaking today that it may also pay its way out of that fraud.)

But Kidney didn’t stop with his blistering retirement speech. In 2016, Jesse Eisinger ran an article at ProPublica on the Abacus case, indicating that “Kidney recently provided me with a cache of internal documents and emails about the Abacus investigation.”

When Eisinger’s book, The Chickenshit Club, was published the following year, it included excerpts of numerous documents on the Abacus case, including this memo from Kidney which argued that the SEC should have considered charging Paulson & Co., John Paulson, as an individual, and others for the Abacus fraud:

“Each of them knowingly participated, as did Goldman and Tourre, in a scheme to sell a product which, in blunt but accurate terms, was designed to fail. An important part of the scheme was, of course, not to inform investors the product was designed to fail and, further, to lull them into confidence about the offering by promoting the participation of a supposed independent entity to select the underlying assets which dictated the performance of the offering. This was intentionally done to disguise the participation and veto authority of Paulson & Co. in selecting the assets. In other words, the current and possibly additional evidence suggests they should be sued for securities fraud because they are liable for securities fraud.”

But it wasn’t just the SEC that failed to bring higher ups on Wall Street to court. The SEC has only civil powers. It takes the U.S. Department of Justice to bring Federal criminal cases against Wall Street which can put people in jail. Kidney noted the following during his lecture at Lake Forest College: “So far as I can determine, and I have followed this closely over the years, only two actual people, employed by Wall Street banks, ever were named defendants by the SEC or the Department of Justice” for crimes connected to the epic Wall Street crash that brought down the U.S. economy. The two were Fabrice Tourre of Goldman Sachs and Kareem Serageldin of Credit Suisse.

Wall Street On Parade has written extensively about why the co-opted Justice Department has not pursued criminal charges against the Wall Street titans. (See here, here and here.)

During the Lake Forest College lecture, Kidney put up a chart to show how Wall Street’s epic corruption impacted the average American and the U.S. economy. The chart shows that $19 trillion in U.S. wealth was lost; there was a 30 percent drop in housing prices; 8.8 million American jobs were lost; and 10 million homes were lost to foreclosure.

It was the largest financial collapse in America since the Great Depression with troves of documents and whistleblower reports showing that the largest U.S. banks (like JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup) knew that the pooled mortgage products they were peddling to investors were defective. Despite that, the only man to see the inside of a jail cell as a result of criminal charges brought by the U.S. Department of Justice was Kareem Serageldin of Credit Suisse – an Egyptian born trader from a Swiss bank — who was sentenced to 30 months in jail in 2013.

Listen to James Kidney’s lecture at Lake Forest College athttps://www.dropbox.com/sh/dvq3147uho ... Speech.mp4

http://wallstreetonparade.com/2019/01/f ... nightmare/

[admin]

At the time of Chernow’s article, $4 trillion had been erased from the stock market.
Those who have taken a long, hard, honest look at Wall Street understand that it is in critical need of deep structural change: that America cannot begin to heal economically until Wall Street’s invisible hand is removed from our pocket.

Three Critical Steps to Making America Great Again Are Not on Trump’s Agenda

By Pam Martens and Russ Martens: August 23, 2017

In 1996 the U.S. had 845 Initial Public Offerings. Last year, after twenty passing years of research and budding new technologies should have fueled growth in the IPO market, the U.S. had a paltry 98 IPOs. According to a study by the law firm, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, gross proceeds from IPOs in 2016 were $18.54 billion while the “average annual gross proceeds for the 12-year period preceding 2016 were $35.73 billion — 93 percent higher than the corresponding figure for 2016.”

Not only has the U.S. seriously lost ground in IPOs but the total number of publicly traded companies in the U.S. is down by almost half in the same 20 year span. Last September, Jim Clifton, the Chairman and CEO of Gallup, the polling company, explained why he thinks this is happening. Clifton wrote:

“The number of publicly listed companies trading on U.S. exchanges has been cut almost in half in the past 20 years — from about 7,300 to 3,700. Because firms can’t grow organically — that is, build more business from new and existing customers — they give up and pay high prices to acquire their competitors, thus drastically shrinking the number of U.S. public companies. This seriously contributes to the massive loss of U.S. middle-class jobs.”

Let’s also not forget that quite a number of those 7,300 companies that were listed in 1996 failed in the great dot.com crash of 2000 because Wall Street’s minions pumped out bogus buy recommendations on new companies that didn’t have a prayer of making it as an ongoing business. The real motive behind the listing was to fuel fat bonuses for themselves. The largest investment banks were calling the startups they were peddling to the public “dogs” and “crap” behind closed doors while lauding their virtues in “research” released to entice the public to buy.

Writing in the New York Times in 2001, Ron Chernow precisely analyzed how the Nasdaq stock market, Wall Street’s primary market for tech startups, had functioned. Chernow wrote:

“Concern has centered on the misery of small investors maimed in the tech wreckage. But what happened to all the money they squandered in the I.P.O.’s? Think of the stock market in recent years as a lunatic control tower that directed most incoming planes to a bustling, congested airport known as the New Economy while another, depressed airport, the Old Economy, stagnated with empty runways. The market has functioned as a vast, erratic mechanism for misallocating capital across America.”

At the time of Chernow’s article, $4 trillion had been erased from the stock market.

Those who have taken a long, hard, honest look at Wall Street understand that it is in critical need of deep structural change: that America cannot begin to heal economically until Wall Street’s invisible hand is removed from our pocket.

The decline in both the quantity and quality of IPOs began around the same time that the Wall Street mega banks acquired the Four Horsemen — four boutique investment banks: Alex. Brown & Sons, Robertson Stephens, Montgomery Securities, and Hambrecht & Quist. As we previously reported:

“Alex Brown’s roots dated back to 1808. It was involved in the IPO of Microsoft and Oracle Systems. It was acquired by Bankers Trust in 1997 and two years later merged into the German behemoth Deutsche Bank.

“Robertson Stephens was a much younger firm, starting out in 1978. The firm was involved in the IPOs of Sun Microsystems, Excite and Chiron. Before being sold to BankAmerica for $540 million in 1997, the company was lead or co-manager on 10 of the top 25 best IPO performers in 1997. (The firm was resold several times after that, each time to a large commercial bank and eventually liquidated.)

“Montgomery Securities, heavily involved in high-tech issues, was sold to Nationsbank for $1.2 billion in 1997. Nationsbank would acquire BankAmerica the following year, but keep the name BankAmerica as the legal entity. In 2008, during the financial crisis, BankAmerica purchased the large retail brokerage firm, Merrill Lynch, which was teetering near insolvency.

“Boutique investment bank, Hambrecht & Quist, was the final of the Four Horsemen. The firm was founded by Bill Hambrecht and George Quist in 1968. The firm was the underwriter of the following well known firms: Apple Computer, Genentech, Adobe Systems, Netscape, and Amazon.com. In September 1999, Chase Manhattan Bank acquired the firm for $1.35 billion. The firm is now part of the largest U.S. bank, JPMorgan Chase…”

“There is no question that the current structure of Wall Street is both unsustainable and a critical head wind to ramping up economic growth in America. The pivotal role played by the previous independent boutique investment firms and investment bank partnerships which had their own money on the line when they invested in startups, must be thoroughly investigated by Congress before it makes any sweeping decisions on restructuring Wall Street.”

Another critical Wall Street reform that must be addressed is restoring the Glass-Steagall Act that would separate banks that hold taxpayer-backed, insured deposits from the gambling casinos on Wall Street. It’s not just that taxpayers should never be put on the hook again for another massive Wall Street bailout. It’s equally critical that five mega banks on Wall Street stop controlling the destiny of the nation through their unprecedented concentration of deposits, derivatives, credit cards, mortgage and commercial loans, hedge fund financing and control of the electoral process through their campaign financing.

And finally, Wall Street’s perpetual invisible hand in our pocket is facilitated by the lack of transparency for its crimes as a result of it setting up its own private justice system which bars the public and the press from these private adjudications which are rigged by their very structure of limiting discovery, selecting arbitrators from a limited pool completely unlike jury pool selection, and ignoring case law and legal precedent in deciding the case. Known as mandatory arbitration, the process has been shown time after time to be as bogus as the dot.coms Wall Street was peddling during the illusory tech boom.

The nation’s courts need to be reopened immediately to hear Wall Street’s crimes against both its customers and its employees. The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees this right:

“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

Darkness, fraud and a rigged wealth transfer system currently constitute the business model of Wall Street. Until critical structural reforms are made to Wall Street, all that the Trump followers have is a meaningless slogan on a red hat growing tattered and dusty with age.

http://wallstreetonparade.com

[admin]

Social Security Requires A Bailout That's 60x Greater Than The 2008 Emergency Bank Handout

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-08-1 ... nk-handout

Authored by Simon Black via SovereignMan.com,

A few weeks ago the Board of Trustees of Social Security sent a formal letter to the United States Senate and House of Representatives to issue a dire warning: Social Security is running out of money.

Given that tens of millions of Americans depend on this public pension program as their sole source of retirement income, you’d think this would have been front page news…

… and that every newspaper in the country would have reprinted this ominous projection out of a basic journalistic duty to keep the public informed about an issue that will affect nearly everyone.

But that didn’t happen.

The story was hardly picked up.

It’s astonishing how little attention this issue receives considering it will end up being one of the biggest financial crises in US history.

That’s not hyperbole either– the numbers are very clear.

The US government itself calculates that the long-term Social Security shortfall exceeds $46 TRILLION.

In other words, in order to be able to pay the benefits they’ve promised, Social Security needs a $46 trillion bailout.

Fat chance.

That amount is over TWICE the national debt, and nearly THREE times the size of the entire US economy.

Moreover, it’s nearly SIXTY times the size of the bailout that the banking system received back in 2008.

So this is a pretty big deal.

More importantly, even though the Social Security Trustees acknowledge that the fund is running out of money, their projections are still wildly optimistic.

In order to build their long-term financial models, Social Security’s administrators have to make certain assumptions about the future.

What will interest rates be in the future?
What will the population growth rate be?
How high (or low) will inflation be?

These variables can dramatically impact the outcome for Social Security.

For example, Social Security assumes that productivity growth in the US economy will average between 1.7% and 2% per year.

This is an important assumption: the higher US productivity growth, the faster the economy will grow. And this ultimately means more tax revenue (and more income) for the program.

But -actual- US productivity growth is WAY below their assumption.

Over the past ten years productivity growth has been about 25% below their expectations.

And in 2016 US productivity growth was actually NEGATIVE.



Here’s another one: Social Security is hoping for a fertility rate in the US of 2.2 children per woman.

This is important, because a higher population growth means more people entering the work force and paying in to the Social Security system.

But the actual fertility rate is nearly 20% lower than what they project.

And if course, the most important assumption for Social Security is interest rates.

100% of Social Security’s investment income is from their ownership of US government bonds.

So if interest rates are high, the program makes more money. If interest rates are low, the program doesn’t make money.

Where are interest rates now? Very low.

In fact, interest rates are still near the lowest levels they’ve been in US history.

Social Security hopes that ‘real’ interest rates, i.e. inflation-adjusted interest rates, will be at least 3.2%.

This means that they need interest rates to be 3.2% ABOVE the rate of inflation.

This is where their projections are WAY OFF… because real interest rates in the US are actually negative.

