fiduciary or not? a "Bait and Switch" game

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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Tue Sep 06, 2011 8:42 am

Investment Advice Is One Of The Greatest Scams Of Our Time
Andrew Haigney, El CAP | Sep. 1, 2011, 2:43 PM
Andrew Haigney


Andrew Haigney is Managing Director of El CAP, a Registered Investment Advisor in the state of Vermont that provides investment-consulting services to individual investors, corporations, foundations, trustees, and endowments

David Swensen, Yale University’s Chief Investment Officer, published on August 13, 2011 an op-ed in the New York Times in which he shines a spotlight on one of the mutual fund industry’s dirty little secrets – the punitive nature of investment management fees.

In the article, “The Mutual Fund Merry-Go-Round,” Mr. Swensen, who oversees Yale’s colossal $16 billion endowment, calls for improved investor education (particularly with respect to the benefits of low cost index funds) and calls for retail brokers to be held to a fiduciary standard.
We applaud Mr. Swensen for taking a stand on these important issues and we agree with most of his points.
However, we believe that the scope of the problem goes well beyond mutual funds, and more can be done to protect investors.
Scope of the Problem
The underlying problem is that investment advice has become a “product,” and investment advisers steer prospective clients right into their own products.
Today’s investors looking for investment advice end up seeking it directly from the point of sale of these products.
Beyond mutual fund companies, the point of sale runs the gamut, from large brokerage firms and registered investment advisers to hedge funds and bank trust departments.
A 2008 SEC study found that nearly 95 percent of investment advisory firms with individual clients also provide proprietary portfolio management services for individuals. These firms make their money through portfolio management services, not by dispensing investment advice. Many of these firms claim that they have no products to sell, instead they say that they provide a service – make no mistake, portfolio management services is a product.
How often at the end of a sales presentation do you think investment advisers (who are held to a fiduciary standard) sit back and tell a potential new client that they may be better off going to a larger firm with more experience or better resources? Or, as Mr. Swensen suggests, explain to a prospective lucrative client that their investment objectives can be better met by investing in a low cost index fund? They don’t. With sales quotas to fill and fierce competition for new business, the name of the game in asset management is to get the money in the door and start generating fees.
Mr. Swensen argues in his article that actively managed mutual funds should be required to show prospective clients a side-by-side comparison of low cost index funds as an alternative to the actively managed fund being sold. We agree with Mr. Swensen, but we fail to see why this should be limited only to mutual funds. Why not also require registered investment advisers that offer proprietary portfolio management services to do the same thing?
Fiduciary Standard 101
We differ from Mr. Swensen with respect to his call for expanding the fiduciary standard. There is a common misperception that the fiduciary standard (which generally applies to mutual funds and registered investment advisers) provides a greater level of protection to investors than does the suitability standard (which applies to traditional brokers). In theory, the fiduciary standard offers investors a high level of protection, but in practice this is not always the case.
The fiduciary standard as applied to the investment industry is not uniformly defined by regulators, in fact the word “fiduciary” doesn’t even appear in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. It wasn’t until a 1963 United States Supreme Court decision that investment advisers were deemed to be fiduciaries. The Court held that investment advisers were required to “…eliminate, or at least [to] expose, all conflicts of interest…”
In the financial services industry, investment managers are inextricably trapped in a fiduciary conflict between shepherding their clients’ interests and marketing their products. The fiduciary standard has become an exercise of “disclosing” these conflicts of interest in the fine print, and as such the essence of fiduciary duty also gets disclosed away.
Many investment managers tout their fiduciary standing in marketing materials, as a kind of seal of approval. But the devil can still be found in the details – conflicts of interest are everywhere.
Notwithstanding the Dodd-Frank Act mandate that these disclosures should be expressed in plain, easy to understand English, the disclosure statements remain difficult for most investors to fully understand. Regulators routinely uncover serious deficiencies in disclosure statements that would be nearly impossible for the untrained eye to detect. Additionally, the fiduciary standard is subject to human failure, fraud and deception (remember Bernard Madoff had a fiduciary duty to his clients).
Expanding the fiduciary standard, absent a clear and uniform definition, will only further confuse investors. To better understand the practical side of fiduciary duty as it relates to the investment industry, see our in-depth report “Fiduciary Duty: What Does It Really Mean?” (available upon request).
What Can be Done?
Securities regulators need to take a page out of the Federal Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) rulebook. Investors covered by ERISA rules (usually pension plans or other retirement programs) enjoy far greater protection than does the general public. Many of the investment vehicles commonly pushed on non-ERISA investors would be prohibited under ERISA rules as they’d be deemed to carry excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary fees. Under ERISA rules, investment advisers who provide investment advice to qualified plans are generally prohibited from receiving compensation tied to the investments the plan makes
Among many other things, ERISA rules assume that once someone has a product to sell, they can no longer be truly objective. With fewer and fewer workers getting traditional pension retirement benefits, shortfalls in 401k plans will come from individuals’ non-ERISA protected investment accounts. Why aren’t these assets entitled to the same protection?
The bottom line is that the investment advice business is perhaps one of the greatest consumer scams of our time. Rather than attempting to educate investors on the ills of Wall Street, regulators need to get serious about investor protection. Again, we applaud Mr. Swensen, who clearly has no dog in this fight, for bringing attention to these important issues. Investors should pay attention.
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Sun Jun 26, 2011 9:26 am

http://retirementaction.com
Fiduciary

In a nutshell

In the simplest terms, a fiduciary duty requires the fiduciary to place the interests of the client ahead his own (or his employer’s or shareholder’s or anyone else’s). There are no shades of grey here: this is not about moral but legal obligation, it’s not about disclosing that you have a conflict of interest but about not having one, it is not about disclosure of fees/commission but about finding the best and most cost-effective product that meets the customer’s needs. It is ultimately about providing untainted advice from a position of power with the benefit of asymmetric information. The investor must be prepared to pay explicitly for the advice rather than continue the ostrich policy of thinking/assuming that the advice is free if it’s buried in a transaction fee or mutual fund trailer fees or other opaque mechanisms. John Bogle thinks of the fiduciary principle as: “No man can serve two masters”.

The details

Last week the SEC tabled its recommendations to Congress to create a “common fiduciary standard of care for brokers and investment advisers”. This would “hold brokers to a higher “fiduciary duty” standard (than the current “suitability” requirement) by legally requiring them to put the interests of clients before their own. (RIAs or Registered) Investment Advisers (in the US) are already held to that standard…” (see “SEC study lifts bar for brokers”). “The common standard is needed because many retail investors don’t understand and are confused by the roles played by investment advisers and broker-dealers...” (see “SEC recommends common fiduciary standard for brokers, investment advisers”). (Unlike in the U.S., where registered investment advisers (typically financial planners) already have a fiduciary duty toward the client, there is no class of adviser in Canada which has that explicit requirement, though some individual advisors are prepared to offer advisory services on a fiduciary basis.)

The need and the desired outcome are clear, but there will likely be lots of problems on the way. You can be sure that if Congress accepts the SEC recommendations, the next battle will be around trying to de-claw the definition of fiduciary. The other question that needs to be answered is the need to include under the fiduciary umbrella insurance agents (especially those selling annuities in general and variable annuities with guarantees in particular)…the answer is unequivocally yes. Given the information asymmetry between the financial industry and investors, nothing but a fiduciary standard can insure that investors get their fair share of the available market returns; this information asymmetry surprisingly not only applies to the (manufactured) ‘products’ and ‘services’ by the industry, but also to the ‘roles’ (adviser vs. salesperson vs. counterparty) played by those working in the financial industry.

To be effective, a fiduciary standard must be based on clear laws, a muscular regulatory infrastructure and must be accompanied by credible enforcement to insure compliance. So there will be difficulties with the definition, the scope of its applicability (which roles-adviser/ broker, mutual fund salesman, counterparty, financial planner- and/or products- investment, insurance, etc-), and educating the investors about the importance of working with an adviser who embraces the fiduciary responsibility. But it’s not enough for the adviser to be a fiduciary; she must also have the necessary skills and expertise to carry out the adviser duties.

Can a commissioned salesperson act as a fiduciary? Is the expectation that humans place self-interest below client interest unreasonable? Can an advisor restricted by his employer to offer only in-house products truly act as a fiduciary? Can financial advisers make a decent living and receive fair compensation for their training, expertise, skill and due diligence? The answers to these questions are probably: No, no, no, and hopefully yes. (One could also ask if a wrap account might be a way for the brokerage industry fiduciary responsibility in the context of the brokerage industry. The answer is maybe with an all-in fee of 1%, but not at with a 2.5% fee typically associated with such accounts. Depending on the investor’s asset mix the 2.5% represents 30-50% of the available market returns, which by definition does not feel like the best interest of the client. Whatever relationship you might have with your 'adviser', in addition to the cost you better understand if you are getting value for your money: you don't want to trade off an IPS, a strategic asset allocation and a low cost portfolio implementation, for promises of market timing, alpha vs. beta (stock selection), tactical asset allocation. If you are not getting an IPS, what are you getting for your money?)

As we begin to understand the scope of the changes required to move the retail financial industry to a fiduciary model, we see that it might be perceived by some as an attack on the industry’s business model (already one of the objections tabled is that government has no right to specify or favour one business model over another one). Whatever the outcome, and clearly I am counting on a meaningful implementation of “fiduciary duty”, no fiduciary standard will solve the problem associated with crooks. Note that in Canada you hear nothing about the need for fiduciary financial services; nothing from the industry of course, but nothing from legislators or regulators.

Can you think of a reason why you would not want to work with a fiduciary adviser? And if you can’t, then why you don’t ask you adviser if he is a fiduciary and if he is not then ask him to at least sign a fiduciary pledge such as the one suggested by Tara Siegel Bernard in NYT’s “Will you be my fiduciary”. Otherwise perhaps you should go and find another adviser.

In summary

So the issue is complex, and the vast majority in the industry do not conduct themselves in a fiduciary manner and will go to great lengths to avoid having to comply with such level of care toward the client because the model today is primarily commissioned sales or counterparty in a transaction. The biggest problem is that vast majority of clients in the financial industry naively think that they already have a relationship of trust (when they in fact have a sales interface) and the clients are also handicapped by asymmetric information. The advisors' problem is that potentially the business model has to change to a fee for service approach. While clients are perfectly content to pay $10-15K/yr in MERs for a mutual fund portfolio of $500K at 2.5% MER (for which typically the client doesn’t even get a Investment Policy Statement- the foundation of any credible financial plan), yet many/most clients would probably be unwilling to pay anything close to that in transparent/explicit fees to get an IPS and a low-cost indexed ETF portfolio whose ongoing annual cost would be <0.5%.( In the UK, effective 2012 product cannot have embedded fees in them, thus legally forcing the separation of the cost of advice.)

Of course no law (or pledge) can replace the high integrity of an individual, but the legal requirement can set expectations correctly, which is not the case today (especially not in Canada where no class of advisor/broker is required to have a fiduciary duty like the RIAs in the U.S. or CFPs who have taken on the duty as a professional pledge.)




Background

Here is some additional background reading material which those of you who are gluttons for punishment might find very interesting.

Vanguard’s “Why invest with us” webpage it includes the following:

“Your interests are the only interests we serve: Most investment firms are either publicly traded or privately owned. Vanguard is different: We're client-owned. Helping our investors achieve their goals is literally our sole reason for existence. With no other parties to answer to and therefore no conflicting loyalties, we make every decision—like keeping investing costs as low as possible—with only your needs in mind.” (Now this is the type of firm that I prefer to do business with. By the way this rare type of corporate setup us the optimum corporate structure, from a client’s perspective, for the financial industry.)


In Investment News’ “Why disclosure is insufficient to ensure a fiduciary standard” Knut Rostad writes that:

“… disclosure shouldn't be presumed to have the same role in a healthy fiduciary relationship as it does in other economic realms. In a healthy fiduciary relationship that involves personalized investment advice, disclosures shouldn't be viewed as a presumptively effective investor protection tool. They are an aid to the fiduciary relationship, not a substitute for fiduciary responsibility. Fiduciary status isn't for the faint of heart. Consistent with the record on which the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was written, it is far more demanding than the commercial standard.

This difference is nowhere more evident than in the responsibility of the fiduciary, as opposed to the responsibility of the salesman, for his or her advice and conduct. In the latter case, the responsibility is shared between the salesman and the consumer. In cases with such significant disparities of knowledge, the responsibility isn't shared with the investor; it is held by the fiduciary alone. That an investment fiduciary alone should be held accountable for his or her conduct and advice shouldn't be controversial. After all, no one suggests that either a surgeon or an attorney be relieved of their fiduciary responsibility to put our interests first, merely by virtue of a “disclosure.” “

In an address entitled “Building a fiduciary society” John Bogle says that:

“…enormous costs seriously undermine the odds in favor of success for investors. For the investor feeds at the bottom of the costly food chain of investing, paid only after all the agency costs of investing are deducted from the market’s returns.”