The 12-month US government bond currently yields 1.2%. Yet the official inflation rate in the Land of the Free is 1.7%.

In other words, the interest rate is LOWER than inflation, i.e. the ‘real’ interest rate is MINUS 0.5%.

Social Security is depending on +3.2%.

So their assumptions are totally wrong.

And it’s not just Social Security either.

According to the Center for Retirement Research at Boston Collage, US public pension funds at the state and local level are also underfunded by an average of 67.9%.

Additionally, most pension funds target an investment return of between 7.5% to 8% in order to stay solvent.

Yet in 2015 the average pension fund’s investment return was just 3.2%. And last year a pitiful 0.6%.

This is a nationwide problem. Social Security is running out of money. State and local pension funds are running out of money.

And even still their assumptions are wildly optimistic. So the problem is much worse than their already dismal forecasts.

Understandably everyone is preoccupied right now with whether or not World War III breaks out in Guam.

(I would respectfully admit that this is one of those times I am grateful to be living on a farm in the southern hemisphere.)

But long-term, these pension shortfalls are truly going to create an epic financial and social crisis.

It’s a ticking time bomb, and one with so much certainty that we can practically circle a date on a calendar for when it will hit.

There are solutions.

Waiting on politicians to fix the problem is not one of them.

The government does not have a spare $45 trillion lying around to re-fund Social Security.

So anyone who expects to retire with comfort and dignity is going to have to take matters into their own hands and start saving now.

Consider options like SEP IRAs and 401(k) plans that have MUCH higher contribution limits, as well as self-directed structures which give you greater influence over how your retirement savings are invested.

These flexible structures also allow investments in alternative asset classes like private equity, cashflowing royalties, secured lending, cryptocurrency, etc.

Education is also critical.

Learning how to be a better investor can increase your investment returns and (most importantly) reduce losses.

And increasing the long-term average investment return of your IRA or 401(k) by just 1% per year can have a PROFOUND (six figure) impact on your retirement.

These solutions make sense: there is ZERO downside in saving more money for retirement.

But it’s critical to start now. A little bit of effort and planning right now will pay enormous dividends in the future.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-08-1 ... nk-handout

[admin]

From ZeroHedge, thanks to Tyler http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-08-1 ... on-dollars

That there are large sentencing disparities between white collar criminals and armed robbers shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone. The American legal system exhibits a strong bias toward individuals with resources who can afford top lawyers to negotiate a lenient sentence for, say, defrauding 600 investors out of $1 billion.

But according to data provided by Dynamic Securities Analytics in partnership with Ponzitracker.com, the gaps in sentencing might be larger than one might expect.

Ponzi scheme operators who stole more than $100 million in 2016 were sentenced to 14 years, about 168 months in prison, or 21 days for each $1 million stolen.

By comparison, federal sentences for robbery were 117 months (9.75 years) with a median loss of $2,989, which works out to about 40,372 months in prison for each $1 million stolen.
In other words, robbers served 50,000x more time per dollar than your average financial fraudster.

And the disparity widens as the amount stolen increases. Those who stole less than $5 million received sentences of, on average, 2.75 years, or about 159 months per $1 million stolen.

The disparity for those convicted of theft is less jarring. Typically, convicted thieves served 22 months for a median loss of $137,828. That’s about 159 months per million, or 227 times as long as the average Ponzi operator.


Aside from the presumed wealth of those convicted, what is it that differentiates a Ponzi scheme from a robbery that makes such a dramatic difference in sentencing? A robbery implies force, sure, but is that enough to warrant a sentence that’s 50,000 times longer relative to the amount taken?

Of course, not every Ponzi scheme receives the intense media coverage that Bernie Madoff's did when he stole $60 billion, the largest financial fraud in US history. New York City dominated the Ponzi scheme tables again in 2016 thanks to the collapse of Platinum Partners, whose executives were charged with stealing more than $1 billion. Ten Ponzi schemes collapsed in California, the most of any state.

From ZeroHedge, thanks to Tyler http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-08-1 ... on-dollars (sorry I could not capture a better image:)

[admin]

When asked after the October procedural hearing why Canadians should care about the case, Galati quickly responded: “Because they’re paying $30 or $40 billion a year in useless interest. Since ’74, more than a trillion to fraudsters, that’s why they should care.”

(COMER says the figures are closer to $60 billion per year, and $2 trillion since 1974.)

Money-greed illustration | by Frits Ahlefeldt-Laurvig, Hiking.org
Joyce Nelson has written in-depth on this subject as well as postal banking, “asset recycling,” the Canada Infrastructure Bank, Iceland’s resistance to austerity, and much more in Beyond Banksters: Resisting the New Feudalism.

One of the most important legal cases in Canadian history is slowly inching its way towards trial. Launched in 2011 by the Toronto-based Committee on Monetary and Economic Reform (COMER), the lawsuit would require the publicly-owned Bank of Canada to return to its pre-1974 mandate and practice of lending interest-free money to federal, provincial, and municipal governments for infrastructure and healthcare spending.
Renowned constitutional lawyer Rocco Galati has taken on the case for COMER, and he considers it his most important case to date.
On October 14, a Federal Court judge cleared away yet another legal roadblock thrown in the lawsuit’s path. The federal government has tried to quash the case as frivolous and “hypothetical,” but the courts keep allowing it to proceed. As Galati maintains, “The case is on solid legal and constitutional grounds.”
When asked after the October procedural hearing why Canadians should care about the case, Galati quickly responded: “Because they’re paying $30 or $40 billion a year in useless interest. Since ’74, more than a trillion to fraudsters, that’s why they should care.” (COMER says the figures are closer to $60 billion per year, and $2 trillion since 1974.)
The Fraudsters
Created during the Great Depression, the Bank of Canada funded a wide range of public infrastructure projects from 1938 to 1974, without our governments incurring private debt. Projects like the Trans-Canada highway system, the St. Lawrence Seaway, universities, and hospitals were all funded by interest-free loans from the Bank of Canada.
But in 1974, the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau was quietly seduced into joining the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – the powerful private Swiss bank which oversees (private) central banks across the planet. The BIS insisted on a crucial change in Canada.
According to The Tyee (April 17, 2015), in 1974 the BIS’s new Basel Committee – supposedly in order to establish global financial “stability” – encouraged governments “to borrow from private lenders and end the practice of borrowing interest-free from their own central banks. The rationale was thin from the start. Central bank borrowing was and is no more inflationary than borrowing through the private banks. The only difference was that private banks were given the legal right to fleece Canadians.”
Just paying off the accumulated compound interest – called “servicing the debt” – is a significant part of every provincial and federal budget. In Ontario, for example, debt-servicing charges amounted to some $11.4 billion for 2015.
And that’s exactly what “the fraudsters” did. After 1974, the Bank of Canada stopped lending to federal and provincial governments and forced them to borrow from private and foreign lenders at compound interest rates – resulting in huge deficits and debts ever since. Just paying off the accumulated compound interest – called “servicing the debt” – is a significant part of every provincial and federal budget. In Ontario, for example, debt-servicing charges amounted to some $11.4 billion for 2015.
What is key to the COMER lawsuit is that the Bank of Canada is still a public central bank (the only one left among G7 countries). Their lawsuit seeks to “restore the use of the Bank of Canada to its original purpose, by exercising its public statutory duty and responsibility. That purpose includes making interest free loans to the municipal, provincial, and federal governments for ‘human capital’ expenditures (education, health, other social services) and/or infrastructure expenditures.”
Deliberate Obfuscation
In February 2015, Rocco Galati stated publicly: “I have a firm basis to believe that the [federal] government has requested or ordered the mainstream media not to cover this [COMER] case.” Subsequently, the Toronto Star and the CBC both gave the lawsuit some coverage last spring and there was good coverage in alternative media. But given the importance of infrastructure-spending in the recent federal election campaign, it’s amazing (and sad) that the COMER lawsuit was so ignored, even by the political parties – especially the NDP.
With the Harper government touting its ten-year, $14 billion Building Canada Fund, and the Liberal Party of Justin Trudeau promising to double that amount of funding by running three years of deficits, the NDP led by Tom Mulcair pledged to balance the budget. The NDP could have explained and championed the COMER lawsuit and even possibly utilized it to somehow justify the balanced-budget promise – a platform plank that likely cost it the election.
In August, Justin Trudeau spoke vaguely about financing infrastructure spending with a new bank. As a COMER litigant wrote in their newsletter, “During the recent federal election, Trudeau floated an interesting plank about creating an infrastructure bank. My first response was ‘You already have one. The Bank of Canada.’ My second question was, ‘Public or private?’ Again we see both the colossal ignorance and deliberate obfuscation of money issues in this country by our leadership.”
A Liberal Party Backgrounder explained, “We will establish the Canada Infrastructure Bank (CIB) to provide low-cost financing to build new infrastructure projects. This new CIB will work in partnership with other orders of governments and Canada’s financial community, so that the federal government can use its strong credit rating and lending authority to make it easier – and more affordable – for municipalities to finance the broad range of infrastructure projects their communities need … Canada has become a global leader in infrastructure financing and we will work with the private sector and pools of capital that choose for themselves to invest in Canadian infrastructure projects.”
It’s those “pools of capital” – including Wall Street titans like Goldman Sachs – that are set to profit handsomely from Canada’s new infrastructure lending and spending spree.
In a cynical move, the Liberal Backgrounder doesn’t mention the interest-free loans of the past, but it does cite their results in order to tout the Liberal Party’s “transformative investment plan” for Canada: “A large part of Canada’s 20th century prosperity was made possible by nation-building projects – projects that without leadership from the government of Canada would not have been possible … the St. Lawrence Seaway served as a foundation for prosperity in Quebec and Ontario; the TransCanada Highway links Canadians from coast to coast; and our electricity projects, pipelines, airports and canals have made it possible to develop our natural resources, power our cities, and connect with each other and the world.”
Pools of Capital
Enthused about Justin Trudeau’s victory and his infrastructure campaign platform, Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (October 23, 2015), “We’re living in a world awash with savings that the private sector doesn’t want to invest and is eager to lend to governments at very low interest rates. It’s obviously a good idea to borrow at those low, low rates … . Let’s hope then, that Mr. Trudeau stays with the program. He has an opportunity to show the world what truly responsible fiscal policy looks like.”
Of course, borrowing from the Bank of Canada at NO interest rates would be even more fiscally responsible, and would keep policy decisions out of the hands of foreign lenders.
***
Joyce Nelson is an award-winning freelance writer/researcher and the author of five books.
See part 2 of this series: Whose Canada Infrastructure Bank?
https://watershedsentinel.ca/articles/b ... a-lawsuit/

[admin]

the FBI has adopted the narrow approach, defining white-collar crime as

"those illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and which are not dependent upon the application or threat of physical force or violence"

(1989, 3). While the true extent and cost of white-collar crime are unknown, the FBI and the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimate the annual cost to the United States to fall between $300 and $660 billion.


https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime
http://www.acfe.com/
Friedrichs, David O. (2009). Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime In Contemporary Society (4 ed.). Wadsworth Publishing. p. 50. ISBN 978-0495600824. citing Kane and Wall, 2006, p. 5

(it must be noted that the bill to bail out the economy, from collapse in 2008 was what.....a few trillions when all were added up?)