“…what we mean by fiduciary duty, a concept that goes back some eight centuries in British common law. Fiduciary duty is essentially a legal relationship of confidence or trust between two or more parties, most commonly a fiduciary or trustee and a principal or beneficiary, who justifiably reposes confidence, good faith, and reliance in his trustee. The fiduciary acts at all times for the sole benefit and interests of another, with loyalty to those interests. A fiduciary must not put personal interests before that duty, and must not be in a situation where his fiduciary duty to clients conflicts with a fiduciary duty to any other entity.” And

“Surely it should be made clear to clients whether they are relying on (1) trained investment professionals, paid solely through fully-disclosed fees to oversee their investments; or (2) sales representatives who sell the products and services of the companies that they represent, whether life insurance, annuities, mutual funds, or anything else. Simply put, the first group is representing its clients; the second group is representing its employers. And each firm’s advertising and promotion should make this distinction clear.”


In Fortune’s “What Goldman owes its clients” Ben Stein writes (in the context of Goldman Sachs with whom typically only sophisticated individual or institutional clients would deal with):

“The story coming out from the friends of Goldman Sachs and of Wall Street generally is that Goldman Sachs is a trading house, that any client should know that, and that the client buys from Goldman Sachs knowing that it might trade against him and screw him up any possible way so as to make a buck. This is a nice fantasy and a tough guy version of how the world works. The problem is that it is contrary to law and common decency….But as underwriters, it has a duty to deal fairly and honestly with its buyers, and to deal as a fiduciary, putting clients' interests first, if the buyer is a client of the firm. It holds itself out to the world that way, too. It holds itself as "adding value" when its works for a pension fund or any buyer by selling him securities. Read the annual report.”

In the journal of Portfolio Management’s “The Fiduciary Principle: No Man Can Serve Two Masters” John Bogle writes:

“We have moved from a society in which there are some things that one simply does not do, to one in which if everyone else is doing it, I can do it too. I’ve described this change as a shift from moral absolutism to moral relativism. Business ethics, it seems to me, has been a major casualty of that shift in our traditional societal values.”

In Forbes’s “Investors misled by brokers masquerading as fiduciaries” Edward Siedle writes that there are sometimes circumstances when even CFA charter holders (and their clients) have to deal with conflict between the requirement by the CFA Institute who holds the members to the “highest fiduciary standards” and their employers as in the case of “brokers employed by the major Wall Street firms, do not acknowledge a fiduciary duty, which requires them to make their clients' best interests their top priority.” The author then quotes the following explanation from the CFA Institute "You've hit upon a dilemma for some of our members, who are bound by our Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice as charter holders and/or members of CFA Institute, but who are employed by firms with business models that apply suitability standards rather than fiduciary standards in their dealings with clients. Our understanding is that in many such instances, the firms do not allow CFA charterholders to display the CFA designation after their name on business cards or other publicly available material, so that clients do not perceive any different standard than what the firm has adopted for all of its employees.” Clearly a very complex subject that is difficult to separate from the business model of one’s employer and the contractual relationship with the client.

Further clarification is provided in CFA Institute Magazine’s “What’s a broker to do?” where Jonathan Stokes (Head of Standards of Practice) addresses the matter as follows. The CFA Institute Code and Standards explicitly states in Standard III (A) Loyalty, Prudence and Care that: “Members and Candidates have a duty of loyalty to their clients and must act with reasonable care and exercise prudent judgment. Members and Candidates must act for the benefit of their clients and place their client’s interests before their employer’s or their own interest.” Stokes writes that “The requirement to act in the client’s best interest, with loyalty, prudence and care, and for disclosure of conflicts of interest apply to all when engaging in their professional activities. What specific conduct is required of members to fulfill these duties will depend on the member’s relationship to the client and the nature of the member’s job functions (e.g. execution only brokers, retail brokers, institutional broker). Although members and candidates must comply with any legally imposed fiduciary duty, the Code and Standards neither imposes such a legal responsibility nor requires all members to act as fiduciaries. In particular, the conduct of CFA charterholders who are broker/dealers may or may not rise to the level of being a fiduciary, depending on the type of client, whether the broker is giving investment advice, and the many facts and circumstances of a particular transaction or client relationship. The specific actions required may vary by job function, but CFA charterholders…must comply with one of the most rigorous and comprehensive codes of conduct anywhere”.



You can read much more on the F-word in the Investment News’ “From the Fiduciary (FI360)” by Bennett Aikin. Also Blain Aikin who heads FI360 has “coined the term “Global Fiduciary Precepts” to denote these seven practices. They are:
1. Know standards, laws, and trust provisions.
2. Diversify assets to specific risk/return profile of client.
3. Prepare investment policy statement.
4. Use “prudent experts” (for example, an Investment Manager) and document due diligence.
5. Control and account for investment expenses.
6. Monitor the activities of “prudent experts.”
7. Avoid conflicts of interest and prohibited transactions.”

In TD Ameritrade’s “The Standard of Care for Investment Advice” contains a good table explaining the differences (in the US context) between an RIA (Registered Investment Advisor) and a “registered representative” (likely a broker). Well worth a read for those interested in the subject.

In SmartMoney’s “Bogle: American Capitalism is Doomed” John Bogle is quoted as:

“For years, says Bogle, the U.S. had a system in which capital was the property of owners. Those who bore the risk reaped the rewards. That system, which he calls the ownership society, has been transformed in the past 50 years into the so-called agency society. Now investors swallow the risk while managers collect more than their fair share of the rewards. Along with that has come the era of phony accounting, stock-option mania and inflated executive compensation.” (Bogle’s book “The battle for the soul of capitalism’)

MSN Money’s “Can you trust your financial adviser?” explains the cost of being too trusting and looks at job titles which may or may not come with fiduciary responsibility.

An finally (while not perfect, since it implies that disclosure of conflicts might provide dispensation for doing the inappropriate thing,, in the NYT’s “Will you be my fiduciary” Tara Siegel Bernard suggests that “the next time you’re shopping — whether it’s for a broker, a mortgage, an annuity or a full-fledged financial plan — ask your provider to sign it. Here it is:
The Fiduciary Pledge
I, the undersigned, pledge to exercise my best efforts to always act in good faith and in the best interests of my client, _______, and will act as a fiduciary. I will provide written disclosure, in advance, of any conflicts of interest, which could reasonably compromise the impartiality of my advice. Moreover, in advance, I will disclose any and all fees I will receive as a result of this transaction and I will disclose any and all fees I pay to others for referring this client transaction to me. This pledge covers all services provided.
X________________________________
Date______________________________”
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Sun Jun 26, 2011 9:22 am

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Report: Clients confused about standards and don't care
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs ... /306199968
By Lavonne Kuykendall
June 19, 2011 6:01 am ET
While the financial advice industry wrangles with regulators and lawmakers over a universal fiduciary standard, most investors are far more concerned about getting their phone calls returned.

According to a J.D. Power and Associates survey released last Thursday, [color=#FF0000][color=#FF0000]85% of 4,200 full-service investors say they have never heard of — or don't understand the difference between — the suitability and fiduciary standards.[/color][/color]

The Securities and Exchange Commission has recommended to Congress a rule change that would place broker-dealers under the tighter fiduciary standard. Currently, only investment advisers must adhere to that more onerous requirement.

But investors don't seem very concerned about the different standards.

Among full-service investors whose financial advisers adhere to the fiduciary standard, 57% said that this increased their comfort level. Then again, 42% said that it decreased their level of comfort.

The survey also showed how clients rate their advisory firms. RBC Wealth Management received the highest rating from clients.

Although clients appear confused about fiduciary standards, they do have a very clear idea of what they want from their adviser. Most are focused on how often they hear from their representative or adviser, and whether they get the information they need.

“There is a growing expectation for outreach” among investors, especially since the market downturn battered their portfolios over the past couple of years, David Lo, director of investment services at J.D. Power and Associates, said in an interview.

The lack of investor enthusiasm about a single fiduciary issue might make firms consider whether it is worth the extra cost of meeting the higher standard, particularly for an imprimatur of which most clients are unaware, he said.The findings suggest instituting a set of best practices that will leave their clients “a lot happier” at little extra cost, said Mr. Lo.

At the top of the list: Clients have clearly indicated that they want more frequent and clearer communication that explains their investments' performance and how fees are charged.

That should be easier than in the past because investors have become much more interested in communicating online, the survey found.

Nearly six in 10 said that they visited their investment firm's website in the past year, up from 52% who said that they did in 2009.

More than half the investors said that they have exchanged e-mail with their adviser this year. In 2008, that percentage was more like 19%.

Among investors who visit their investment firm's website, older investors are far more active. Clients more than 64 years old said they visit the sites more than 35 times a year. Somewhat surprisingly, respondents under 45 said that they only visit their advisory firm's site 12 times a year.

The most common actions on investment company websites are reviewing documents posted by advisers and reviewing tax information. Advisers should take advantage of their investors' online activities and reach out via e-mail and on their websites, Mr. Lo said.

That said, investors also want their phone calls returned, preferably within 24 hours, he said.

Investors also were asked to rank their advisers on factors including investment performance, fees, product offerings and website quality. RBC Wealth Management earned the top score, Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. came in second and Fidelity Investments ranked third.

E-mail Lavonne Kuykendall at lkuykendall@investmentnews.com.
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Fri Jun 24, 2011 8:53 am

From http://faircanada.ca/top-news/statement ... listening/
The investment industry looks poised on the very cliff edge.......of spending another fifteen to twenty five years milking their lucrative bait and switch. ("lets advertise trusted "advisors" and then deliver commission salespeople instead, and pocket the rewards from that")

Statement of Priorities Signals that New OSC Chair is Listening
The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) has published its 2011-2012 Statement of Priorities (Statement of Priorities) revising the draft Statement of Priorities published for comment earlier this year. The revisions include a number of specific initiatives that have been added in order to address public comments they received. These initiatives include:

Research the pros and cons of imposing a fiduciary duty on financial advisors and identify what problems the OSC thinks that introducing a statutory fiduciary duty would resolve;
Work with the CSA, IIROC and the MFDA to develop harmonized standards for cost disclosure and performance reporting to investors, thereby improving clients’ account statements;
Monitor the Point of Sale initiatives’s (POS) impact on price competition in mutual funds as implementation of POS moves forward and is expanded to other investment fund products;
Work with the Ontario Government to explore a mechanism by which the OSC could award compensation to Ontario investors who suffer losses because of Securities Act violations; and
Conduct town hall meetings and investor round tables to gather views of investors.
FAIR Canada is encouraged to see the addition of these specific initiatives to the Statement of Priorities. While the Statement of Priorities does not fully meet recommendations made by FAIR Canada, the OSC’s Investor Advisory Panel, the Small Investor Protection Association and other investor advocates, it does constitute a significant improvement over previous years’ statements of priorities.

The Statement of Priorities signals Chair Howard Wetston’s vision for the OSC as a more investor-focused regulator.

Fiduciary Duty
FAIR Canada has been advocating for a fiduciary duty or best interests of the client standard for some time. FAIR Canada strongly believes that the framework within which registrants operate needs to shift from “suitability” and “know your client” rules to one where a client’s best interests are put first, so that registered firms and individuals that provide investment advice are required, when providing that advice, to put their client’s best interests first. The suitability requirements currently in place in Canada are insufficient to adequately protect individual investors. FAIR Canada believes that such a change is key to remedying the imbalance and misalignment of interests in current registrant-client relationships.

These misalignments may occur for a number of reasons. First, under the existing framework, registrants are often compensated and incentivized to sell products that may be “suitable” for a client, but not necessarily in the client’s best interests. Second, there is no specific requirement that a client’s best interests be put first in the provision of investment advice.

The OSC’s Investor Advisory Panel also supports the implementation of a fiduciary duty. The Investor Advisory Panel commented in its submission on the OSC’s Statement of Priorities that a fiduciary duty would eliminate the need to prove the existence of a fiduciary duty on the facts of a specific case and would greatly enhance the access of retail investors to rights of action against financial service professionals.

FAIR Canada believes that obligations arising out of the relationship between clients and advisors should be built around a duty to act in the best interests of clients. FAIR Canada suggests that the best interest of the client or fiduciary standard be tailored to the different types of investment services provided by intermediaries to investors. Regulators need to set out the expectations under such a standard. The Investor Advisory Panel similarly believes that the imposition of a fiduciary duty, on its own, is not sufficient and that the Commission should also specify the types of behavior that would run contrary to the standard by issuing a companion policy or other guidance.

We hope to see a draft rule or policy document for comment from the OSC prior to the end of 2011.
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Sun Jun 12, 2011 6:27 pm

from ken kivenko www.canadianfundwatch.com, great stuff

IFIC speaks out on Fiduciary duty

.... 7. Will the introduction of a statutory fiduciary duty address any concerns regarding possible conflicts of interest?
Not really. If a conflict of interest exists as a result of compensation, it will continue to exist even if there is a statutory fiduciary duty. A financial advisor still could make the same recommendations to clients as long as the financial advisor’s compensation is fully disclosed to the client and the client agrees to proceed. In many ways, existing securities regulation is more strict since it includes numerous outright prohibitions regarding compensation in order to eliminate various opportunities for conflict of interest. Existing securities regulation also includes requirements relating to the disclosure of, and proper handling of, conflicts of interest.