How illegal schemes were used to pad Wells Fargo’s profits
BY JEREMY BAGOTT
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A report issued last week by Wells Fargo is no bodice-ripper, but it does have moments of guile, intrigue and betrayal to match the seediest pulp fiction.

Nearly a third of the fraud described in the report was concentrated in California, which, when the bad behavior began, was still reeling from earlier actions of a different set of rogue bankers whose practices led to a host of problem from the subprime loan meltdown and taxpayer bailouts to the mortgage default crisis for which the Northern San Joaquin Valley was ground zero in 2008.

The 110-page volume, commissioned by the bank’s board of directors, is part of an apology tour the bank has been conducting since late last year. Wells now seeks to be the “transparent bank.”

ADVERTISING

The report attempts to explain how managers at a Big Four bank could have cultivated thousands of dishonest underlings who then created as many as 2 million bogus accounts and engaged in other chicanery. Branch personnel at Wells Fargo have been accused of preying on non-English speakers, young adults and the elderly. It also hoodwinked other pitifully gullible members of society like professional investment managers and writers of popular business management books.

The report whitewashes some of the abuses.

For example, it describes a practice of wiring money in and out of accounts without the knowledge of depositors as “simulated funding.” Less kindly observers might call it wire fraud.

The report also references employees “opening unauthorized accounts” to pocket bonuses. Here, too, less kindly observers might be tempted to call the practice identity theft.

The report paints a picture of fraudsters ravaging the bank like a plague of locusts.

We meet John Stumpf, Wells Fargo’s former chairman and chief executive officer; and Carrie Tolstedt, a bespectacled former senior banking executive. Both shoulder much of the blame in the pages of the report. The bank’s board is now trying to claw back millions in bonuses promised to the two, though it’s unlikely either will have to pay back the millions already paid them over many years as a result of the institutionalized petty larceny.

Before the revelations, Wells was known for its skill in cross-selling all manner of accounts, services, credit cards and mortgages. In 2009, it claimed it had reached a point of getting each retail customer to subscribe to an average of nearly six Wells Fargo products. That claim now seems fishy.

In 2009, America was more than a year into the Great Recession. People were upset with their banks. No one had much brand loyalty. It’s just not believable.

The report finds the fraud disproportionately affected California, Arizona and Florida – states heavily hit by the subprime meltdown. At Wells, the Golden State had the highest number of sales practice-related allegations (27.9 percent of the total) and terminations coupled with resignations (28.2 percent of the total).

The report is silent on the role junk fees have come to play in banking since the end of the Great Recession.

As a result of Dodd-Frank reforms and unresolved problems with Fannie and Freddie, fees have increasingly become the raison d’être of big banks as lending becomes more problematic. In 2016. three of America’s biggest banks – JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo – are getting rich on fees. They raked in more than $6.4 billion from ATM and overdraft fees, according to an analysis by CNNMoney and S&P Global Market Intelligence.

That’s up almost $300 million from the previous year.

Meanwhile, a wave of investigations continues. In March, the Wells Fargo reached a $110 million settlement over the creation of the fake accounts. Though the accounts were fake, the fees they generated on unsuspecting depositors were all too real.

Moreover, the fraud cost ordinary people countless hours trying to identify and unwind accounts.

Wells Fargo ended up firing 5,300 employees (averaging as many as 377 fake accounts each) and launched its mea culpa tour.

In the background, U.S. banks push for more ebanking, incentivize direct-deposit programs and would like to eliminate legal tender from transactions wherever possible. In places like Sweden, this is happening.

From 2005 to 2015, the total value of ATM withdrawals in Sweden fell by 47 percent. During the same period, card payments increased by about 50 percent. One statistic shows that cash transactions made up barely 2 percent of the value of all payments in that country in 2015.

In a government study in the U.K., researchers found cash was only the second-biggest threat for criminal activities like money laundering. The bigger threat, according to researchers, was the banks themselves.

Jeremy Bagott, a former journalist, writes about finance and land-use issues in the state. He wrote this for The Modesto Bee.

Read more here: http://www.modbee.com/opinion/article14 ... rylink=cpy

[admin]

Meanwhile, in measurements of systemic financial harvesting of American investors and consumers.....here are some early data musings to try and compile the non-academic report comparing the financial cost of all ‘ordinary’, verses the financial cost of those done by the financial sector

Thanks to all who contribute to this report by sending in examples, with a source-link so they can be added to the tally.

The research question is this: “How does the cost of systemic financial and investment industry failures or wrongdoing, compare to the economic harm done by the ‘ordinary’ crime in America....comparison of crime/harm done by ‘trusted’ perpetrators of harm, verses ‘non-trusted’ perpetrators of harm.

People who we tend to trust, as compared to those whom we do not trust.....who does more financial damage to America?

Going back about as far as I recall, I bring up the 1995, December 6, story “Orange Country Marks a Grim Anniversary” Toronto Globe and Mail newspaper. (sources listed include Associated Press, Santa Ana, Calif)

Orange County, Ca south bankruptcy do the the kind of help one gets from an unregulated, "honour system" of financial games playing.

The treasurer of Orange County managed to ‘erase’ $1.7 billion of the $7.5 billion entrusted to him. I would ascribe a great deal of his ability to erase this much money to the ‘help’ and guidance that he may have received from a Wall Street advice giver...while a survey in the TIMES ORANGE COUNTY at the time read thusly: "Poll: Poverty seen as a sign of personal weakness”.

It is now 20 some years later and I think the world is coming to terms with the probability that poverty might be a sign of unchecked economic criminality, and not a sign of weakness. That is my view in 2017.




To be continued...work in progress....any good sources/examples (with a link) sent to visualinvestigations@shaw.ca, and thank you for helping flesh out this issue.

[admin]

From AnT in Toronto, financial expert and industry analyst:

Re: Securities Commissions protecting investors, or....another agenda? (my paraphrasing)

“ Or whether the FCAC’s mandate of ensuring that Canadian financial institutions act in their best interest has to be rethought for the modern era.”

Where does the best interests statement come from. I thought it was just to “to protect the interests of customers”

Current regulations allow advisors to earn more on some products than others.

One thing that has become increasingly clear to me over the years is that all these regulations that are supposedly there to protect investors actually operate as carve outs from common law. Under agency law an advisor acting under instruction to buy a security would not be allowed to sell you a product that is more expensive than another because he gets paid more for doing so; he would owe a duty of loyalty to the principal and not to the third party to do otherwise.

At present there are no material regulatory or common law protections for advice.

Current regulations allow advisors to earn more on some products than others. The present best interest standard proposals via the CSA Consult appear to me to be attempting to right this carve out in an attempt to prevent advisors from recommending higher cost similar products – this is a best product standard and conforms to agency law with respect to duties of loyalty and performance. It is not a best interest standard for advice.

These carve outs will weaken attempts by individuals to take complaints to court

All a fiduciary standard is, is a common law duty, and in the case of advice, this common law duty is applied to advice. Securities Acts allowed this carve out in the US in 1940 and Canadian Securities Law is drawn from this root. At present there are no material regulatory or common law protections for advice. Suitability is a half way house, a recognition that advice is being provided, that the typical agency relationship of instruction is actually one that includes advice but that regulation of the transaction on its own omits important liabilities associated with this non regulated duty.



The Statutory Best Interest Standard (SBIS) from the expert committee appears to be a best interest standard applied to advice with carve outs from common law that weaken the duties and obligations of the fiduciary duty. The expert committee should provide an explanation as to what the carve outs are exactly. Its standard complements the CSA proposed standard in that it deals with different duties: one is the best product, the other the best advice. But the SBIS, as I said, has critical carve outs that would not be allowed at common law. These carve outs will weaken attempts by individuals to take complaints to court in that a determination has already been made, at a statutory level, that the duty to advice in a client’s best interests is not a fiduciary duty as such and not deserving of its protection.

An

[admin]

4% cost to investors in the U.S., and 3.8% "haircut to Canadians"

(the cost per year of conflicted, high fee financial advice from some sources)

This compilation of info from two of Canada's top investment academics and professionals, with decades of experience is well worth reading in my opinion.

It looks at mostly Canada, with a bit of commentary about the costs of biased financial advice in the U.S. as well, from studies quoted in this report.

Enjoy.


P.O. BOX 85 COMMERCE COURT WEST TORONTO, CANADA M5L 1 B9
ewaitzergstikeman.com (416) 869-5587
September 8, 2016
Alberta Securities Commission
Autorite des marches financiers
British Columbia Securities Commission
The Manitoba Securities Commission
Financial and Consumer Services Commission (New Brunswick) Nova Scotia Securities Commission
Ontario Securities Commission
Financial and Consumer Affairs Authority of Sasktachewan
c/ o Josee Turcotte, Secretary Ontario Securities Commission 20 Queen St. W., 22nd Floor Toronto, ON M5H 3S8

and

c/o Ms Anne-Marie Beaudoin, Corporate Secretary Autorite des marches financiers
800 rue de Square-Victoria, 22e etage
C.P. 246, tour de las Bourse
Montreal, Quebec H4Z 1G3
Re: CSA Consultation Paper 33 -404
Please find enclosed our comments made in response to CSA Consultation Paper 33-404. The comments are solely in our personal capacity.
SUITE 5300
Please feel free to follow-up with either of us. Ed Waitzer can be reached at ewaitzer@stikeman.com . Keith Ambachtsheer can be reached at keith@kpa-advisory.com .

Keith Ambachtsheer


SUBMISSION TO THE CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS

Date: September 9, 2016
To: The Canadian Securities Administrators
From: Keith Ambachtsheer and Ed Waitzer

RE: CSA CONSULTATION PAPER 33-404 – PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE OBLIGATIONS OF ADVISORS, DEALERS, AND REPRESENTATIVES TOWARDS THEIR CLIENTS

Thank you for the opportunity to submit our views on this important topic.

We see the CSA’s initiative as requesting guidance to create and implement measures that will achieve better financial outcomes for the clients of Canada’s retail investment advice and management industry.

As two individuals who have studied this question from both academic and professional perspectives for multiple decades, we believe we are well-placed to respond and contribute to the CSA’s request.

A Time to Act

In 1994, the Ontario Securities Commission asked Commissioner Stromberg to undertake a review of regulatory issues facing the then rapidly growing investment fund industry. Her report, released in January 1995, highlighted inherent conflicts of interest with respect to the structuring and management of investment funds and the distribution of securities generally – all resulting in the interests of clients not being placed first. She also noted the inadequacy of the training and proficiency of many of those who sell and manage investment funds. Her proposals addressed these conflicts of interests and proficiency gaps.

a strong financial services sector depends on public trust.

With the passage of over twenty years, the significance of the issues highlighted in the Stromberg report now have systemic implications. For one, a strong financial services sector depends on public trust. This has been seriously eroded and is unlikely to be restored (or a sound regulatory framework built) unless investors are entitled to expect that the financial professionals they rely upon are proficient and will be held accountable to a uniform best interest standard. As importantly, the lack of workplace pension coverage for the majority of Canadian workers, coupled with the ongoing transfer of wealth from savers to the financial sector through high investment fees, have become challenges to the adequacy of retirement income savings. The time has come to act, rather than continue to kick the can down the road.

Separately and together, we have published a series of articles and studies on the question over time. The most recent (a copy of which is attached) is our article “Our investment advisers’ moral compasses are still being aligned” in the August 16, 2016 edition of the Globe & Mail. Bios can be found appended to this submission.

Simple logic predicts that when retail investors are advised by people with conflicting interests and limited competencies, poor financial outcomes will result.

Poor Financial Outcomes

Simple logic predicts that when retail investors are advised by people with conflicting interests and limited competencies, poor financial outcomes will result. There is considerable evidence that this is in fact the case. For example, in a recent Financial Analysts Journal article, Jack Bogle reports a - 4%/yr. average underperformance relative to the market for U.S. mutual fund investors for the 15- year period ending June 30, 2013.

A new paper by researchers from the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, and Western University sheds important light on the ‘value-of-financial- advice’ question in a Canadian context.iii Their study compared the investment behavior and results of a large sample of Canadian mutual fund investors and those of the people who advise them. The researchers found that while conflicts of interest do appear to impact the behavior of some advisers, there is a bigger problem.

However, their own investment results were, on average, worse than their clients’.

They found that in most cases, there was a strong correlation between how advisers advised their clients to invest, and how they invested themselves. However, their own investment results were, on average, worse than their clients’. While their clients underperformed their passive benchmarks by an average -3%/yr., the advisers’ own portfolios underperformed by an average -4%/yr. These findings led the researchers to conclude that in too many cases, advisers are drawn into the industry with the misguided strong belief that the combination of high-fee funds and high turnover will improve investment performance.

findings confirm yet again the wisdom of Commissioner Stromberg’s 1995 dual recommendations of establishing a clear ‘best interest’ fiduciary standard

Better Financial Outcomes for Clients

These new findings confirm yet again the wisdom of Commissioner Stromberg’s 1995 dual recommendations of establishing a clear ‘best interest’ fiduciary standard, as well as a clear competency standard for individuals providing investment advice in Canada.

As noted by one of us in a related op-ed (attached), Canada takes justifiable pride in our financial institutions and infrastructure. In doing so, we can ill afford to gloss over the nature of customer relationships or be perceived to lag other jurisdictions in our efforts to ensure fair dealing in financial markets. The stakes are too high (and are growing).

Attachments
ii See Bogle (2014), “The Arithmetic of ‘All-In’ Investment Expenses”, FAJ, Jan-Feb.
iii Linnainmaa, Melzer, and Previtera (2015), “Costly Financial Advice: Conflicts of Interest, or Misguided Investment Beliefs?”, Working Paper. The study was based on a sample of some 500K Canadian mutual fund investors with collective assets of $20B, being advised by some 5K investment advisors.
iv We noted that the client investment performance results reported in the new LMP (2015) study are consistent with those of prior studies of mutual fund performance performed over the course of the last 20 years. However, as far as we know, this is the first study to document that the average investment performance of the advisors’ own portfolios were even worse than those of their clients’. The study’s general findings are also consistent with a personal experience of one of the authors of this submission from some time ago. A 65-year-old just-retired friend requested an assessment of her $300K retirement savings portfolio. It was made up of five high-fee equity mutual funds with no obvious connection to her age, risk tolerance, or her approaching need for supplemental retirement income. Her ‘advisor’ was shocked when she informed him that she was closing the account and moving to a lower-cost solution more suitable to her circumstances.
v See “Make advisors work for investors” in the February 14, 2011 edition of the National Post.
6612727 v2
APPENDIX - BIOS
Keith Ambachtsheer was named ‘Top 30 Difference-Maker’ by P&I, the ‘Globe’s #1 Knowledge Broker in Institutional Investing’ and in the ‘Top 10 Influential Academic in Institutional Investing’ by aiCIO, in the ‘Top Pension 40’ by II, ‘Outstanding Industry Contributor’ by IPE, the Lilywhite Award winner by EBRI, and the ‘Professional Excellence’ and ‘James Vertin’ Awards winner by the CFA Institute.
He is Adjunct Professor of Finance, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, and Director Emeritus of its International Centre for Pension Management. He is a member of the Melbourne-Mercer Global Pension Index Advisory Council, the CFA Institute’s Future of Finance Advisory Council, and the Georgetown University Center for Retirement Initiatives Scholars Council.
Edward Waitzer served as Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission from 1993 to 1996. He holds the Jarislowsky Dimma Mooney Chair in Corporate Governance at Osgoode Hall Law School and the Schulich School of Business (York University) and is a senior partner (and former Chair) of Stikeman Elliott LLP.

"If the product sold is that of advice, then that advice should be in the best interest of the client. Anything else is fraud, because the seller is delivering a service different from what the consumer thinks he or she is buying."

Make advisors work for investors


Financial Post

Make advisors work for investors
Edward Waitzer, Financial Post ' Tuesday, Feb. 15, 2011

In January 2004, the Ontario Securities Commission released a concept paper advocating a "fair dealing model." The paper acknowledged that the regulatory regime -- regulating dealers and their representatives through the products they sell -- was based on the outdated assumption that transaction execution is the primary reason people seek financial services. Recognizing that most customers are seeking advice, the concept paper proposed changing the regulatory framework to focus on the advisory relationship.

Financial professionals and salespersons in Canada are allowed to call themselves advisors, irrespective of their professional designation. Few, however, are compensated directly for their advice. Instead, they are paid commissions to sell specific products. Addressing the conflicts of interest that result from commission-based compensation, the paper proposed that retail clients should be entitled to rely on objective advice that is in their best interest and, when there are conflicts of interest, they should be clearly disclosed so that the client can understand the conflicts and how they may affect the advice given.

In September 2004, the proposal was swept into a broader project of the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) and rebranded as the "client relationship model." Last month, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) published its proposed reforms to establish requirements for the client relationship model. They specifically avoid imposing a duty on firms and their representatives to act in the best interest of clients, focussing instead on improving compliance with the existing "suitability" standard and improving disclosure with respect to conflicts of interest and performance reporting. IIROC noted that part of what influenced its thinking was an effort to harmonize with existing and proposed CSA standards (and other standards applicable to firms not under its jurisdiction).

To understand the difference between a "suitability" and "best-interest" standard, think of a student seeking advice at an electronics store about her need for a laptop. The salesperson recommends a highly priced unit with an expensive extended warranty -- all designed to generate the highest commission. The laptop is suitable--it will satisfy the student's needs. It clearly isn't the best
solution and a disclosure obligation isn't likely to stand in the way of a motivated salesperson. If the salesperson had been bound by a "best-interest" standard, he would recommend a simpler, more reliable and affordable unit.

In the U.S., brokers and investment advisors are subject to different standards when providing investment advice. Many investors
are unaware of these differences or their legal implications or find them confusing. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Dodd -Frank Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to evaluate the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care for providing personalized investment advice to retail customers. Five months later and with the benefit of over 3,500 comment letters as well as a survey conducted by the CFA Institute (which already requires both a suitability and best-interest standard of its members in order to use the Chartered Financial Analyst professional designation) SEC staff released its analysis and recommendations.

It has proposed a uniform standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers and investment advisors providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers to act in the best interest of the customer.

The SEC staff study acknowledges that working through the details of such a standard so as to ensure it is practicable and cost effective will be complex. It does not propose a strict fiduciary duty, nor does it suggest rules to try to eliminate conflicts.

The U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) recently banned commissions for advised sales of retail investments and released proposals which would require advisors to explain why a product is better than a cheaper alternative. This and other more intrusive proposals are based on the FSA's realization that there are "fundamental reasons why financial services markets do not always work well for consumers."

The contrast in the direction, speed and intensity of regulatory reform between Canada and other major developed markets raises a number of questions and suggestions. Why did the OSC start down the path of a "best-interest" standard in 2004 and, while others (including the U.K., Europe and Australia) have caught up, we appear to have fallen back to where we started -- disclosure requirements and a relatively static "suitability" standard? To what extent is this a function of a fragmented regulatory framework suffering from bureaucratic inertia (and an industry suffering from regulatory fatigue)? What accountability mechanisms are required to motivate a more focussed and intense effort?

Why is it that Canadian regulators have shied away from proposing a "best-interest" standard? As one commentator to the SEC staff's study noted, "If the product sold is that of advice, then that advice should be in the best interest of the client. Anything else is fraud, because the seller is delivering a service different from what the consumer thinks he or she is buying." Many argue that it's the buyer's
responsibility to do due diligence and shop around for the best price. But should caveat emptor apply when buyers think they are hiring a professional to do the shopping?

There may be light at the end of this tunnel. Hopefully, the robust regulatory reform efforts underway elsewhere will inform and impose some discipline on our own. The OSC has a new chair. It recently established a highly credible Investor Advisory Panel, which has added this issue to its list of initiatives. FAIR Canada, the Hennick Centre for Business and Law, and the Toronto CFA Society are convening a second annual symposium on the subject next week. Finance Minister Jim Flaherty has demonstrated genuine interest in investor protection -- most recently supporting a national strategy to strengthen financial literacy.
Canada takes justifiable pride in its financial institutions and infrastructure. In doing so we can ill afford to gloss over the nature of customer relationships or be perceived to lag other markets in our efforts to ensure fair dealing in financial markets.

- Edward Waitzer is a professor and director of the Hennick Centre for Business and Law at York University and a former chair of the Ontario Securities Commission.

More than 20 years later, the Canadian Securities Administrators is still studying these issues

AMBACHTSHEER and WAITZER

Our investment advisers’ moral compasses are still being aligned

KEITH AMBACHTSHEER and ED WAITZER Contributed to The Globe and Mail
Published Friday, Aug. 19, 2016 5:00AM EDT

Keith Ambachtsheer is director emeritus of the International Centre for Pension Management at the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, and president of KPA Advisory Services.
Edward J. Waitzer is Jarislowsky Dimma Mooney chair and director of the Hennick Centre for Business and Law, Osgoode Hall Law School and Schulich School of Business, and senior partner at Stikeman Elliott LLP.

In 1994, the Ontario Securities Commission asked one of its commissioners to undertake a review of regulatory issues facing what was then a rapidly growing investment fund industry. Commissioner Glorianne Stromberg’s report, released in January, 1995, highlighted inherent conflicts of interest with respect to the structuring and management of investment funds and the distribution of securities generally – all resulting in the interests of consumers not being placed first. She also noted the inadequacy of the training and proficiency of many of those who sell and manage investment funds. Her proposals addressed these conflicts of interests and proficiency gaps.

More than 20 years later, the Canadian Securities Administrators is still studying these issues. Many in the industry continue to argue that it is the client’s responsibility to do their homework. Should caveat emptor apply when buyers think they are hiring a professional to help them do the shopping?
With the passage of time, the significance of the issues highlighted in Ms. Stromberg’s report now have systemic implications. For one, a strong financial-services sector depends on public trust. This has been seriously eroded and is unlikely to be restored (or a sound regulatory framework built) unless investors are entitled to expect that the financial professionals they rely upon are proficient and will be held accountable to a uniform best- interest standard. As importantly, the lack of workplace pension coverage for the majority of Canadian workers, coupled with the ongoing transfer of wealth from savers to the financial sector through high investment fees, have become challenges to the adequacy of retirement income savings. We continue to kick the can down the road.

The notion that financial professionals must act in the best interests of their clients and make full disclosure, particularly regarding conflicts of interest, is long overdue. The need for such core principles have been recognized in most other mature market economies. The suggestion by some Canadian securities regulators is that incremental rules, in the absence of strong foundational principles, may be sufficient. The result, if this approach is taken, will defer practical solutions and raise expectations, which will be disappointed.