Investors can also choose an advisor who provides a fee-based account.A “fee-based account” is one
where the client is charged an annual fee by their dealer, rather than commissions for each transaction they request. The fee is calculated as a percentage of the value of the account. Source: IFIC, FAQ :Fiduciary Duty And Financial Advisors (DRAFT) , Dec. , 2010

Any comments? [ note that IFIC implies that fund dealer Reps are Advisors [ The UK FSA, England's financial services regulator has passed new rules prohibiting financial advisers from receiving commissions from companies for recommending their products to clients, starting at the end of 2012. Customers will be told up-front what fees they are paying for investment advice. The change means advisers cannot collect fees from mutual fund companies when they recommend their products, representing a major shift for the fund industry.“What we’ve seen over the years is consistently bad advice over which products to be purchased, driven particularly by the fact that commissions exist,” - Peter Smith, head of the investments policy department at Britain’s Financial Services Authority]

UK getting better, Canada going backwards : The UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) has made improved complaint handling is one of central features of its new, more intrusive approach to regulation. On June 3rd , the FSA announced new complaints handling rules as part of a package of measures designed to drive up standards within the investment industry. Among the changes, the FSA confirmed that the limit on awards made by the Financial Ombudsman Service will increase from £100,000 to £150,000, effective January 2012. The FSA 's new limit is necessary in order to prevent a decline in consumer protection. Additionally, the new rules include the planned abolition of ‘two-stage’ complaints handling; a move opposed by the industry, but supported by consumer advocates, which is intended to make sure firms resolve complaints fairly, faster and do not dismiss them the first time. The rules will also require firms to identify a senior individual responsible for complaint handling; and, provide guidance to help firms understand the processes they might need to meet FSA requirements on root cause analysis, and guidance requiring firms to take account of ombudsman decisions and previous customer complaints e.g. organizational learning .

This is an industry with confusing products and an appalling record for mis-selling. It feels designed to generate problems for its customers. To require consumers to endure a drawn out and unresponsive complaints process is bad for dealers and bad for investors. Companies deny themselves crucial insight into what they are getting wrong and consumers need herculean powers of resilience and determination to get a problem sorted out. Good complaints handling contributes to customer loyalty and should provide the opportunity for firms tocorrect problems in product design or sales before issues become widespread. Recently , the FSA announced a fine for Bank of Scotland of £3.5 million for failures related to complaints handling of its retail investment products. Last year, Royal Bank of Scotland and Natwest were fined £2.8 million for multiple failings in the way they handled customers’ complaints. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp11_10.pdf In Canada , 5 investment firms want to dismember OBSI and pick a dispute resolver that suits them better!
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Wed Jun 08, 2011 12:52 pm

Is it the role of the IFIC to define regulatory standards and common law edicts such as fiduciary responsibility? What worries me more than the propaganda piece itself (George Orwell would have been tempted to place it as Appendix A in Animal Farm) is the very fact that such a document may be (it is currently a draft) communicated with impunity and without regulatory oversight. After all, this is the IFIC defining standards governing financial relationships.

Also note that this is really an opinion piece, and, given the public profile and vested interests (a conflict which is not disclosed in this document) of the organization, should be clearly marked as such (ethics) : there are no references to any case law (legal precedent) or any other authority that would support their arguments where these subtly veer from what one could rationally consider the “consensus” view. On the one hand, when discussing the standards that many would like to see implemented, there is an incredible vagueness, yet on the other hand, a pointed degree of illogical certainty when discussing the “Maginot” like characteristics of current regulation of the transaction.

“Even with a statutory fiduciary duty, financial advisors would remain entitled to be paid for what they sell, as long as it is disclosed to the client and the client agrees to proceed.“

Really (re above)! I think the actual fiduciary standard is several leagues removed from this embarrassing attempt at codification.

The government/Canadian people really need to decide whether ethics, integrity, accountability, transparency, independence and objectivity are factors and characteristics worthy of reinforcing in the Canadian retail financial services market place, because from my point of view you are penalised if you even attempt to be seen to be acting in the best interests of the individual investor.

I think the attack on OBSI is a defining moment: a barometer of an underlying and confident ascendance of a long standing moral decay in the financial services industry. We will see, but this moment, I feel, represents a move back to the last redoubt on the battlefield.

Andrew Teasdale
(advocate comment......I have to agree with Andrew, and add that financial advice is far removed from sale of financial products, and it is the incestuous need of the industry to co-mingle those to near opposites that are holding them from doing the honest thing. They (industry) just cannot let go of the cash cow that deception provides them) See Bait and Switch article at http://www.examiner.com/crime-in-calgary/larry-elford
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Sun Jun 05, 2011 6:12 pm

From the Investment Funds Institute of Canada: IFIC

1. What is a “fiduciary duty”?

In general terms, a “fiduciary duty” is a concept used by Canadian courts to impose a duty of loyalty on a person who has been entrusted to look after the best interests of someone else. It usually arises in circumstances where one person is vulnerable to the other because of the personal nature of the relationship, or because of the broad scope of authority given to the other.

Some types of relationships always include a fiduciary duty. Lawyers have a fiduciary duty to their clients because of the personal nature of the relationship. Directors have a fiduciary duty to the companies they serve because of the scope of authority they have over the company.

With other relationships, a fiduciary duty does not automatically exist, but can arise in specific circumstances. For example, a fiduciary duty may arise when one person places so much trust, confidence and authority in another as to become vulnerable to that other person, and that other person proceeds with an awareness of such trust and confidence.

2. Are financial advisors in Canada already subject to a fiduciary duty?

Generally, no, but in some situations, yes. Pursuant to Canadian common law, whether or not a financial advisor would be found to be a fiduciary to his or her client would depend on the particular facts. The existence of a fiduciary duty in a given situation would depend upon the reasonable expectations of the parties based on such factors as vulnerability, trust, reliance, discretion, confidence, complexity of subject matter and community or industry standards.

The sort of advisor-advisee relationship that would likely be found not to be fiduciary in nature would be one where the client simply placed orders with a discount broker who then carried out the requested transaction. On the other hand, an advisor-advisee relationship that would likely be found to be fiduciary in nature would be one where an elderly, unsophisticated client placed his or her retirement savings in the hands of an investment advisor to invest as the advisor deemed necessary to achieve certain investment objectives for the client (e.g., to provide income through retirement).