We must also look beyond principles that seek to provide a strong moral compass for the industry and focus on ensuring the proficiency of investment “professionals.” If accountants, actuaries and lawyers need to go through rigorous certification processes to practise their profession, why not investment advisers and managers? The stakes, for clients, are often higher, as a recent study concluded.

The study compared the investment behaviour and results of a large sample of Canadian mutual-fund investors with those of the investment advisers who serve them. The researchers found that while conflicts of interest impact the behaviour of some advisers, there is a bigger problem. In most cases, there was a strong correlation between how advisers advised their clients and how they invested themselves. In fact, on average, their investment results were worse than those of their clients. The researchers concluded that, in too many cases, advisers are drawn into the industry with the, misguided, strong belief that the combination of high- fee funds and high turnover will improve performance. This suggests that most investment advisers know no more about successful investing than their clients do.

Finally, it should not be surprising that countries with the strongest best-interest standards for financial advisers also have the strongest rules regarding workplace pension-plan participation. While fiduciary principles-driven funds will easily generate twice the pension per dollar of contribution than the average mutual-fund option, more than three-quarters of Canadian private-sector workers do not participate in a pension plan other than the Canada Pension Plan. The recent agreement to enhance CPP benefits has moved Canada’s retirement savings yardstick in the right direction, but will not fully bridge this looming retirement savings gap. Canada’s financial-services regulators and industry should play a constructive role by raising the bar on fiduciary conduct and designing and offering cost-effective workplace pension plans for 21st-century realities.




[url]
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/S ... sheerk.pdf[/url]

[admin]

This post will serve as the Executive Summary of the longer post immediately following, which contains data.

ANNUAL fees, commissions, costs and abuse of market dominance (price gouging) by giant financial institutions in Canada appears to be costing the Canadian economy an amount of money that is close to the government measured stats of the financial cost to Canadians of all the measured criminal acts in the land.

The Concepts of Financial Harm to Millions of Canadians are in this Summary, while the excruciating details are found in the longer report following. Please forgive the length and incomplete nature of the report. The academic budget devoted to studying High Value Systemic Fraud in Canada consists of a can opener and a piece of string....

Click to enlarge image

Comparison of two Morgan Stanley statements show the "Bait" of luring clients with promise of trusted advice....then the "Switch" of delivering them a commission broker who is not responsible for advice.

This same Bait and Switch is done by over 100,000 "advisors" (non-advisor-licensed sales agents" in Canada as was found in this study by the Small Investor Protection Association of Canada recently. http://sipa.ca/library/SIPAsubmissions/500%20SIPA%20REPORT%20-%20Advisor%20Title%20Trickery%20October%202016.pdf

The shopping list of financial harms, as viewed through the lens of an Investment Malpractice expert, is found below, in it's yet to be complete form. However, even unfinished, it points to concerns of three areas of financial harm to Canadians and measurements of those three:

1. Annual harms which are "built into" the systems, the investment (fees etc) and the annual cost of those investment products and systems.

2. Individual (one off) investment products, tricks or traps which the system allows due to the self-regulatory, or captured-regulatory nature of the game.

3. Systemic issues which ensure that causing financial harm, or ensuring a good financial 'harvest' of people who invest and save, becomes easier for those portions of the industry who practice in this manner.

http://sipa.ca/library/SIPAsubmissions/ ... 202016.pdf



Consumer Federation of America report on the fraud of commission brokers using self-title (advisor) to pretend to be SEC Adviser. The bait and switch of one "vowel movement".

http://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploa ... Report.pdf

Please scroll down to the next posting to see a lengthy list of financial harms done to Canadians by our financial services providers and allowed to be done by literally dozens of financial regulatory agencies.

Depending upon which statistics are chosen for the cost of Canadian crime in financial terms to the country, I believe that a case can be (with data) made which supports the following statement:

ANNUAL fees, costs and abuse of market dominance (price gouging) by giant financial institutions in Canada appears to be costing the Canadian economy an amount of money that is close to the government measured stats on the financial cost to Canadians of all the measured criminal acts in the land.




Time and data permitting, study of the cost of one-off, or individual investment product failures, which number in the hundreds, will be complied. Please send any thoughts comments, or sourced examples of investment harm/failures to Canadians, to

visualinvestigations@shaw.ca

[admin]

INVESTMENT INDUSTRY HARVEST
Society’s Largest Economic Drain?



Executive Summary:

In a recent report by the Small Investor Protection Association of Canada, we were shown how easy it was to pull the wool over investors eyes. To conceal the true license of investment sellers, hiding their commission-sales role and giving investors a falsified impression of professional trust and agency duty. In Canada, over 100,000 Investment Advisors do NOT hold an Advisor license, nor the implied duty of care.

See report at SIPA titled: Advisor Title Trickery
http://sipa.ca/library/SIPAsubmissions/500%20SIPA%20REPORT%20-%20Advisor%20Title%20Trickery%20October%202016.pdf


Imagine if our most trusted financial institutions were misinforming or misdirecting their trusting clients, in order to glean more money for themselves. Imagine how much money could be made if it were possible to profit, from deceiving the public. In Canada.

 “Where the fundamental nature of the relationship is one in which customer depends on the practitioner to craft solutions for the customer’s financial problems, the ethical standard should be a fiduciary one that the advice is in the best interest of the customer. To do otherwise —

to give biased advice with the aura of advice in the customer’s best interest — is fraud.”

(this was the nutshell argument of report #1, Advisor Title Trickery)
 
James J. Angel, Ph.D., CFA and Douglas McCabe Ph.D., McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, “Ethical Standards for Stockbrokers: Fiduciary or Suitability?” Sept. 30, 2010
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686756

Then we learned that salaries of the top Securities Commission regulators in Canada are in the range of $500,000 to $700,000+ and those salaries are 100% funded by the industry, and not government. http://www.investoradvocates.ca/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=105#p3900

In this report, we look at a fraction of the costs imposed upon Canadian society and investors, arising as a consequence of the deceptions in the previous report. We view a partial record, by no means complete, of the financial harm to Canadians over the last two or three decades.

investment harms to Canadians, by investment industry professionals,appear to equal or exceed the financial cost of each and every crime in the land.

Why is this important?

If this were found to be possible, it would constitute one of the largest economic drains in the entire nation, and an injustice to every honest citizen. We let the numbers speak for themselves, and hope readers will add their voices, corrective comments, and forward this report to legislators both Provincially and Federally.

Lets begin with one example of the net effects of Investment Industry Self Dealing, before we get into the math:

Click to enlarge image and to zoom in

Jan 8, 2017 Globe and Mail story on bank misbehaviour, by Rob Carrick, linked here: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/personal-finance/household-finances/bad-behaviour-from-the-big-banks-try-their-competitors/article33542334/


Annual Cost to Canada From “Professional” Financial Trickery Believed to be in excess of $50 Billion each year

Trickery in this report is understood as professional self-dealing, deceptions, and abuse of market dominance, among other tricks and tactics. These result when investment sales agents, Dealer Representatives and commission salespersons, intentionally conceal their license and registration categories, as well as their agency duty to investors. These deceptions are contrary to Canada’s laws, as well as moral codes or conduct, and yet appear to be rampant and accepted, exempted, or ignored, by all regulatory bodies. The public is thus led into a false sense of trust based on deliberately false information.

Some Examples Of Dealer Self Dealing:

--Three divisions of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce have reached a settlement deal with the Ontario Securities Commission after revealing

they overcharged fees to clients for up to 14 years

.

An OSC statement of allegations said some clients were also not advised they met the minimum investment thresholds to qualify for lower-cost mutual funds within the same class, and instead were sold funds with higher management expense ratios. The OSC said the problem stretched back to August, 2006.

CIBC is the latest in a string of investment firms to face an OSC hearing for overcharging clients on mutual fund or account fees.

In July, three Bank of Nova Scotia divisions agreed to pay $20-million to compensate almost 46,000 clients who overpaid for investments back to 2009. Mutual fund giant CI Investments Inc. reached a deal in February to return $156-million to 360,000 clients who bought mutual funds over a five-year period when the company failed to detect errors in calculating fund valuations. In 2014, three subsidiaries of Toronto-Dominion Bank agreed to repay $13.5-million to clients who were overcharged fees.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/cibc-divisions-reach-deal-with-osc-over-excess-client-fees/article32521943/

-Morningstar article, which stated "Total fund management expenses paid in 2002 added up to more than $10 billion." and it appears to me to be a calculation of the "sum total" of management fees paid by Canadian mutual fund investors. http://investoradvocates.ca/viewtopic.p ... star#p3251

Would investors willingly pay each of these costs if they knew it was a “fee grab” and not investment “Advice”, as promised?

Canadians Mutual Fund Fees up to 100% higher than U.S. http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs07 ... 97878.html

-From page 14 “Only Canadian and Indian investors pay more than 2% for available-for-sale equity funds.” and “Canada, India, Italy, and Spain are the only countries with locally domiciled equity fund expense ratios above 2.00%.”


-From Page 15 “Canada is the only country in the survey with TERs (total expense ratios) in the highest (cost) grouping for each of the three broad categories.”
http://corporate.morningstar.com/us/doc ... ce2011.pdf


-page 22, “Among the 22 countries in this survey, Canada has the highest annual expense ratios for equity funds, the third highest for bond funds, and tied for the highest for money-market funds.”

-page 58 “ Canada has the highest overall expense ratios, scoring signi cantly higher than every other country for equity funds, and higher than every country except for locally domiciled Spain funds for money market funds. “

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clients are being robbed of returns

Subject: CSA Consultation Paper 81-408 - Consultation on the Option of Discontinuing Embedded Commissions demonstrates massive DIY investor abuse

If we examine tables 13 and 15 of the CSA consultation document we find that only $12 Billion of the $30 billion in mutual funds are D class which means that $18 billion is invested in full trailer commission paying funds. Since discount brokers cannot and do not provide investment advice , clients are being robbed of returns. Clients are not being treated fairly, honestly and in good faith as required by securities laws. We've been asking IIROC for years to enforce the law ; we're still waiting for an answer. By the way, at 1% trailing Commission , that amounts to $180,000,000 that isn't going towards the retirement funds of Canadians!
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_sn_20170110_81-408_consultation-discontinuing-embedded-commissions.htm
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-“a failing F- grade in the category of ‘fees and expenses’, the lowest grade of all countries surveyed.” )

We pause here for a quick breath, and a sub total of financial harms to Canadian society from these sales tricks, dressed up as trusted “Advice”:

It seems like mutual fund self dealing comes in between $25 Billion per year, and $50 Billion per year, depending on whether we rely on U of Toronto Pension study numbers of 2007, or bring this up to date with 2017 numbers.

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The latest statistics provided by the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) showed that in 2011 mutual fund investors paid $4.6 billion in trailing commissions to advisers and their firms, representing 34% of total revenue from MERs for that year.

[url]http://www.moneysense.ca/save/investing/mutual-funds/investors-dont-have-to-wait-for-canada-to-bury-trailers/
[/url]

Alberta’s Robb Engen, a fee based planner recently wrote this about the cost of trailing (hidden) commissions to Canadians:

According to a recent study by York professor Douglas Cumming, there are three ways that trailer fees cause harm to investors:

1.) More money is steered towards mutual funds that have higher trailer fees;

2.) Money is less likely to be taken out of mutual funds with poorer performance among funds that pay higher trailer fees, and;

3.) Mutual funds that raised their trailer fees experienced a drop in performance, while funds that lowered their trailer fees experienced a rise in performance.

Canadian securities regulators have been mulling a ban of trailer fees or embedded commissions for over two decades. The mutual fund industry, as you can imagine, is vehemently opposed to such a ban.

Canadian investors hold more than $1 trillion in mutual fund investments and pay over $5 billion in trailer fees every single year. Robb Engen

http://findependencehub.com/commission-based-advice-suitability-dangerous-combination/

Sales practices that maximize commission costs to customers and commission revenues to broker =up to $X bil each year on $YY bil per year in funds sales, @5% Deferred Sales Charges (DSC) ???

Wrap accounts, (fund of funds), house brand funds, etc. Wrap accounts (from the following image) made up 91% of mutual fund sales in this 2007 image from the industry:

Investors’ capital is steered towards funds that have higher trailer fees;

We appreciate that the industry has a substantial financial interest in keeping trailer fees in Canada, with over $5 billion per year charged to Canadian investors. My co-authors and I have no financial stake one way or the other. We simply report what the data indicate. Blame the data. Please don’t shoot the messenger.
Douglas Cumming, J.D., Ph.D., CFA, is Professor and Ontario Research Chair, York University Schulich School of Business

http://www.moneysense.ca/save/investing ... iler-fees/

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Canadian Mutual Fund charges trim $25 billion each year according to Keith Ambaschteer U of Toronto
University of Toronto 2007 pension study suggested that costs to Canadians of $500 million weekly, from Canadian mutual fund products alone when compared to institutional pension fund costs.

If the Canadian people, are being harvested by $500 million (2007 actual study figures) to $1 billion WEEKLY (our 2016 estimates), it is time that the financial regulatory forces of this nation received a gentle wake up, perhaps a shake up.

The $25 Billion Dollar Pension Haircut, University of Toronto, 2007
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BzE_LMP ... NGYxODAzZj

Mutual funds- excessive fees ( Canada has highest in the world) Morningstar report 2011

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=177&start=30#p2245

END OF MUTUAL FUND ANNUAL “HARVEST” NUMBERS

Toxic new issues, faulty income trusts, junk securities sold to the public = $20 billion each year (see detailed posting to follow)

Fractured regulators = $10 billion each year Prof John Coffee, Columbia University, or approx $100 billion out of pockets of investors since this article was written in 2007.
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=105&p=3844&hilit=coffee#p3844




Double/Triple dipping fund (trailer commissions on top of advisor fees on top of sales commissions, on top of fund Management expense fees) =$1 bil (conservative estimate based on personal experience from 20 years in industry)

Dealers pushing fee-based account charges (adding unnecessary fees to clients accounts) = $500 million per big bank (estimate based on personal experience inside industry, also See footnotes in RBC management presentation page 15 and 24 http://www.investisseurautonome.info/PD ... gement.pdf (also called “reverse churning”)

Churning clients for commissions, unknown. (note: Britain has banned the use of commissions as a form of compensation for those who call themselves financial advisors)

I met with an elderly investor recently…..with a large account which her “advisor” (truly a commission salesperson representing the interests of dealer revenues) wanted to put him into the latest and greatest Investment Dealer trend, a “Fee Based Account”. This would have merely added 2% fees to the account and otherwise done little else, and would have added sixty thousand dollars to this account.

As client age, they become more and more vulnerable, and (non fiduciary) advisors/dealers find ways to squeeze greater amounts of fees from their trusting elderly clients. The trend toward fee-based accounts and products is like creating an “annuity” to the dealer, from the accounts of their clients and not always done for the best interests of the investor.

Canadian investors should not need financial “bodyguards”, to protect them from financial “advisors”

(aka salespersons).

Investments of Ill-Repute


Canadian investors lost an estimated total of $1.9 billion in the fifteen financial scandals reviewed
http://faircanada.ca/wp-content/uploads ... -02221.pdf

A Report on A Decade of Financial Scandals
FAIR Canada Calls for a National Action Plan to Tackle Investment Fraud
http://faircanada.ca/submissions/report ... ppendix-b/


“Canada appears to have a serious problem with financial fraud and government, regulators, police and prosecutors do not seem to be effective at prevention, detection and prosecution.”

“Financial Crimes Devastate Individuals - As of July 2009, an estimated 1.3 million Canadians have been victims of fraud at some point during their lives. In many cases, investors lose a significant part of or their entire life savings. The impact on their lives is devastating and irreversible.”



Other Common Investment Toxins To Canadian’s Financial Health



PPN’s -(Principle Protected Notes) excessive fees, opaque disclosure

LSIF’s- just don’t make money A labour-sponsored venture capital corporation (LSVCC), known alternately as labour-sponsored investment fund (LSIF) or simply retail venture capital (RVC), is a fund managed by investment professionals that invests in small to mid-sized Canadian companies. The Canadian federal government and some provincial governments offer tax credits to LSVCC investors to promote the growth of such companies.

Structured products – complex/expensive, forensic analysis of one bank structured product discovered up to five layers of fees buried in them. A veritable bounty of fees to the investment bankers peddling these.

Bad new issues, faulty income trusts, junk securities dumped onto the public = $20 billion each year (see detailed posting to follow)

Sales practices that maximize commissions to customers/rev to broker =1 bil each year $20 bil per year in funds sales, @5% DSC

Double dipping (fees on top of commissions or vice versa) =$1 bil (ultra conservative estimate based on personal experience from 20 years inside industry)

Reverse Churning: The art of placing as much of ones clients into annual-fee- based accounts, and then collecting an annuity of up to 2% from every dollar in every client account, every day of the year.

Fee based accounts, where the objective is to create a “fee annuity” to the dealer and not necessarily or primarily in the interests of the investor.


More Investments of Ill-Repute
ONE-OFF JUNK INVESTMENTS

$39 billion in this short list of 73 one-offs

Average of $500 million per “investment”

HERCULES MANAGEMENT $40mil
VICTORIA MORTGAGE $50mil
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL BANK $1 bil
NORTHLAND BANK $230mil
PRINCIPAL GROUP $500mil
STANDARD TRUST $50mil
TEACHERS INVESTMENT AND HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE $150mil
CASTOR HOLDINGS $2bil
BRAMALEA $1bil
CARTAWAY $450mil
GOLDEN RULE RESOURCES $350mil
BRE-X $ 6 bil
CONFEDERATION LIFE $10bil
SHAMRAY GROUP $7mil
LIVENT $500mil
YBM MAGNEX$650 mil
JEVCO INSURANCE$30mil
COREL $500mil

PHILLIPS SERVICES $2.6 bil
MERIT ENERGY $100mil
KING'S HEALTH CENTER$100mil
CINAR $1.4 bil
VISUAL LABS$300mil
HOLLINGER $500mil

CROCUS $150mil
PORTUS $120mil
NORTHSHIELD $500mil
NORBOURG $80mil
List Source Diane Urquhart, independent consulting analyst. Toronto.

Income Trusts sold with a deceptive yield

$8 billion of investor losses on 46 income trust IPO's and secondary
offerings down more than 30%, where investment bank marketing
materials gave deceptive yields and assurances of low risk to seniors
seeking income and preservation of capital. Not the subject of any SRO or
provincial securities commission regulatory restrictions or investigations.
For details see:
m http://www.sipa.ca/

Harm Caused by Exemptions to Our Laws

One crime was $32 billion

Thousands of exemptions granted in secret for which no data is available, but some details shown below

8764 exemptions appear online at the Alberta Securities Commission

Exemptions to the law are the hidden way in which investment product makers and sellers can dispose of defective products….silently dumping them onto the consumer without notice of the defects, or warning of the exemptions. No public notice need be given when laws are exempted. No public input or discourse is allowed, and you may never know if you have been the victim of an investment which received an exemption to be sold to you, by the regulator who was charged with protecting you. It feels like a world where the regulator is “running a business within a business”, which endears them to the industry, feathers some nests and justifies the industry paying our Canadian regulators up to $700,000 salaries. (for a “government” regulator:).

The regulatory racket of granting exemptive relief from the law, appears not to be making things better for the public, but in “milking” things better…from the public.

PS. Provincial regulators when asked, will give no protocols, no procedures and no public interest reasons for granting exemptions to our laws. They act completely above the need to be accountable to the public.


Some examples of exemptive relief from our public protective laws:


commission kickback exemption

Securities law "exemptions". A license to steal?
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=143


At this web site are 42 posts about exemptions granted to avoid our laws [url]http://www.investoradvocates.ca/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=143&sid=e30dcbdb8214411b092ca9003bf442d3
[/url]
At this post are “ABCP's of stealing $35 Billion. Case study 2 for inquiry” 139 posts covering the largest crime in Canadian history, the lifting of $35 Billion from the pockets of Canadians. All aided with securities commissions who granted “exemption” to our protective laws to enable faulty products, toxic products, junk investments to be dumped on the public. In each exemption case the justification given by each Securities Commission was the same, and it was this exact reason: “Each of the Decision Makers is satisfied that the test contained in the Legislation that provides the Decision Maker with the jurisdiction to make the decision has been met.”


The non-bank ABCP market collapsed in August, 2007, leaving investors holding about $35-billion of frozen notes, including 2,542 individuals with investments totalling $317-million.
Private (non regulatory authorities) "negotiate" free do not go to jail passes for participants in return for a refund of small investors monies, and when they have legal immunity, they still do not return the money as promised. (see Purdy Crawford for get out of jail on this one and on $1 bil tobacco smuggling cleanup) Governments have to bail money into this sinking ship in order for small investors to get refunds. Thanks Purdy, keep up the great work you do for……….

http://www.investoradvocates.ca/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=177&start=30#p2249


$2 billion was taken from the PSPP (the pension plan of retired judges and RCMP) at the same time that judges were granting "immunity" from prosecution to those responsible (I assume they do not know to this day, but the PSPP annual report for 2008 includes the write downs)


Each of these toxic pools of sub-prime debt, did not meet the rating requirements to be sold to the public, but Dealers were stuck with the product and desperately needed to “dump” them like a hot potato.

Enter the byzantine world where Securities Commission will accept a “fee”, and without notice to the public, or warning to investors, will allow public protective laws to be “exempted”, which allows some fairly bad investment products to be unloaded upon the investing public.

Here is a fraction of the investors (from memory only) who got these toxic products dumped on them by salespersons, posing as “advisors”.

ALBERTA TREASURY BRANCH (>1.2billion)
UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY (18 Million)
UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA (50 Million)
CITY OF LETHBRIDGE (30 Million)
City of Hamilton ($90 mil+)
RETAIL INVESTORS (4.2 Billion)



Over 2500 smaller investors……some whose lives were ruined with alcoholism, depression, suicide, family breakup. The list of harms to society includes far more than merely being Canada’s greatest economic drain. It is putting some of our most vulnerable people, often seniors, into poverty and despair.

http://www.investoradvocates.ca/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=177#p2610

Regulator fines and settlements from the 7 investment banks who settled, and the Coventree fine was only $140 million. All of the investment banks received immunity from lawsuits.

The fines imposed in the end amounted to less than one half of one penny for each and every dollar missing.