Financial advisors are already subject to extensive regulation by Canadian securities regulators. These regulations impose many of the same requirements that apply to situations where a fiduciary duty exists.

3. What is a person required to do under a fiduciary duty?

It varies, based on the circumstances. A person who has a fiduciary duty toward someone else as well as authority to make decisions on that other person’s behalf must place that other person’s interests ahead of their own when exercising that authority. This is the case with directors of corporations. In some contexts, this means that the person with the fiduciary duty cannot personally benefit from the relationship except to the extent that the other person has provided informed consent. There are other variations of the duty based on the risks that the courts are trying to address. Canadian courts have held that the fiduciary duty is different in important respects from the ordinary duty of care, and that, while the fiduciary obligation carries with it a duty of skill and competence, the special elements of trust, loyalty and confidentiality that underlie a fiduciary relationship also give rise to a corresponding duty of loyalty.

4. What would a financial advisor be required to do under a fiduciary duty?

It’s not clear. The obligations of a fiduciary duty vary depending on the circumstances and how the Canadian courts define it. One expectation is that a fiduciary duty would require that the financial advisor disclose to his or her client the amount of compensation that the financial advisor is going to receive as a result of the client’s investments, and obtain the client’s consent before proceeding. The existing regulation of financial advisors already requires that this information be disclosed at the time that the client opens their account. There are other occasions during the relationship when the financial advisor discloses his or her compensation to the client before the client decides to proceed with an investment.

5. Why are some people proposing that a fiduciary duty should be imposed on financial advisors?

There are mainly two concerns expressed by the people who are proposing a fiduciary duty for financial advisors.

The first concern is that some financial advisors may be doing a sub-standard job for their clients due to insufficient knowledge or skills.

The second concern is that there is a perception that financial advisors will recommend to their clients that they purchase the product that will best compensate the financial advisor, rather than the product that is most appropriate for the client.

6. Will the introduction of a statutory fiduciary duty address any concerns over knowledge or skills?

No. Financial advisors already are subject to regulatory and other legal requirements to use care, skill and diligence when providing advice to their clients. Introducing a statutory fiduciary duty would add a requirement with respect to loyalty, not skill and knowledge. The way to deal with any person who has inadequate knowledge or skills is to train and educate them better. Think about the issue of unskilled car drivers. We already have rules of the road that prohibit bad driving. Adding a new rule that “everyone must put the interests of other drivers ahead of their own” won’t improve unskilled drivers.

7. Will the introduction of a statutory fiduciary duty address any concerns regarding possible conflicts of interest?

Not really. If a conflict of interest exists as a result of compensation, it will continue to exist even if there is a statutory fiduciary duty. A financial advisor still could make the same recommendations to clients as long as the financial advisor’s compensation is fully disclosed to the client and the client agrees to proceed. In many ways, existing securities regulation is more strict since it includes numerous outright prohibitions regarding compensation in order to eliminate various opportunities for conflict of interest. Existing securities regulation also includes requirements relating to the disclosure of, and proper handling of, conflicts of interest.

Investors can also choose an advisor who provides a fee-based account.

A “fee-based account” is one where the client is charged an annual fee by their dealer, rather than commissions for each transaction they request. The fee is calculated as a percentage of the value of the account.



8. Should Canada restrict or prohibit embedded fees, similar to what is apparently being done in the U.K. and Australia, and what the U.S. is considering?

To be clear, “embedded fees” usually refers to up-front commissions and ongoing trailer commissions that the mutual fund’s manager pays to the financial advisor and later recoups over time out of the management fees paid by the mutual fund. In Canada, embedded fees are not hidden: they are disclosed in the mutual fund’s prospectus and by the financial advisor to his or her client.

Embedded fees are handy tools for investors. When the manager, rather than the investor, pays the up-front commission to the financial advisor, it enables 100% of the investor’s money to be invested in the mutual fund, rather than first deducting a commission from the investor’s money. When the manager pays the annual trailer commission to the financial advisor, it ensures that the investor’s advisor is compensated annually for ongoing service in circumstances where the investor may not be able to do so through a fee-based account where the investor pays their financial advisor directly.



9. What is the current state in Canada with respect to statutory fiduciary duties for financial advisors?

Canadian common law already addresses in what situations a fiduciary duty will appropriately be found to exist between a financial advisor and his or her client. In addition, financial advisors already are subject to extensive regulation by our securities commissions and by the SROs, a fundamental goal of which is to protect investors. Also, every financial advisor must work through a dealer company that also is subject to further extensive regulation. On top of that are further regulations that govern the way products are sold and operated. Every financial advisor and his or her dealer also is under the supervision of at least two regulators – the securities commission in their jurisdiction and an industry-specific regulator: either the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada or the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada. In most cases, members of the public and media are not aware of the scope and extent of these regulations. The impact of these regulations begins long before an investor ever becomes a client of the financial advisor, and continues at several levels throughout the relationship between the client and his or her financial advisor. These regulations include the following:
A requirement to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with clients
A requirement to observe high standards of ethics and conduct in the transaction of business with clients
Proper disclosure and handling of conflicts of interest
Prohibited sales practices
Supervision of activity in client accounts
Background checks (such as police, credit, employment, education and proficiency course completion)
Industry-specific education requirements
Compensation disclosure
Insurance and bonding

Every dealer is responsible for maintaining systems to monitor compliance with all of these regulatory requirements.

10. If introduction of a statutory fiduciary duty would not add much protection for clients, then why not institute it?

The main reason is that it would perpetuate a myth that it would dramatically improve the regulation of financial advisors. Financial advisors already are subject to specific rules and regulations that clearly address the main issues that arise in the relationship between a financial adviser and his or her client. These include existing requirements to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with clients and to observe high standards of ethics and conduct in the transaction of business with clients (2.11 of the MFDA Rules; 29.1 of the IIROC Rules). The introduction of a statutory fiduciary duty would not help to clarify the scope of an advisor’s duties from situation to situation.

Another reason is that a fiduciary duty is not as comprehensive a solution as many think. Even with a statutory fiduciary duty, financial advisors would remain entitled to be paid for what they sell, as long as it is disclosed to the client and the client agrees to proceed. A statutory fiduciary duty does not mean that clients always will buy the product for which the advisor is paid the least amount.

Last, investors need to remain focused on what is the best investment for them, rather than rejecting good investment recommendations simply because of how much their advisors would be paid.