More than a hundred pension funds in Canada had invested their cash directly or through their manager in commercial paper backed by financial assets. About $16 billion in total. This was not by greed, but by fiduciary duty to maximize the return on assets to their participants. A possible error, but there was also a tragic lack of information in this fully deregulated market.


There are big name losses among those pension funds: Domtar ($455 million), Ontario Teachers ($60 million) and plans for university professors of Western Ontario ($30 million), Alberta (over $40 million) and British Columbia, the pension fund of credit unions ($60 million), Canada Post ($27 million), but also more pension funds managed by the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec ($12,600 million) and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board ($1,972 million).

http://www.investoradvocates.ca/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=140&start=45#p1912

The Public Service Pension Plan of Canada (PSPP) took a writedown/loss in their 2008/2009 financial report for approximately $2 billion dollars. This is the pension plan for retired RCMP and judges. Ironically, the RCMP did not even know their pensions were being robbed, when they worked alongside the regulatory bodies to quietly close a complaint file alleging criminal activity. The RCMP also did not seem to know that the regulatory bodies they “collaborate” with, are the very agencies who granted exemption to our laws to allow these tainted investments to be sold in Canada.

When I search for the word “Exemption” at my local securities commission I get 8,764 results. But not a single document to justify the exemptions as being in the public interest.

I recall one exemption which was granted to a bank, late one friday evening, when one the bank’s underwriting department, was having difficulty selling a new investment issue, it was not being well received in the marketplace. Yet the bank’s underwriting people could not “look bad” internally and let the bank be stuck with a bunch of junk product on the shelf. What did they do, they applied for an exemption to the laws which prevented them from dumping the bad product into their bank customer’s mutual fund holdings, and Viola!. Problem solved with the swipe of a pen, from a friendly regulator.

There are so many like that. Or the mutual fund and life insurance dealer that learned (and bragged) on it’s share selling prospectus that they could earn “nine to sixteen times” more money if they switched their trusting clients out of high quality and independent mutual fund investments, and into their own “house brand” created funds, with higher commissions, higher annual fees, and zero track record. They applied and received an exemption for just this, and another exemption backdated, for all the provinces that they did this in without asking to skirt the law……they skirted the law first, took advantage of the clients, THEN applied for for exemption a year or two later….I am not making this up.

There are exemptions on the books granted (in Alberta) to Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, HSBC, every Canadian Bank and investment dealer, etc.
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Here is an exemption to the Oleary Funds seeking to obtain relief from restrictions on only being able to lend out 50% of the underlying assets of their investors mutual funds…..or something to that effect. Read it yourself and see if you can spot how regulators, lawyers and financiers apply to bend the rules. Rules designed to protect investors.

[url]http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ord_20120309_219_oleary-fund.htm
[/url]

Nearly all of the exemptions on record, carry this statement as their only justification/explanation for removing the lawful protections of the Securities Act:

Each of the Decision Makers is satisfied that the decision meets the test set out in the Legislation for the Decision Maker to make the decision.

some actual exemption examples with links so you can read for yourself what happens behind closed doors at Securities Regulators offices.

Exemptive relief granted from the mutual fund self-dealing restrictions in the Securities Act (Ontario)….. http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ord_20121129_216_invesco.htm


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RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT INC
Exemptions granted from the mutual fund conflict of interest investment restrictions and management reporting requirements and self-dealing prohibition. http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ord_20121129_212_rbc-global.htm

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“Exemption from the requirement to include the financial statement disclosure” [url] http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesL ... aleant.htm
[/url]
Valiant Pharmaceuticals? What could go wrong? (About $400 Billion may evaporate...equal to the entire market cap of any of Canada’s top companies) This alone would rival up to eight years of all the crime measured in the land...

“Each of the Decision Makers is satisfied that the decision meets the test set out in the Legislation for the Decision Maker to make the decision.”

the test set out in the Legislation??

something about it …..must not be “detrimental to investors or the public interest”…..but no commission I have seen has ever demonstrated a protocol or procedure to determine this, nor have I seen any documentation in ANY exemption decision to support such a protocol. I have asked for such documented protocol and been refused 100% of requests.

============================


relief for dealer-managed mutual funds to invest in distributions of debt securities for which dealer-manager acts as underwriter during distribution period or 60 day period following distribution

When banks get stuck with a bad underwriting, and they cannot sell it to the public, they CAN dump them into customers-owned mutual funds…..funds which are managed and run by the banks…….A bad but usually hidden example of self-dealing by banks, while doing harm to bank mutual fund investors. All they need to do is to apply to their securities commission for exemption to the laws.

http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ord20100813_2110_cibc.htm

———-
An exemption to Assante to give commission rebates to clients who are “advised” out of their independent third party funds, and instead sold the Assante house-brand funds.

ASSANTE CORPORATION
 
MRRS DECISION DOCUMENT
WHEREAS the local securities regulatory authority…..an application from Assante Corporation (the “Filer”)…..that the prohibitions on certain rebates contained in section 7.1 of NI 81-105 shall not apply to rebates paid by representatives to clients who are switching from third party products to mutual funds managed by, or by an affiliate of, the Filer;

http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ord_20040220_211_assante.htm
Commission rebating to encourage switch of client independent mutual funds to Assante’s “house brand” to earn Assante Nine to Fifteen times greater earnings as stated in their 1999 Prospectus……self dealing with clients trust?

AND WHEREAS, on April 15, 1999, the Original Jurisdictions granted an exemption to the Filer from section 7.1 under section 9.1 of NI 81-105 (the "Prior Exemption”);


In a Category All It’s Own, Exempt Market “Securities”
What are they?

Exempt Market Securities are often investment issues which are smaller in size, and may not be able to afford the $1 million dollar cost of drawing up a legal prospectus.

They often involve condominium projects, golf courses, and other developments of all kinds, but of much smaller scale than typical Investment Dealer offerings. As a result, they apply to eliminate the cost of the prospectus, and market them through specific types of dealers who seem to specialize in these products.

Without impugning the products, I find them often sold to investors for whom they are unsuitable, and marketed in a manner designed to lure less sophisticated investors, who are starved for investment yield and investment solutions, and will jump at nearly any shiny brochure with a hotel ballroom sales pitch. There may of course be legitimate exempt market products out there, I just have not been witness to them.

In my community I can point to a church-related organization which raised over $500 million during the boom years, failed to complete a single project out of about two dozen, and instead gave investors 100% losses. I can point to considerable numbers of such schemes in Alberta alone.

Sadly, because they have been approved for sale by Securities Commissions, most marketers and investors can too easily assume a level of scrutiny and legitimacy to this market, and I do not find this a safe assumption to make overall.

They have been aggressively marketed to less sophisticated investors,

At a conference in Toronto hosted by the Association of Canadian Compliance Professionals, David Di Paolo, partner at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, said regulators are monitoring exempt market transactions much more closely as the scope of the market grows. He estimates that in 2010, $83.9 billion was raised in the exempt market.


Exempt market securities in Alberta lose $2 billion. Most lose 100%, TOTAL loss.

Between 20,000 and 30,000 Albertans have suffered TOTAL loss of their investments, and in some cases their life savings as a result of products sold under the approval of the Alberta Securities Commission, but with “exemption” from the prospectus requirements of our Securities Act? (exempt market products) This (exempt market products) is another entire realm of abusing securities laws to abuse Albertan’s.

http://www.albertainvestorsprotection.com

Other Canadian Provinces all have their own Exempt Market stories to tell.


Investors lost $8.8 million after being referred to firm that subsequently want bankrupt

http://www.investmentexecutive.com/-/fund-rep-banned-fined-over-exempt-market-losses?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=nl&utm_content=investmentexecutive&utm_campaign=INT-EN-All-afternoon

Concrete Equities
Platinum Equities
etc., etc etc

Click on image to enlarge and zoom in.


FINALLY, WE ARRIVE AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER

So….which does more harm to Canadians and to society, investment products “sold” to investors by commission salespeople posing (falsely) as “advisors”….or any number of typical criminal offences against society?

It is fairly easy to search for the costs of criminal offences in Canada, but this report on investment industry practices, may be a beginning towards tabulating the cost of the hidden systemic financial harms to society.

COST OF ALL “MEASURED” CRIMES IN CANADA

Justice Canada’s previous study was in 2008, and it put the social and economic costs of Criminal offences in Canada at $31.4 Billion per year.
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj- ... rr10_5.pdf

Another source of information is from this Fraser Institute report, 2014

The Cost of Crime in Canada: 2014 Report
While in 1998 Canada spent over $42.4 billion on crime—$15.5 billion on what we think of as the direct cost of crime and the remainder on the less easily measured consequences for the victims—today’s estimates reveal that Canadians spend over $85 billion being victimized by, catching, and punishing crime. Victims’ losses through criminal acts committed against them amount to over $47 billion, more than half of the total. The current cost of crime is over 5% of our national product and this is an underestimate.
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/researc ... 014-report

And according to Stats Canada, the number of property crime violations in 2015 was 1,154,315 offences.

By way of comparison, our industry-insider estimates in this report come up with costs of systemic and/or intentional harm done to Canadians by a self-regulating investment industry (not counting banking industry offences) is seen to be in the neighbourhood of $65 Billion per year, on average, plus a steady stream of one-off, imaginative “flavour of the month” investments which appear more designed to prey upon Canadians…than to be of service to them. One offs listed herein amount to over $76 Billion.
==========================

Notes for an address by The Honourable Peter MacKay, PC, MP Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
Economic Club of Canada
Westin Hotel
Ottawa, Ontario
February 6, 2015

Although it's extremely difficult to accurately put a price on crime, a recent report from the Fraser Institute, titled The Cost of Crime in Canada, has made a valiant attempt. Not surprisingly, it concluded that crime is an incredibly expensive drain on society.

The report estimates that crime cost Canadians more than $85 billion in fiscal year 2009-2010. That's roughly five percent of GDP. Some recent estimates go as high as $100 billion per year. That's all-in justice costs and impact on lost productivity.

http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=965699

========================

It is hoped that these numbers can be used as a base for more thorough academic study into the social and economic cost of systemic, self regulated investment industry harms to Canadian society. Readers who wish to send me corrections or additions to this topic will find them welcomed and added where they may fit. In this way a report such as this may grow and change over time, becoming more accurate, and more useful to society.

The number of systemic financial offences in Canada is not calculated, but is assumed to be in the thousands, made up of hundreds of different investment product types. These investments are then spread among millions of investment consumers. Each product type has a regulatory or self regulatory body monitoring it (mutual funds, insurance products, stocks and bond sales etc)

The total harm is estimated at $139 billion from the varieties of systemically harmful products followed herein.

2 mil street crimes in Canada 2015 did harm of $40 billion in round numbers, while a number of a few thousand “Suite Crimes” can do harm to Canada of $139 billion.

In the case of Hollinger, where Conrad Black was convicted of doing some $500 million in economic harm, and was one of two persons convicted, his position allowed him to do a similar amount of crime than could be done by 50,000 street level offences. One man able to do the crime of 50,000 people, and yet in Canada, we can count the prosecutions of this type of thing on one hand……and someprosecutions (Livent, Garth Drabinsky, $ 500 million, take time measured not in months, but in decades, here in Canada.

Sadly, his (Conrad Black’s) conviction did not even take place in Canada, but it was the U.S. system of justice which convicted him. Canada simply appears to be most interested in NOT prosecuting it’s highest status financial mobsters. It seems to be the Canadian way.

One could go a step further and imagine that a single systemic financial infraction can do as much economic and or social harm to Canada as the total harm done by one million ordinary crimes. $35 was billion taken from Canadians, in just one type of crime, with sub-prime mortgage investments 2008.


Now let us look at how much money is spent on catching ordinary criminals verses the systemic financial folks.

ordinary crime systemic financial crime/mega criminals
police $14 Billion 30 million RCMP IMET
courts $1 Billion unknown est. single digit millions?
jails and corrections $5 Billion unknown est. single digit millions?

Court and jail costs for mega criminals needs more work, as the small number of court cases and jail time in Canada reflects a reluctance to even bother pursuing mega criminals in Canada. Conrad Black had to be pursued in a Chicago courtroom for example. No prosecutors could bother in Canada. I am willing to update this report at anytime that better information becomes available.


When we look at the dollars spent on the systemic investment crimes, verses those spent on “ordinary” criminal offences, it seems apparent that 466 times as many resources are spent on catching crime in the streets, while only 2/1000ths of the funds are dedicated to crime in the suites….

”Two, one-thousands, as much spent to pursue organized financial mega crimes, as opposed to spending on “ordinary” crime in Canada.”

And that may explain why fines of less than one-half of a penny, for every dollar taken in Canada’s largest financial ripoff were levied…..

the regulators were in on granting the permission slips (exemptions to our laws) to allow the ripoffs….

It is almost like Canada’s systems are designed and incentivized more to NOT catch our most harmful criminals.

And yet a gang of well dressed criminals in a boardroom, can do the same social and economic harm as the harm done by one thousand or more criminals in the streets.

What if our “trusted” bankers, investment dealers, and offshore tax specialists, are doing ten, one hundred or one thousand times, greater harm than do the Hells Angels or Mafia?

An economic study by P Puri, University of Toronto, 19)?? stated that Canada suffers from having the strongest financial institutions in the world, alongside the weakest regulators in the world…perhaps there is a design for this imbalance?

Perhaps it is the Canadian disadvantage…the largest drain on our entire economic health, and the greatest financial harvest in the country.

It also must be noted, for students wishing to study systemic financial crime, that OBSI, the official banking ombudsman office has as recently as a few years ago been FORBIDDEN to investigate or pursue systemic financial issues. Forbidden to look. What could go wrong with an industry so powerful that it gives orders to the regulators as to what they can and cannot look into.

Protocol for Handling Systemic Issues Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investment (OBSI) and OBSI Joint Regulators Committee (JRC)
https://www.obsi.ca/en/download/fm/528

This protocol gives full discretion BACK to the regulators (who are paid by industry) on whether or not to pursue issues of a systemic nature against their members….)

This image shows systemic powers of OBSI being removed, (examples of anything “Systemic” being crossed off of OBSI’s mandate) in 2013
https://www.obsi.ca/download/fm/149 page 3

Furthermore, when some banks (RBC TD etc) were unhappy with the penalties or decisions of this particular regulator, they either refused to pay the penalty, or simply walked-away from this ombudsman, and hired their very own legal entities to “arbitrate” complaints against them. This is another sign of hidden systemic cracks, that, like and underground oil well frack, can cause earthquakes of unimaginable magnitude, harming the financial foundations of every citizen in Canada.

from page 8 https://www.obsi.ca/download/fm/149

(OBSI was effectively “neutered” by the industry they were responsible to police, telling all who care to listen, “who is in charge, the watchers, or the mega financial criminals”? It is the criminals.)


Regulators, police and prosecutors in Canada seem “throttled back” or restrained from investigating anything large, systemic or meaningful….and instead focus on the minor or crimes and minutia only.

This provides a “facade” of what appears to be protective financial industry regulation, while actually allowing the largest and most harmful effects of financial crime, to drain the economy of Canada, and diminish the economic security of every Canadian.

Thus, the unique violence of unregulated financial crime. Hidden. Unprotected. Unprosecuted. A tremendously rewarding, low risk career for any financial “professional”. This is due to our most “trusted” institutions being well above the reach of our mechanisms of justice.

SOLUTIONS


Provinces who wish to protect the public from unfair dealing, should establish Investor Protection Agencies, with government staffing, government funding, and police-like powers, including a mandate to involve the criminal code, which is now often ignored in favour of “self” regulation. These agencies could direct their energies to sole protection of consumers, rather than the “dual-master/dual-mandate” style of regulation that is failing us.

An Investor Protection body should not contain committees or boards who are filled with industry spokespersons, but should be over-weighted towards persons who can demonstrate and uphold a strong public interest protective mandate. Any board protecting the financial health of a nation, or its citizens must be designed to be robust enough to resist the pull of billion dollar corporations.

============================

Final thoughts:
From the book "DARK AGE AHEAD", by Jane Jacobs

"The first crime is the actual abuse of trust, whether it be a financial advisor taking advantage of his client for personal gain,, child abuse, malpractice, embezlement, bribe, whatever."

"The second crime is the cover up, involving individuals of considerable power or influence who were not involved personally in the initial wrongdoing, but whose sense of loyalty is stronger than their attachment to honesty and openness. Since exaggerated loyalty may be the very quality that gives such people power and influence, it is hard to know what can be done about loyalty as self serving weakness."

"The third crime is the hoodwinking of police and the public with false assurances that all is well."


==================links, sources, stats below============




2015 Number of Crime Violations 2,111,021

http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/legal50a-eng.htm

The Cost of Crime in Canada: 2014 Report
While in 1998 Canada spent over $42.4 billion on crime—$15.5 billion on what we think of as the direct cost of crime and the remainder on the less easily measured consequences for the victims—today’s estimates reveal that Canadians spend over $85 billion being victimized by, catching, and punishing crime. Victims’ losses through criminal acts committed against them amount to over $47 billion, more than half of the total. The current cost of crime is over 5% of our national product and this is an underestimate.
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/research/cost-crime-canada-2014-report


In 2008, the total (tangible) social and economic costs of Criminal Code offences in Canada were approximately $31.4 billion. 1.

Costs of Crime in Canada, 2008
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/crime/rr10_5/rr10_5.pdf


Justice spending

Total police expenditures 2008

$11,448,937,000 http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj- ... rr10_5.pdf
 ====
The costs pertaining to the Canadian criminal justice system in 2008 amounted to about $15.0 billion for policing, court, prosecution, legal aid, correctional services and mental health review boards.2
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/crime/rr10_5/rr10_5.pdf


Total Criminal Court Costs $672,392,760
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/crime/rr10_5/rr10_5.pdf

Total Court Costs to Prosecute systemic Crimes over $100 million by White Collar Criminals======ZERO??? (there are no stats, and no cases known to myself of prosecuting financial crimes above about nine figures ($100 million) in Canada It is an area that appears to be above our laws and justice system capabilities


Total Correction Costs $4,836,224,546

Total Correction Costs for white collar criminals?
How many bankers and investment bankers do you know of who go to jail?

http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj- ... rr10_5.pdf


Total Value of Pain and Suffering $65,100,168,642 2008

Total Value of Pain and Suffering White collar systemic Crime =Not measured?
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/crime/rr10_5/rr10_5.pdf

Year-end operating expenditures for police services in Canada in 2014/2015 totalled $13.9 billion in current dollars.
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2016001/article/14323-eng.htm

(Nearly 500 times more spent on ordinary crime than on our larger problem, systemic financial crime?)


Annual Spending on Catching the Perps

Integrated Market Enforcement Teams
The Integrated Market Enforcement Teams (IMETs) are special RCMP-led units that detect, investigate and deter capital markets fraud. They promote compliance with the law in the corporate community and assure investors that Canada's markets are safe and secure. The IMET Initiative is a partnership with Justice Canada's Federal Prosecution Service, provincial and municipal forces and securities commissions and market regulators.

https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntr ... t-eng.aspx


White-collar crime task force 'doomed to failure' unless separated into ...
news.nationalpost.com/.../white-collar-crime-task-force-doomed-to-failur...


Nov 29, 2015 - During the first five years of IMET's existence, it received $30 million annually, the largest chunk going to the RCMP. Beginning in 2008, funding …

====================




(teaming with sec commissions, who are paid 100% by industry players, taints the criminal investigative process when the regulators involved themselves (granting exemptions to our laws) in actions that precipitated or helped in the removal of $35 billion from Canada.


http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canad ... ed-mountie RCMP IMET in range of $30 million


=========
A guarantee that systemic investment crimes will not be investigated……


RCMP securities unit moving into OSC offices - The Globe and Mail
http://www.theglobeandmail.com › Report on Business › Industry News › Law

1 Similar
Mar 2, 2015 - The RCMP's low-profile securities investigation unit is moving into the ... The RCMP said the Toronto IMET team laid no charges in 2012, but …

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/rcmp-securities-unit-moving-into-osc-offices/article23247433/

========

David Baines: Is the RCMP Integrated Market Enforcement team a ...
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/David+ ... story.html
Feb 5, 2013 - Is the federal government finally pulling the plug on the RCMP Integrated Market Enforcement Team? There.
[url]http://www.vancouversun.com/news/David+Baines+RCMP+Integrated+Market+Enforcement+team+dead+duck/7922979/story.html
[/url]
======
Nortel case caused RCMP to question their ability to solve crimes ...
o.canada.com/.../rcmp-raised-concerns-about-ability-to-crack-down-on-whi...
May 1, 2013 - Formed in 2003, the RCMP's IMET program comprised teams of “highly specialized” investigators in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal …

“This decision may raise questions as to whether the Canadian justice system as a whole is equipped to deal with complex fraud cases of this nature and magnitude.”

http://o.canada.com/news/national/rcmp-raised-concerns-about-ability-to-crack-down-on-white-colllar-crime-after-nortel-aquittals-letter-shows

=====

Spending on white collar crime enforcement, financial crimes, stock or bond market fraudsters, ponzi schemes etc, is literally in the “thousandth's, fractionally compared to what is spent on all other crimes combined, despite financial crimes being equal to or greater than all other crimes combined. (According to experts financial crime is greater than all other crimes combined, in fact FBI studies in the United States puts it vastly larger than ordinary crimes.)

http://www.alternet.org/story/54093/twenty_things_you_should_know_about_corporate_crime

Twenty Things You Should Know About Corporate Crime
end: headline start: teaser

Did you know that corporate crime inflicts far more damage on society than all street crime combined? This and 19 more amazing facts

(article about some of the tricks of the trade in American crime, and here in Canada, we are 40 years away from even talking about it)

We conclude that investment harms to Canadians, by investment industry professionals, equals or exceeds the financial cost of each and every crime in the land.

From the 1940 book “Where are the Customers Yachts?” https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN ... pictu09-20

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addendum Jan, 2017

We appreciate that the industry has a substantial financial interest in keeping trailer fees in Canada, with over $5 billion per year charged to Canadian investors. My co-authors and I have no financial stake one way or the other. We simply report what the data indicate. Blame the data. Please don’t shoot the messenger."

Douglas Cumming, J.D., Ph.D., CFA, is Professor and Ontario Research Chair, York University Schulich School of Business

http://www.moneysense.ca/save/investing/blowing-smoke-on-trailer-fees/