We also would emphasize the securities regulators and mutual fund industry are in the process of rolling out the new point-of-sale regime that is intended to provide investors with more simplified disclosure of the types of information that investors find most helpful, including past performance and dealer compensation. More than ever before, investors will have immediate access to information which will help them ensure they are buying the right investment for their circumstances, and can balance it against the amount they know their dealer is being paid to complete the sale for them.

We also encourage both investors and members of the media to become more familiar with the scope and extent of existing regulation in Canada that protects investors throughout their investment cycle.
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Tue May 17, 2011 8:48 am

NO FIDUCIARY STANDARD NEEDED IN CANADA
David Di Paolo, Kara Beitel / May 12, 2011
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In the wake of numerous instances of financial fraud in North America, there has been increased focus on the duties and obligations owed by investment professionals to their clients. In the U.S. and elsewhere, regulators are proposing changes that would impose a fiduciary standard on those entrusted with managing investor funds.

In Canada, however, regulators have been reluctant to move to a fiduciary standard, in part because some of the new standards being proposed in other countries have been in place in Canada for some time — and in part because they do not believe imposing a fiduciary standard is necessary.

That said, while a fiduciary standard applicable to all registered individuals is not on the table in Canada, the OSC, IIROC and the MFDA are moving ahead with regulatory reforms that will change advisors’ relationships with their clients, bringing them closer to a fiduciary standard.

The fiduciary

The legal concept of a fiduciary is exemplified by agent-principal and trustee-beneficiary relationships. The agent or trustee has absolute obligation to act for the sole benefit of the principal or beneficiary. A high standard is imposed on the fiduciary because he often has discretion over the interests of the beneficiary; thus, the beneficiary is reliant upon the fiduciary.

Part of the impetus to move to a fiduciary standard in the U.S. was existing legislation that applied a fiduciary standard to financial advisors but not broker-dealers. Because financial advisors and broker-dealers can both provide personalized investment advice or recommendations about securities to retail investors, different standards for each were confusing and could lead to regulatory arbitrage.

The fiduciary standard in the United States is comprised of:


A duty of loyalty, which prohibits advisors from putting their interests first by requiring conflicts of interest be avoided or disclosed
A duty of care, requiring advisors to determine that they are not basing recommendations on materially inaccurate or incomplete information, and to seek best execution of the clients’ securities transactions.
Over the years, Canadian courts have considered relationships outside of the agent-principal and trustee-beneficiary categories and developed a principled approach to identifying situations in which a fiduciary duty is owed. Having considered the relationship between financial professionals and clients, the courts have clearly stated the relationship is not presumptively fiduciary.

A financial professional owes clients a duty of care. However, a fiduciary relationship, and all the attending obligations, may or may not exist, depending on the circumstances of the specific relationship. The Ontario Court (General Division) provided useful guidance on fiduciary duties in the context of the broker-client relationship (Varcoe v. Sterling, 1992). This description has been cited and approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in describing the principles of fiduciaries in the context of independent professional advisory relationships.

In addition to civil standards, there have been regulatory requirements for a number of years — at least in Ontario — that a registered individual deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with his or her clients. Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) such as IIROC and the MFDA have included similar requirements in their rules.

IIROC Rule 29.1 requires that investment professionals observe high standards of ethics and conduct in the transaction of their business; not engage in any business conduct or practice which is unbecoming or detrimental to the public interest; and be of such character and business repute as is consistent with the standards of the rule. The MFDA has the same requirements, but also states explicitly that investment professionals under its jurisdiction must deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with their clients.

The duties imposed on investment professionals by the civil courts, the OSC and SROs provide important protections for investors. Canadian securities regulatory agencies have proposed strengthening and enhancing regulations to further protect investors.

In September 2009, amendments to National Instrument 31-103 came into effect that contain provisions relating to “know your client” and suitability obligations, as well as conflict of interest management, identification and disclosure. Moreover, IIROC and the MFDA have proposed, and in the case of the MFDA passed, amendments to their rules pursuant to the Client Relationship Model (CRM) project. Neither the amendments to NI 31-103 nor the CRM proposals impose a fiduciary duty on IIROC and MFDA members, but they do codify and in some cases add to the obligations these investment professionals owe to their clients.

A fiduciary standard in Canada?

The existing duties and obligations imposed on investment professionals, together with the rules developed through the CRM project, provide investors with significant safeguards in their financial dealings with registered investment professionals. They are similar to the protections that would be afforded under the uniform fiduciary standard being proposed in the United States.

In many instances, the advice of investment professionals, while no doubt valued, is not relied upon or even followed by the client. Many individuals conduct their own research and analysis and take an active role in determining which investments to hold in their portfolio. In cases where a client is made aware of and is knowledgeable of the risks of a particular holding or strategy, investment professionals, who are not acting in the capacity of a true fiduciary, should not be held to the higher standard applicable to fiduciaries.

In civil actions, the imposition of a fiduciary standard may deprive the investment professional of certain defences, including that the client is at least partially responsible for her own losses, or that the losses are attributable to market events rather than negligence.

Moreover, the damages that flow from a finding of breach of fiduciary duty can be higher than those flowing from a finding of negligence, in some cases significantly so. A blanket imposition of a fiduciary standard would ignore the realities of many advisor-client relationships. In this regard, Canadian regulators have taken the correct approach to enhancing investor protection.

David Di Paolo and Kara Beitel are partners at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP (BLG) specializing in securities litigation.
| Take the poll | U.S. previews new financial rules |

Filed by David Di Paolo, Kara Beitel, editor@Advisor.ca
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Fri May 13, 2011 2:07 pm

http://tv.investmentexecutive.com/video ... with-notes


Expert's Podium
Tell us what an adviser really does
S. Kelly Rodgers
Published Thursday, Apr. 22, 2010 11:00AM EDT
Last updated Sunday, Apr. 25, 2010 8:18AM EDT
S. Kelly Rodgers is president of Rodgers Investment Consulting

This article by Janet McFarland on the potential for tougher rules for financial advisers raises some interesting questions. While I strongly support tougher enforcement and higher standards within the investment industry, I wonder just how it might work.

In Britain, the practice of an adviser receiving commissions for the sale of products from the company offering products will be banned in 2012. In Canada there is much talk of applying a ‘fiduciary standard of care’ to advisers. Which is better? Which has some chance of working?

Before we can answer that question, we must first examine what we mean by a ‘fiduciary standard of care’. I am not a lawyer, so my explanation may be criticized by those trained in the law but it is a plain English definition that I have been told by lawyers is fair.

A Fiduciary must put the interests of those to whom they owe a duty ahead of their own and a Fiduciary must avoid conflicts of interest.

The current standard for an adviser is that they must recommend only products that are suitable. A Fiduciary would be required to recommend the most suitable products.

More on financial advisers:
Let's get the ethics clear here
What if advisers couldn't accept commissions from mutual fund companies?
Video: How your adviser is paid
Video: Is your financial adviser just pushing funds?
Take a closer look at your adviser, and be skeptical
Provide true value or advisers are 'toast'
Let’s examine this distinction. Hypothetical investor, we will call him Jim, goes to see his Manulife adviser. Manulife has recently introduced a group of funds managed by Mawer Investment Management, a very highly regarded firm. Jim has seen the many press reports on the quality of the Mawer funds and management team and thinks the Manulife Mawer Balanced fund would be an appropriate.

Current Standard of Care

Manulife adviser: "Jim, this is an excellent fund from an excellent company and I agree this is appropriate for your objectives. While our version of the fund is new, the original fund has been given a five-star rating by Morningstar. You can purchase this fund on a front end load basis or a rear end load basis. If the former, I will receive a higher trailer fee and you will pay an upfront commission, which we will negotiate. If the later, I will receive a lower trailer fee but the company will pay me a commission and you will be locked in for a number of years. Which option makes the most sense to you?"

Fiduciary Standard of Care

Manulife adviser: "Jim, this is an excellent fund from an excellent company and I agree this is appropriate for your objectives. While our version of the fund is new, the original fund has been given a five-star rating by Morningstar. There are a number of ways you can make this purchase. As a Fiduciary, I have to avoid conflicts and act in your best interest so I will explain all of the options.

"You can purchase our version of the fund and the MER will be 2.45 per cent annually. I will be paid a service fee, called a trailer. I will also get a commission at the time of purchase, which we will negotiate or you can chose the deferred sales charge method.

"Now, since I am a Fiduciary and must act in your best interest, I should also tell you that you can purchase the original version of this fund directly from Mawer. You call their 1-800 number or purchase through a discount broker for a small commission. The MER when you purchase this way is 1.03 per cent annually, less than half of the MER for our version. They will not pay me a service fee out of the MER, so you and I will have to negotiate what is a fair payment for my time and advice.

"Saving 1.40 per cent annually in MER expenses will allow you money to grow much faster, and over the next 20 years, this will make a very significant difference in your wealth. We can figure out how much of a difference by going to the Ontario Securities Commission website and using their MER calculator.

"So Jim, would you like to purchase the Mawer Balanced fund with a 2.45 per cent MER or the one with the 1.03 per cent MER? For every $100,000 you invest in this fund, the difference in the annual expenses will be $1030 every year that you own it. "

There are many other firms and products where this type of conversation could take place and readers should not think the issue only applies to Manulife. Investors Group and Industrial Alliance also have products that can be purchased much more cheaply directly from the managers. And for readers who think this is only a problem for insurance company products, many of the investment firms participating in managed account programs offered by investment dealers can be accessed directly by clients for much lower fees.

As you can see from this hypothetical conversation, I believe it is highly unlikely that advisers will adhere to a fiduciary standard of care as long as the industry maintains its current structure.

My concern would be that the current fiduciary standard would be weakened and lessened in its interpretation. Instead of ‘you must put the client’s interest ahead of your own’ it would become ‘you must make recommendations that are the best for the client, within the context of the products you have to sell’ (even if those products are not the best) which is the current standard.

Given the current structure of the investment industry and the overwhelming number of advisers who are little more than distributors (salespeople) I cannot see how a true fiduciary standard is practical.

Simpler Approaches

Perhaps some simpler approaches that would not require a complete industry restructuring and could be implemented immediately would be useful.

We could start with reversing the recent change in categories of registration. Canada has eliminated, with the stroke of a pen, salespeople in the investment industry. They changed the name of the registration category from Salesperson to Dealing Representative. Investment and Mutual Fund Dealers have also assisted. Never did you see a business card that said Salesperson. They have titles like, Financial Planner, Investment adviser, Account Executive and Vice president, if they are a really good salesperson.

Most of us understand what salesperson means. How many people outside of the investment industry know that the rest of these titles mean the person is a commissioned salesperson.

The second thing that could be done is to require IIROC, the regulator for the Investment Dealers, to actually publish on their website the registration of all advisers. Currently this must come from the Provincial Securities Commissions and the OSC site is excellent for this, but it does not contain much detail on IIROC registrants, such as whether they are registered for options or when they joined the industry.

The third thing would be to disclose the components of the pricing. What is the client paying for the investment management and what are they paying for the sales commissions and service fees? An investor cannot assess the value of the advice received if they do not know the cost of that advice.

The fourth thing would be for each of the provincial securities commissions to engage more actively in the regulation and oversight of the investment dealers and mutual fund dealers and rely less on ‘self regulation’.

And finally we could begin to move to a system like Britain is moving to by banning commissions. If advisers want to be treated like investment professionals, then they should begin to act like investment professionals, not sales professionals. If they want to be treated like sales professionals, then they should acknowledge that they are sales people and not try to hide it.
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Fri Apr 08, 2011 8:23 pm

ConductPracticesHndbk.jpg


Another Industry course training manual from the Canadian Securities institute that the industry fails to follow
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ConductHnbk.jpg
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Fri Apr 08, 2011 8:20 pm

93 Uniform Fiduciary Standards_020.jpg
once again the US is a few years ahead of understanding and admitting what relationship truly exists.
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Fri Apr 08, 2011 8:13 pm

58 industry codes_059.jpg
58 industry codes_059.jpg
funny, that your canadian investment dealers, some claiming the highest degrees of ethics and transparency in their codes of conduct cannot even be upfront with customers and tell them in advance what duty of care they should expect......instead they rely on the industry "bait" with trusted professional advice, and then the industry "switch" by delivery of a correspondence trained commission salesperson
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59 Playing the market_060.jpg
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Fri Apr 08, 2011 8:06 pm

54 Courts Approach_055.jpg
54 Courts Approach_055.jpg
a bit more common sense from the Fair Dealing Model


there is an awful lot of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation involved in selling someone on the concept of trusted advice, and then delivery of commission sales. Those are two different services, and fraud is the only way to sell one and deliver the other.
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57 advisory relationship_058.jpg
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Fri Apr 08, 2011 8:04 pm

53 Law and Fair Deraling_054.jpg
the industry killed this FAIR DEALING MODEL. I felt that it was to .........um.......fair.
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Re: fiduciary: lets play it both ways

Postby admin » Fri Apr 08, 2011 8:00 pm

51 RBC Investment Philosophy_052.jpg
seems to me this firm is promising a fiduciary duty........or certainly leading customers to believe such a relationship exists:
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